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I. MONTREAL AND WARSAW CONVENTIONS
A. MONTREAL CONVENTION
{rflHE MONTREAL CONVENTION is not an amendment
.Ito the Warsaw Convention. Rather, the Montreal Con-
vention is an entirely new treaty that unifies and replaces the
system of liability that derives from the Warsaw Convention."1
The Convention "applies to all international carriage of persons,
baggage or cargo performed by aircraft for reward. It applies
equally to gratuitous carriage by aircraft performed by an air
transport undertaking. '2 The Convention was ratified by the
United States on November 4, 2003.'
1. Parties Liable
In McCarthy v. American Airlines, Inc., the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Florida addressed the application of
"actual carrier" and "contracting carrier" found in Chapter V
(Articles 39 through 48) of the Montreal Convention.4 Defend-
ants had moved for summary judgment on plaintiffs claims for
injuries sustained whilst on board an American Eagle flight
bound for Miami from the Bahamas.5 Specifically, the defend-
Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 360 F.3d 366, 371 n.4 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoted in
Gardner and McSharry, "The Montreal Convention: The scram jet of aviation
law," Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP (Apr. 2006)).
2 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air, art. 1, May 28, 1999, S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-45, 2242 U.N.T.S. 350 (en-
tered into force Nov. 4, 2003) [hereinafter "Montreal Convention"].
3 Ehrlich, 360 F.3d at 372.
4 No. 07-61016, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49389, at *6-7 (S.D. Fla. June 27, 2008).
5 Id. at *1-2.
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ants argued that Executive Airlines had conceded that it was the
owner and operator of the aircraft, rendering it the carrier.6
Since under Article 17 of the Montreal Convention only the
"carrier" is liable for damages arising from bodily injuries
caused by an accident occurring on the aircraft, the court
turned to the task of determining which defendant was the "car-
rier" for liability purposes.7
The court, taking into account that neither the Montreal Con-
vention nor the Warsaw Convention defined the term "carrier,"
looked to cases that had been decided under the Warsaw Con-
vention to provide the definition.8 Under those cases, there
could only be one carrier: the operator of the aircraft.9 But the
court noted that the Montreal Convention had included a whole
chapter (Chapter V) addressing the distinction and relationship
between a contracting carrier and an actual carrier, which was
notably missing from the Warsaw Convention. ° As such, the
court determined that it could not rely on the old Warsaw Con-
vention case law definition of carrier to determine the parties
liable under the Montreal Convention.11 What appeared to
have troubled the court the most was Article 40 of the Montreal
Convention, which states that "where there is a contracting car-
rier and an actual carrier, both carriers 'shall, except as other-
wise provided in [Chapter V], be subject to the rules of this
Convention, the former for the whole of the carriage contem-
plated in the contract, the latter solely for the carriage which it
performs.'" 12 The court concluded that the added language in
Chapter V of the Montreal Convention meant that more than
one carrier could be responsible for plaintiffs injuries. 13 Conse-
quently, the court denied American Eagle's motion for sum-
mary judgment on the grounds that the record showed that the
flight was billed as an American Eagle flight, indicative of a
code-sharing relationship with Executive Airlines. 4 Accord-
ingly, American Eagle was at the very least a "contracting car-
6 Id. at *3.
7 Id. at *4.
8 Id.
9 Id. at *4.
10 Id. at *6-7.
11 Id. at *9.
12 Id. at *7.
13 Id. at *9.
14 Id. at *9-10.
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rier," and therefore could be found liable under the Montreal
Convention for plaintiff's injuries. 15
But to be liable for plaintiffs injuries, Article 17 of the Mon-
treal Convention requires that the plaintiff prove that the injury
was caused by an "accident.' 1 6 Plaintiffs injury in this instance
resulted from his falling down the stairway as he was trying to
check his luggage plane-side.17 Allegedly, a flight attendant
touched him and caused him to lose his balance.' 8 Defendants
moved for summary judgment, arguing that such incident did
not constitute an accident. 19 Since the Montreal Convention
does not supply a definition of "accident," the court applied the
U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Air France v. Saks,20 that "liabil-
ity exists under the Warsaw Convention... 'only if a passenger's
injury is caused by an unexpected or unusual event or happen-
ing that is external to the passenger,"' 2' and denied defendants'
motion for summary judgment.22 In reaching its decision, the
court compared plaintiffs case to the facts of Gezzi v. British Air-
ways, in which the Ninth Circuit held that a passenger who
slipped on water on the stairs as he was embarking was an "acci-
dent" under the Warsaw Convention.23 The court stated that
the plaintiffs fall from the stairs caused by external factors
would, if true, constitute an "accident" under the Montreal
Convention.24
15 Id. at *10.
16 Id. at *13.
17 Id. at *1-2.
18 Id.
19 Id. at *14.
20 Id. at *13 (citing Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985)).
21 Id. at *13. "[The parties] are in agreement that the term "accident" means
the same thing under the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Convention."
Id. at *13 n.5.
22 Id. at *16-17.
23 Id. at *14-15 (citing Gezzi v. British Airways, 991 F.2d 603, 605 (9th Cir.
1993). "The presence of water on stairs that are used to provide access to an
airplane . . . qualifies as an 'accident' because it was both 'unexpected or unu-
sual' and 'external to' [the plaintiff]." Gezzi, 991 F.2d at 605 (quoting Air France,
470 U.S. at 405).
24 Id. at *15. The court also rejected the defendant's argument that "an
event's relationship to the operation of the aircraft is relevant to determining
whether or not it is an 'accident,"' stating that "the Court concludes that this
argument is not binding law in [the Eleventh Circuit], finds it unpersuasive, and
declines to apply it here." Id. at *15, *16. The court also denied summary judg-
ment based upon preemption under the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), stating
that
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Plaintiff also brought negligence claims against the defend-
ants based on their failure to maintain the stairway in a safe con-
dition, their alleged knowledge that the stairway was dangerous,
and their failure to correct the problem. The court noted that,
under the Montreal Convention, the Defendants have the bur-
den to prove that they were not negligent, 25 which imposes an
even greater burden at summary judgment than in typical
cases.26 As to the defendants' failure to maintain the stairway in
a safe condition, the plaintiff offered evidence into the record
that created an issue of material fact and, therefore, summary
judgment was denied.27 Defendants also moved for summary
judgment on the basis that the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) regulations preempted plaintiffs design defect claim be-
cause the design of the aircraft complied with FAA standards.28
The court noted that the Eleventh Circuit had addressed a simi-
lar argument in Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Lake Aircraft
and concluded that "where federal aircraft design regulations
did not require, but did permit, the use of a safer design on
aircraft, the regulations did not preempt a claim for negligence
[e]very claim in the Complaint references the Montreal Conven-
tion specifically, and there is nothing in the Complaint that would
suggest that any of these claims arises under state common law...
although the Defendants may be correct that the ADA preempts
certain state law negligence claims, the Court concludes that this
argument has no relevance here, where no state law claims have
been asserted.
Id. at *18-19. Finally, the court denied summary judgment based upon preemp-
tion. First, the court rejected defendants' preemption defense because the
claims were not limited to negligent design, noting that the plaintiff did not
merely allege negligent design but also a "known dangerous condition on the
stairway and that the Defendants failed to correct it." Id. at *11. The court also
rejected defendants' preemption defenses relating to the claims that the stairway
was negligently designed because the Eleventh Circuit, in Public Health Trust of
Dade County v. Lake Aircraft, 992 F.2d 291 (11 th Cir. 1993), had "concluded that
where federal aircraft design regulations did not require, but did permit, the use
of a safer design on aircraft, the regulations did not preempt a claim for negli-
gence for failure to use the safer design." Id. at *11-12.
25 Id. at *12.
26 Article 21 of the Montreal Convention sets up a two tier damage scheme for
passenger death and injury claims. (1) The carrier is strictly liable up to 100,000
Special Drawing Rights and (2) the carrier is not liable for damages beyond that
amount if it shows that (a) the damages were not due to its negligence or wrong-
ful acts or (b) the damages were solely due to the negligence or other wrongful
act or omission of a third party. Montreal Convention art. 21, supra note 2.
27 McCarthy, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49389, at *12.
28 Id. at *11.
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for failure to use the safer design. '"29 The court, therefore, de-
nied the defendants' motion for summary judgment.3 0
In a last-ditch effort, the defendants moved for summary judg-
ment claiming that the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) pre-
empted plaintiff's negligence claims; but, the court noted that
the plaintiff had not brought a state claim. 31 Rather, Plaintiff
had pled two counts: (1) for strict liability under the Montreal
Convention up to the liability limit and (2) for damages above
the liability limit caused by Defendants' negligence. 2 Since no
state court causes of action had been pled, summary judgment
was denied.3
In American Home Assurance Co. v. Kuehne & Nagel (AG & Co.)
KG, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York addressed whether the two-year period of limitation con-
tained in Article 35 of the Montreal Convention is applicable to
agents of the "actual carrier," even if the agent is not itself an air
carrier. 4 After K&N, the contracting carrier, was sued for dam-
ages to cargo by the plaintiff, it filed a third-party complaint
against Polar, the actual carrier, and Alliance, Polar's ground-
handling carrier, seeking indemnification and contribution. 5
The third-party complaint was filed well over two years after the
cargo was damaged. 6
K&N conceded that its claims against Polar, the actual carrier,
were time-barred, but contended that Alliance, as agent for Po-
lar, was not an "air carrier" and therefore the two-year bar did
not apply. 7 The court recognized that the case involved an in-
ternational shipment of cargo from Germany to the U.S. and
that both parties were signatories to the Montreal Convention. 8
The court noted, however, that while the Montreal Convention
controlled, there was little case law interpreting the two-year
time limitation found in Article 35; therefore, since Article
29(1) of the Warsaw Convention contained the same time limi-
tation provision, the court looked to cases that had been de-
29 Id. at *11-12.
30 Id. at *12.
31 Id. at *17-18.
32 Id. at *18.
33 Id. at *19.
34 544 F. Supp. 2d 261, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
35 Id. at 262-63.
36 Id. at 262.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 263.
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cided under the former treaty.39 The majority rule was that the
two-year time limitation was a condition precedent to filing suit,
a complete bar to filing, even in cases involving third-party com-
plaints for contribution and indemnification.4" The court relied
heavily on Split End, Ltd. v. Dimerco Express (Phils) Inc.,4" a case
directly on-point.4 2 In Split End, the District Court for the South-
ern District of New York held that "the two-year limit barred
contribution and indemnification claims by a contract carrier
against (a) the actual air carrier and (b) the air carrier's ground
handling agent at the destination airport."43
Further, the court noted that Article 30(1) of the Montreal
Convention "specifically extends the conditions and limits of lia-
bility to the agents and servants of the air carrier" that are acting
within the scope of their employment. 44 The court disagreed
with K&N's argument that Article 30(1) did not extend to Alli-
ance because it was not an "air carrier," as the Convention
makes no mention that this is a requirement and as it would be
a significant departure from the case law decided under the
Warsaw Convention.4 5 The court found that Alliance was Po-
lar's agent and was acting within the scope of its employment.46
As such, K&N's claims against Alliance were time-barred under
the Montreal Convention, and the court granted Alliance's mo-
tion for summary judgment.47
In Best v. BWIA West Indies Airways Ltd., the court held that the
Montreal Convention, where applicable, completely preempts
state causes of action and is the exclusive remedy for a passen-
ger.48 Plaintiff had booked a flight with BWIA West Indies Air-
ways Ltd. (BWIA) .41 She had full knowledge that "her itinerary
placed her on a BWIA flight from JFK to Port of Spain, and then
on a flight with another carrier, LIAT, from Port of Spain to
Grenada."5 ° Her flight with BWIA occurred "without incident,"
but when she boarded her LIAT flight, a customs officer forcibly
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 No. 85 Civ. 1506 (RLC), 1986 WL 2199 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 1986).
42 American Home, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 263.
43 Id. (quoting Split End, 1986 WL 2199, at *6).
44 Id. at 265.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 266.
47 Id.
48 581 F. Supp. 2d 359, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
49 Id. at 360-61.
50 Id. at 361.
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removed her from her seat, drug her off the aircraft and onto
the tarmac.5' Plaintiff brought claims against both LIAT and
BWIA for injuries sustained. 52 The court found that the rela-
tionship between BWIA and LIAT was that of successive carriers
and that, under Article 36 of the Montreal Convention, "liability
is limited to the carrier 'which performed the carriage during
which the accident ... occurred."'53 The court noted the only
exception to this rule is when, by express agreement, "the first
carrier has assumed liability for the whole journey. '54 Since the
plaintiff did not allege that BWIA expressly assumed liability for
the LIAT portion of the transportation, the court found that the
plaintiff could only take action against LIAT.55
The court was not persuaded by the plaintiff's argument that
Article 39 of the Montreal Convention should apply. 56 Articles
39 through 41 of the Montreal Convention extended liability to
contracting carriers for harms incurred during the carriage of
actual carriers but excluded successive carriers from that defini-
tion.57 The court noted that the relationships usually covered by
Article 39 include "code share operations and operations where
one carrier offers service using an aircraft and crew leased from
another carrier. "58 The court explained, "[c]ode sharing is an
arrangement in which an airline sells a ticket under its name
and code number, but the flight itself is operated by another
airline. '59 Because "[p]laintiffs [did] not allege that the LIAT
flight was a code share flight with BWIA or that BWIA leased the
LIAT plane and crew to offer service," and since the plaintiffs'
itinerary receipt indicated only the LIAT code for the Spain-Gre-
nada flight, the court concluded that the relationship between
BWIA and LIAT was that of successive carriers.60 Therefore, Ar-
ticle 39 had no application to the case.61 Plaintiff also at-
tempted to make an implied agency argument, but the court
held that "Article 36 forecloses the possibility of any implied
51 Id. at 361.
52 Id. at 360.
53 Id. at 363.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 363, 364.
56 Id. at 363.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 364.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 364.
61 Id. at 365.
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agency relationship. '62 The court granted BWIA's motion for
summary judgment.63
2. Exclusive Cause of Action
In Vigilant Insurance Co. v. World Courier, Inc., the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York considered a case in
which the plaintiff brought two counts against the defendant
under the Warsaw Convention and two counts against the defen-
dant under state law for damages to a shipment of pharmaceuti-
cals from England to Pennsylvania.64 World Courier had
"subcontracted part of the door-to-door services to U.S. Airways
and Priority Express. '"65 An investigation revealed that when the
shipment arrived in Pennsylvania, US Airways had stored the
shipment in its warehouse for two days at a temperature differ-
ent than that provided for by the air waybill.66 Further, "the
shipment had been soaked during transit," and the shipment
was destroyed.67
Defendant moved for summary judgment on the basis that
the Montreal Convention governs and that plaintiffs remedy is
limited to Article 22 of the Convention.68 The court agreed with
the defendant that any analysis should be done under the Mon-
treal Convention, not the Warsaw Convention, since the ship-
ment at issue took place after the Convention had been
ratified.69 As such, the court, sua sponte, amended plaintiffs
Count I for "damages to cargo" so that the claim fell under the
Montreal Convention instead of the Warsaw Convention.7 ° The
court found that the Montreal Convention applied to plaintiffs
claims because the cargo was being transported by aircraft be-
tween member States.7' The court found that the time during
which the pharmaceuticals were being stored in US Airways'
warehouse fell within the period of "carriage by air" contem-
plated by Article 18 of the Convention, rendering the defendant
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 No. 07 CV 194(CM), 2008 WL 2332343, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2008).
65 Id. at *2.
66 Id. at *3.
67 Id.
68 Id. at *1, *7.
69 Id. at *4 (stating that the Montreal Convention was ratified by the United
States on Nov. 4, 2003, replacing "the Warsaw Convention as the treaty governing
international carrier liability").
70 Id. at *5.
71 Id. at *4-5.
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liable for the damages sustained.7 2 Plaintiffs recovery, however,
fell under the Convention's limits of liability, found in Article
22, which provides for a sum of "Seventeen Special Drawing
Rights" per kilogram, i.e., $298.08. 73 The court recognized that
the plaintiff could have avoided the liability limitations of Article
22 of the Montreal Convention by making a "special declaration
of interest in delivery at destination and [paying] a supplemen-
tary sum," but had failed to do so." Plaintiff argued that the
Montreal Convention did not apply to a "specialized accessorial
service contract such as controlled ambient care."75 The court
disagreed, stating that Article 1 of the Convention "specifies that
the convention applies to 'all international carriage of...
cargo.' 76
Plaintiffs second cause of action alleged that the Montreal
Convention did not apply because the defendant did not issue
its air waybill in a timely manner and did not meet the require-
ments of the Warsaw Convention.77 Again, the court noted that
the plaintiff incorrectly referenced the Warsaw Convention and
assessed whether it should permit plaintiff to amend its com-
plaint.78 It determined that an amendment would be futile,
since Article 9 of the Montreal Convention states that "[n]on-
compliance with the provisions of Articles 4 to 8 shall not affect
the existence or the validity of the contract of carriage which
shall, nonetheless, be subject to the rules of this Convention in-
cluding those relating to limitation of liability.
79
72 Id. at *4; Montreal Convention, supra note 2, at art. 18 (providing that "[t]he
carrier is liable for damage sustained in the event of the destruction or loss of, or
damage to, cargo upon condition only that the event which caused the damage
so sustained took place during the carriage by ai' (emphasis added)).
73 Vigilant Ins. Co., 2008 WL 2332343, at *6; see also Montreal Convention, supra
note 2, at art. 22 (providing that "[i]n the carriage of cargo, the liability of the
carrier in the case of destruction, loss, damage or delay is limited to a sum of 17
Special Drawing Rights per kilogram [ ].").
74 Vigilant Ins. Co., 2008 WL 2332343, at *6. In such a case, Article 22 provides
that the "carrier will be liable to pay a sum not exceeding the declared sum,
unless it proves that the sum is greater than the consignor's actual interest in
delivery at destination." Montreal Convention, supra note 2, at art. 22.
75 Vigilant Ins. Co., 2008 WL 2332343, at *4.
76 Id.
77 Id. at *5.
78 Id.
79 Id. Article 4 provides that "[i] n respect of the carriage of cargo, an air way-
bill shall be delivered." Montreal Convention, supra note 2, at art. 4. Article 5
deals with what must be included in the air waybill. Id. at art. 5. Article 6 pro-
vides that a "consignor may be required ... to meet the formalities of customs,
police and similar public authorities to deliver a document indicating the nature
163
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Defendant's motion for summary judgment requesting that
damages be limited under the Montreal Convention was
granted."0 The court dismissed plaintiffs remaining state law
based causes of action as preempted by the Montreal
Convention."1
In Matz v. Northwest Airlines, the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan considered a case in which the
plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to add a claim under
Michigan's consumer protection statute.82 Defendants opposed
the motion on the ground that any state law claim is preempted
by the Montreal Convention and any amendment would be
futile.83
The case arose from a flight from Detroit to Kilimanjaro Inter-
national Airport through Amsterdam in February 2007.84 The
claims alleged that plaintiffs' luggage was lost, that they "were
denied a complimentary toiletry kit," that the return flight to
Amsterdam was delayed thirty hours, that they "were not given
accurate announcements" regarding the flight, and that the ho-
tel at which the airline put them up was fifty miles away from the
airport and was infested with vermin and that, as a result, they
were bitten by insects.8 5 The complaint was originally filed in
Michigan state court alleging breach of the contract of car-
riage.86 Defendants removed the case to federal court.87 Plain-
tiffs then sought leave to amend the complaint to assert a claim
under the Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA). 8
In determining whether a claim under the Michigan statute
would be preempted, the court considered the three types of air
carrier liability that the Montreal Convention covers: "Article 17
covers personal injury and damage to baggage; Article 18 covers
of the cargo. [But] creates for the carrier no duty, obligation or liability resulting
there from." Id. at art. 6. Article 7 deals with the description of the air waybill.
Article 8 deals with the documents for multiple packages. Id. at art. 7, cf infra
Part I.b.2 (discussing Warner Lambert Co. v. LEP Profit Int'l, Inc., 517 F.3d 679
(3d Cir. 2008).
80 Vigilant Ins. Co., 2008 WL 2332343, at *7.
81 Id. at *5.
82 No. 07-13447. 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38614, at *2 (E.D. Mich. May 13, 2008).
83 Id.
84 Id. at *1.
85 Id. at *1-2.
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damage to cargo; and Article 19 covers damage due to delay."8 9
The court found that since plaintiffs alleged damage stemmed
from delay in their flight and delivery of their baggage, the
Montreal Convention was her "exclusive remedy."9 If plaintiff
could not recover under the Convention, she could not resort to
state law.9' Thus, it would be futile to allow plaintiff to amend
the complaint.9 2 The court denied plaintiff's motion for leave
to amend her complaint.9
Unlike the preceding decisions in Vigilant Insurance Co. and
Matz, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia in Serrano v. American Airlines, Inc., remanded the case to
state court on the grounds that the Montreal Convention did
not "completely preempt Plaintiffs state law claims," and as
such, the federal courts did not have exclusive jurisdiction.94
The court contrasted ordinary preemption, for which there is
no exclusive federal jurisdiction, from complete preemption, in
which the federal courts do have exclusive jurisdiction because
"even if pleaded in terms of state law, [the cause of action] is in
reality based on federal law."95 Specifically, the court found that
when a state action substantively falls within the Montreal Con-
vention, the Convention only serves to limit plaintiffs liability
and remedies. 96
In reaching its decision, the court looked to Article 29 of the
Montreal Convention, entitled "Basis of Claims."97 That Article
provides that
[i] n the carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo, any action
for damages, however founded, whether under this Convention or in
contract or in tort or otherwise, can only be brought subject to the
conditions and such limits of liability as are set out in this Con-
vention without prejudice to the question as to who are the per-
89 Id. at *6. The fact that this case involves international carriage of person
and baggage by aircraft brought the case within the scope of the Montreal Con-
vention. Article 19 then determines whether the carrier is liable for damage oc-
casioned by the delay, and Article 22 sets forth the limits of such liability.
Montreal Convention, supra note 2, at art. 19, 22.




94 No. CV 08-2256 AHM (FFMX), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40466, at *1, *8 (C.D.
Cal. May 15, 2008).
95 Id. at *4-5 (quoting Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8
(2003)).
96 Id. at *7.
97 Id. (citing Montreal Convention, supra note 2, at art. 2a).
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sons who have right to bring suit and what are their respective
rights.9
8
The court focused on the words in Article 29-"whether under
this Convention or in contract or in tort or otherwise"-and in-
terpreted them to mean that "not all damages actions involving
carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo arise under the
Convention."99
The court then attempted to harmonize two cases decided by
the U.S. Supreme Court-El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng 00 and
Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co.' 0"-by stating that in those cases
the Court did not address the issue of complete preemption to
determine if removal was proper.10 2 Rather, the Supreme
Court, in refusing to allow the plaintiffs to raise state claims not
authorized by the Warsaw Convention, was ensuring that there
is "uniformity in the law of international air travel."' °3 The
Court reasoned that the "goal of uniform rules of liability, iden-
tified in Tseng and Zicherman, is not necessarily undermined by
claims for relief based on local law, so long as those local laws
are in accordance with the rules of the Convention."'104 The
Court stated that, since Tseng, there has been "a split in the cases
dealing with the doctrine of complete preemption in the con-
text of the Warsaw Convention. '" °5 The Court chose to follow
the holding in Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., in which the Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Texas "held that the War-
saw Convention does not completely preempt state law claims"
and "noted that the uniformity required by the Warsaw Conven-
tion may be achieved through 'exclusive remedies and liabili-
ties,' not through a requirement that all such cases be brought
in federal court."'0 6 Thus, the goal of uniformity "relates to the
remedy available, not to the forum adjudicating the remedy."'0 7
98 Id. (citing Montreal Convention, supra note 2, at art. 2a) (emphasis added).
- Id. at *7-8.
100 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
101 516 U.S. 217 (1996).
102 Serrano, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40466, at *11-12.
103 Id. at *11 (citing Tseng, 525 U.S. at 169-70).
104 Id. at *11.
105 Id. at *13.
106 Id. at *16-7 (quoting Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 2d 661, 671
(N.D. Tex. 2001)).
107 Id. at *17 (citing Rogers, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 671). For a detailed and persua-
sive critical analysis of this case, see article entitled "The Impact of the Montreal
Convention on the Aviation Legal Community-From the Perspective of One of
the Drafters," authored by George N. Tompkins, Jr., presented at Embry Riddle
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Similarly, in Narkiewicz-Laine v. Scandinavian Airlines Systems,
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held
that the Montreal Convention was not a complete preemption
of state causes of action. l08 Rather, a claimant can bring an ac-
tion under the Convention or under contract or tof-t state law. 0 9
In following Seventh Circuit precedent, under the Warsaw Con-
vention, the court held that the Montreal Convention merely
serves as an affirmative defense.1 0 Because the plaintiffs com-
plaint only alleged state causes of action, the court found that
the Convention did not provide a basis for federal-question sub-
ject matter jurisdiction and granted plaintiffs motion to
remand."'
In Schoeffler-Miller v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of Illinois considered a case in
which the plaintiff contended that she suffered personal injuries
while disembarking an international flight in Amsterdam. 1 2
Plaintiffs complaint was comprised of only common law negli-
gence claims. 1 3 Defendant removed the case, and the plaintiff
filed a motion to remand." 4 Unlike the decision of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Narkiewicz-
Laine, the court held that the Montreal Convention is "field pre-
emptive" with respect to a plaintiffs cause of action." 5 It found
that, although the plaintiffs complaint was drafted as to only
reference a state cause of action, her claim was in fact inherently
federal.' 6 The court found that plaintiffs negligence claim was
within the scope of the Montreal Convention, was completely
preempted by the terms of that treaty, and therefore arose
Aeronautical University's 20th Anniversary Aviation Law and Insurance Sympo-
sium held in Orlando, Florida, Jan. 7-9, 2009.
108 587 F. Supp. 2d 888, 889 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
109 Id.
110 Id. (citing Sompo Japan Ins., Inc. v. Nippon Cargo Airlines Co., 522 F.3d
776, 785 (7th Cir. 2008)); see also infra Part I.B.1.
1" Narkiewicz-Lane, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 890.
112 No. 08-CV-4012, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93851, at *3 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 17,
2008).
13 Id. at *5.
114 Id. at *3
115 Id. at *5-6 (following the Eighth Circuit authority in Husmann v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 169 F.3d 1151, 1153 (8th Cir. 1999), but failing to identify
the more recent Seventh Circuit authority in Sompo Japan Ins., Inc. v. Nippon
Cargo Airlines Co., 522 F.3d 776, 781 (7th Cir. 2008), which was followed by the
court in Narkiewicz-Laine, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 890); see also supra notes 104-08 and
accompanying text.
116 Schoeffler-Miller, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93851, at *6-8.
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under federal law.' 17 As such, the plaintiffs motion to remand
was denied.'
3. Accident
In Ugaz v. American Airlines, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Florida addressed whether the defendant
airline and the defendant airport were liable for injuries sus-
tained by a passenger who fell while ascending an inoperable
escalator within an airport sterile zone that led from the car-
rier'sjetway to the airport's immigration checkpoint. 9 Plaintiff
originally filed her claim in state court, but defendants removed
the action. 2 The court found that it had federal subject matter
jurisdiction, as the Montreal Convention was the proper law gov-
erning the plaintiffs claims. 2 ' As such, the court determined
that all of the plaintiffs state claims were preempted by the Con-
vention. 122 The court stated that "[f] or all air transportation to
which the Montreal Convention applies, if an action for dam-
ages falls within one [of] the treaty's damage provisions, then
the treaty provides the sole cause of action under which a claim-
ant may seek redress for his injuries. 123
Since this case involved bodily injury, the court looked to Arti-
cle 17 of the Montreal Convention. 24 Under that Article, "a car-
rier is liable only for damage sustained when the 'accident that
caused the death or injury took place on board the aircraft or in
the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembark-
ing.' ,,125 The court noted that the Eleventh Circuit has already
"deduced three requirements that must be established to satisfy
Article 17: '(1) an accident must have occurred; (2) injury or
death must have occurred; and (3) the preceding two condi-
tions must have occurred while embarking or disembarking or
during the flight itself.' ",126 Since the second element was not at
117 Id. at *9.
118 Id. at *11.
119 576 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1358-59 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
120 Id. at 1358.
121 Id. at 1358, 1360; see also Montreal Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1 (pro-
viding that the Convention "applies to all international carriage of persons, bag-
gage or cargo performed by aircraft for reward ...
122 Ugaz, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1360.
123 Id. at 1360.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 1361 (quoting Marotte v. American Airlines, Inc., 296 F.3d 1255, 1259
(l1th Cir. 2002)).
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issue in this case, the court focused its evaluation on the remain-
ing elements. 127
Element 1: The court assessed whether the injury in question
qualified as an accident under Article 17.128 The U.S. Supreme
Court has pronounced the controlling interpretation of the
term "accident" as "an unexpected or unusual event or happening
that is external to the passenger.'1 29 The court further stated that
"the 'accident' requirement.., involves an inquiry into the na-
ture of the event which caused the injury rather than the care
taken by the airline to avert the injury."' 3 ° The court found that,
on the merits, there was "no evidence whatsoever that an inoper-
able escalator is an 'unusual or unexpected event' sufficient to
constitute an 'accident. '""13 1 The court stated that "[i]n this
case, there were no foreign substances on the stairs, jostling pas-
sengers, or other direct outside influence that caused the Plain-
tiffs fall apart from her own decision to climb an acknowledged
inoperable escalator.' '1 32
Element 3: To determine if plaintiff's injury occurred while she
was disembarking, the court adopted the Second Circuit's
widely used three-prong test that was set forth in Day v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc.133 As stated by the court, "[t] he Day test con-
siders: (a) what the plaintiffs were doing (activity), (b) at whose
direction (control), and (c) the location where the injury oc-
curred.'1 34 The court further stated that "[t]o date, the Su-
preme Court has not defined the words 'embarking' or
'disembarking' in the context of Article 1 7, 135 and so the court
applied the Day test to find that the plaintiff was disembarking
the flight at the time of the incident.3 6 Specifically, the court
found that
Plaintiff was injured while ascending an inoperable escalator on
her journey from the plane to customs and immigration. Under
the second prong, she was doing so under the direction of Amer-
ican Airlines, who maintained the gate area and sterile zone and
127 Id.
128 Id. at 1364.
129 Id. (quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405, (1985)).
130 Id. (quoting Air France, 470 U.S. at 407).
131 Id. at 1366.
132 Id.




136 Id. at 1363.
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directed passengers to customs and immigration. Her location
(third prong) was on one of the lower steps of the nonmoving
escalator located in the sterile zone. She had only recently ex-
ited the jetway (or jet bridge). There was a close temporal and
spatial relationship with the flight itself. The Plaintiff here was
not a free agent roaming at will throughout the terminal, which
several other courts have found to be a persuasive factor.1 3 7
Although the injury occurred while the plaintiff was dis-
embarking, she could not show that the injury was caused by an
accident compensable under the Montreal Convention; conse-
quently, the court granted summary judgment to American Air-
lines.1 18 As to the airport itself, the court granted summary
judgment, reasoning that an airport is not a carrier and there-
fore it cannot be held liable where an action falls within the
Convention's purview.
In Rafailov v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Florida considered a case in which
the plaintiff sought damages pursuant to the Montreal Conven-
tion for injuries she sustained when she slipped on a piece of
plastic that was on the aircraft's floor.13 Under Article 17 of the
Montreal Convention, a carrier is only strictly liable for bodily
137 Id. at 1363 (internal citations omitted).
138 Id. at 1375. The Court discussed the liability limitations of the Convention
and also the defenses available to an air carrier under the Convention. The
Court noted that the Montreal Convention imposed a different legal standard of
recovery than that set forth in the Warsaw Convention. Id. It stated that if an
accident had been found, Defendant would have been "essentially held liable for
proven damages up to '100,000 SDRs,"' approximately $135,000.00. Id. at
1366-67 (citing Montreal Convention, Art. 21, subparagraph (1)). The court
further stated that "if damages arising under Article 17 are not 'due to the negli-
gence or other wrongful act or omission of the carrier or its servants or agents,'
then [the carrier] would not be liable over that amount." Id. at 1367 (citing
Montreal Convention, supra note 2, at art. 21). While this statement omits the
burden of proof imposed on the carrier to show that it was not at fault, the court
then quoted Article 20-pertaining to exoneration-which accurately states that
the carrier has the burden of proof to show "that the damage was caused or
contributed to by the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of the person
claiming compensation." Id. (quoting Montreal Convention, supra note 2, at art.
20). Importantly, "if the negligence of the injured party actually caused the in-
jury in question," the carrier is wholly or partially exonerated under both Articles
20 and 21, including subparagraph (1). Id. The Court found that the plaintiffs
negligence caused the injury, so even if there were an accident, the plaintiff
would not be entitled to recover under the Convention, nor would she have been
able to recover under state law even if the Montreal Convention did not apply.
Id.
139 No. 06 CV 13318 (GBD), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38724, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y.
May 13, 2008).
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injuries due to an accident that occurred while on board the air-
craft.14 ° The court noted that not every "incident or occurrence
during a flight is an accident within the meaning of Article 17,
even if the incident gives rise to an injury."14' The court
adopted the U.S. Supreme Court's definition of accident, mean-
ing liability only arises if the "passenger's injury is caused by an
unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the pas-
senger.' 4 2 The court found that "[t] he presence of a discarded
blanket bag on the floor [was not] unexpected or unusual, and
that it "would seem customary to encounter a certain amount of
refuse on an airplane floor.' 14 3 The court found that the inci-
dent that caused the injury was not an "accident" under Article
17 of the Montreal Convention and, therefore, the plaintiff
could not recover from the defendant. 144 Consequently, the
court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.145
In Mansoor v. Air France KLM Airlines, the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of California considered a case in
which the plaintiff brought a claim under the Montreal Conven-
tion for personal injuries she sustained when she fell as a result
of a hazard in the walkway onboard the aircraft. 46 The defen-
dant moved to dismiss her complaint for failure to state a claim,
contending that plaintiffs injuries did not qualify as an Article
17 "accident." '147 Defendant relied on a number of cases to sup-
port its position, including Rafailov in which the court held that
slipping on an empty blanket plastic bag was not an accident
because the presence of such a bag on the floor during flight is
not unexpected or unusual,14 and Sethy v. Malev Hungarian Air-
lines, in which the court held that tripping over luggage left in
an aisle during boarding was not an accident because "there is
nothing unexpected or unusual about the presence of a bag in
or [near] the aisle during the boarding process."' 4 9 The court
140 Id. at *4-6.
141 Id. at *6 (quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 403 (1985)).
142 Id. (quoting Air France, 470 U.S. at 405).
143 Id. at *8.
144 Id. at *9-10.
145 Id.
146 No. 08 CV 0828JM(RBB), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86916, at *1-2 (S.D. Cal.
Oct. 27, 2008).
147 Id.
148 Id. at *5-6 (citing No. 06 CV 13318 (GBD), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38724, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2008).
149 Id. at *6 (quoting No. 98 CV 8722 (AGS), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12606
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2000).
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distinguished those cases, stating that the present motion arises
in the context of a motion under Rule 12(b) (6) and not Rule
56.150 The court found "that the hazard encountered by Plain-
tiff, whatever the precise nature of that hazard may be, is ade-
quately alleged to be the cause of Plaintiff's injury.
Furthermore, that hazard, as alleged, appears [to be] external
to Plaintiff.'1 51 The court "note[d] that an accident under Arti-
cle 17 of the Montreal Convention is a flexible term that encom-
passes an 'assessment of all the circumstances surrounding a
passenger's injuries."' 152 The court concluded that "[o]n a Rule
12(b)(6) motion the court is simply not able to assess the circum-
stances of Plaintiffs injuries," it denied the defendant's motion
to dismiss, and did not render a decision on the merits of plain-
tiffs Montreal Convention Article 17 claim. 153
4. Venue
In Transvalue, Inc. v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, the defendant
filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Florida lacked subject matter jurisdic-
tion pursuant to the Montreal Convention. 154 Plaintiff had en-
tered into a contract with defendant "to transport 1,487
kilograms of gold bullion from Mexico to Zurich[,] Switzerland
.... ,155 Plaintiff contended that two of the fifty-four boxes of
gold bullion were missing when it arrived in Switzerland. 156 The
parties agreed that Article 33 of the Montreal Convention gov-
erned jurisdiction in this case. 157
Article 33(1) of the Montreal Convention provides that 'an ac-
tion for damages under the Convention must be brought, at the
plaintiffs option, in the territory of one of the States Party to the
Convention before a court of: (1) the carrier's domicile, (2) the
carrier's principal place of business, (3) the carrier's place of
150 Id. at *7.
151 Id. at *7-8. The district court stated that for the legal standard for "acci-
dent," the "Supreme Court held 'that liability under Article 17 of the [Montreal]
Convention arises only if a passenger's injury is caused by an unexpected or unu-
sual event or happening that is external to the passenger."' Id. at *4-5 (citing Air
France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985)).
152 Id. at *8 (quoting Air France, 470 U.S. at 397).
153 Id.
154 539 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
155 Id. at 1367-68.
156 Id. at 1368.
157 Id.
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business through which the contract was made, or (4) the place
of destination.' 158
Plaintiff conceded that the defendant's domicile and principal
place of business was the Netherlands. 159 It conceded that "the
place of destination of the lost cargo was Switzerland," but it
argued that the United States was the "place of business through
which the contract of transportation was made."' 6 ° It based this
argument on the fact that defendant's employee in New York
communicated with plaintiff in Florida about the air waybill; al-
beit, the plaintiff conceded that the air waybill was actually is-
sued in Mexico. 6 ' The court found plaintiffs argument
unpersuasive and, following other circuit decisions, found that
the place where the air waybill was issued was the place where
the contract of carriage was made. 162 The court granted defen-
dant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.'63
In Aikpitanhi v. Iberia Airlines of Spain, the plaintiffs brought
claims on behalf of their son, who died aboard defendant's
flight while he was being deported back to Nigeria from
Spain.'64
Plaintiffs assert Spanish law enforcement agents facilitated Dece-
dent's death by giving him tranquilizers, handcuffing him, and
chaining him to his seat, having gagged him with industrial
strength rubber before .. .placing him on the flight. Plaintiffs
further contend the law enforcement officials took turns beating
him. Plaintiffs claim that Defendant acted in concert with the
law enforcement officials in covering the Decedent with a sack so
other passengers on the flight could not see the manner in which
he was restrained.1 65
Their son suffocated shortly after takeoff.166 Defendant filed a
motion to dismiss contending that the court lacked subject mat-
ter jurisdiction under Article 33 of the Montreal Convention. 67




162 Id. at 1369 (distinguishing Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 360 F.2d 804
(2d Cir. 1996)).
163 Id.
164 553 F. Supp. 2d 872, 873 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
165 Id. (emphasis added).
166 Id.
167 Id. at 873-74. The court noted that both Spain and Nigeria are signatories
to the Montreal Convention and that since the case involved the carriage by air of
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The court noted that, under Article 33,
there are five different forums in which Plaintiffs could bring
their claims against Defendant for the death of [their son]: (1) in
the territory of the State Parties; (2) the domicile or principal
place of business of Defendant; (3) the place where the ticket
was bought; (4) the place of destination; or (5) the principal and
permanent place of residence of the Decedent.68
Plaintiffs argued that the fact that the defendant was incorpo-
rated in Florida was evidence that it was domiciled in the United
States.'69 Since the Warsaw Convention's jurisdictional require-
ments were substantively similar, the court looked to Warsaw
Convention case law to aid in defining what constituted "domi-
cile."170 In In re Air Disaster Near Cove Neck, New York, the district
court, in examining "domicile" as used in the Warsaw Conven-
tion, found that the drafters of the Warsaw Convention did not
intend to authorize jurisdiction in two or more places simultane-
ously under the domicile provision. 7 The court found that to
adopt the plaintiffs' argument-that the defendant's place of in-
corporation was its domicile-however, "would render the other
jurisdiction provisions in Article 33 redundant."' 7 2 "Incorpora-
tion as it is understood in American jurisdiction jurisprudence is
inapplicable in this context."'' 73 Plaintiff did not meet its bur-
den of showing jurisdiction and the motion to dismiss was
granted.'74
decedent that originated from Spain to Nigeria, the Convention controlled. Id.
at 874.
168 Id. at 875.
169 Id.
170 Id. The Montreal Convention added a fifth possible forum that did not
exist under the Warsaw Convention: the principal and permanent residence of
the passenger. This addition, however, did not substantively alter the previous
provisions. Id.
171 Id. at 876 (citing In reAir Disaster Near Cove Neck, N.Y., 774 F. Supp. 718,
720 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
172 Id. at 877.
173 Id. at 878.
174 Id. The court further rejected plaintiffs' arguments that jurisdiction was
not limited to the venues prescribed in the Montreal Convention because the
Montreal Convention was not the exclusive remedy for the plaintiffs' injury. The
district court relied upon the Supreme Court's opinion in El Al Israel Airlines,
Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 161 (1999), stating that "Plaintiffs' cited
case law predates the Tseng opinion, and merely illustrates the split of authority
regarding the exclusivity issue before the Supreme Court resolved the question."
Id.
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Plaintiffs attempted to argue that the treaty was not the exclu-
sive cause of action for their injury. 175 But "the Supreme Court
has stated that the Montreal Convention ... affords the exclu-
sive remedy for any personal injury suffered on board an inter-
national flight," as in this case.1 76
5. Limitation of Actions
In Chubb Insurance Co. of Europe, S.A. v. Menlo Worldwide For-
warding, Inc., third-party defendant Qantas Airways Limited filed
a motion to dismiss United Parcel Service's (UPS) third-party
complaint on the grounds that it was time-barred by Article 35
of the Montreal Convention.1 77 UPS had issued an air waybill
for shipment and carriage of an aircraft engine from New Zea-
land to Los Angeles.178 UPS had then contracted with Qantas to
carry the aircraft engine but, when Qantas delivered the engine,
it was damaged. 179 Chubb Insurance sued UPS on November
14, 2006, and UPS ultimately settled. 18 0 On September 18, 2007,
UPS filed its complaint, seeking indemnity and contribution
from Qantas. 8' Qantas conceded, that the Montreal Conven-
tion governed the case and claimed that UPS was time-barred by
the Convention's two-year limitation period as set forth in Arti-
cle 35. 182 UPS contended that Article 35 did not apply to third-
party indemnity and contribution claims.18 3 It stated instead
that Article 45 of the Convention governs and subjects claims for
indemnity or contribution to the limitations of the forum state
in which the case is being heard.184 But the court held that
175 Id. The court further addressed plaintiffs' contention that the Convention
does not provide a remedy for intentional torts and therefore jurisdiction in the
federal courts in the United States was proper. Id. The court rejected that argu-
ment as well, noting that plaintiffs may have a remedy under the Montreal Con-
vention for intentional torts, but that the exclusive remedy was under the
Convention, and the venue therefore was determined by the Convention. Id.
176 Id.





182 Id. at 15,980.
183 Id.
184 Id. Article 45 states that
[i]n relation to the carriage performed by the actual carrier, an
action for damages may be brought, at the option of the plaintiff,
against the carrier or the contracting carrier, or against both to-
gether or separately. If the action is brought against only one of
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Chapter V of the Montreal Convention-in which Article 45 is
contained-does not establish a separate body of rules for in-
demnification or contribution actions independent of the re-
quirements of the remainder of the Montreal Convention." 5
Article 45 does not create an exception to Article 35, but gives a
plaintiff the option of suing the actual contracting carrier, and
gives the carrier sued the right to require the other carrier "to
be joined in the proceedings, the procedure and effects being gov-
erned by the law of the court seised of the case."186 The plain language
of Article 45 refers to the procedure and effects of joinder.'87
The limitation period for bringing an action "has nothing to do
with whether or how a party is joined."'18 The two-year limita-
tion period is absolute and there are no exceptions. 9 To hold
otherwise would destroy uniformity and predictability in cases
involving transport by a carrier other than the contracting car-
rier.190 Since UPS did not file its complaint until a year after the
limitation period expired, the court found that UPS's claims
were barred.1 9'
6. Damages
In In re Air Crash at Lexington, Kentucky, August 27, 2006, plain-
tiffs opposed Comair's motion to amend its third-party com-
plaint to add a claim for apportionment under Article 37 of the
Montreal Convention. 92 The issue before the court "boil[ed]
down to the legal interpretation of Article 37 and whether Arti-
cle 17 precludes an instruction that could limit the victim's re-
covery of all damages from the carrier. '
Article 37 provides that the air carrier has a right of "re-
course" against other responsible parties.1 94 Plaintiffs contend
those carriers, that carrier shall have the right to require the other
carrier to be joined in the proceedings, the procedure and effects
being governed by the law of the court seised of the case.
Montreal Convention, supra note 2, at art. 45.
185 Chubb Ins., 32 Avi. Cases (CCH) at 15,980.
186 Id. (quoting Montreal Convention, supra note 2, at art. 45).




191 Id. at 15,982.
192 No. 5:06-CV-316-KSF, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11255, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 12,
2008).
193 Id. at *7.
194 Montreal Convention, supra note 2, at art. 37. Article 37, entitled Right of
Recourse Against Third Parties, provides that "[n] othing in this Convention shall
176
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that the defendant's right to recourse is limited to contribution
or indemnity claims against third parties. 195 Since "[t]he exis-
tence and extent of the right of recourse is determined by appli-
cable local law,"'1 96 the Kentucky federal court looked to its own
state law to determine what form of recourse the defendant
had. 19 7 The court noted that Kentucky no longer recognizes
joint and several liability, and that contribution is not a viable
claim. 98 In light of this, the court reasoned that "[i]f apportion-
ment is not available as a possible means of recourse under the
Convention, as Plaintiff contends, the effect would be to require
Comair to pay more damages than the amount for which it is
responsible."' 99 The court appears to have been further per-
suaded by the fact that an apportionment instruction could be
given with regard to the victim's own negligence under Article
20 of the Montreal Convention.2° ° The court held that "Article
37 of the Montreal Convention does not preclude an apportion-
ment instruction against a party whom reasonable jurors could
determine was at fault. '20 ' The court granted Comair's motion
prejudice the question whether a person liable for damage in accordance with its
provisions has a right of recourse against any other person." Id.
195 In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11255, at *4.
196 See Tompkins, supra note 103, at 25 (citing Sompo Japan Insurance, Inc. v.
Nippon Cargo Airlines Co., 522 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2008)).
197 In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11255 at *8.
198 Id.
199 Id. Plaintiff relied on an Eleventh Circuit case decided under the Warsaw
Convention but, as the Kentucky federal court noted, that case recognized that "a
carrier should not 'pay more damages than the amount for which it is responsi-
ble."' Id. at *7 (citing Cortes v. American Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1305
(11th Cir. 1999)).
200 Id. at *9 (quoting Montreal Convention, supra note 2, at art. 20). It is not
expressly stated whether plaintiffs' claims exceeded the 100,000 SDR limit for
which the carrier is strictly liable, subject only to exoneration for any negligence
of the victim under Article 20. See Montreal Convention, supra note 2, at art. 21.
However, in view of the fact that the claims were for wrongful death and the fact
that the air carrier was defending against such claims, even though there clearly
was no fault on the part of any of the passengers for the accident, it is likely that
the claims did exceed the 100,000 SDR limit. Only as to claims in excess of
100,000 SDR may the carrier defend the claim by showing that it exercised due
care or that the injury was caused by the act of a third person, under Article 21.
Id. Because the carrier would have available the defenses under Article 21 for
claims in excess of the 100,000 SDR limit, which permit the carrier to avoid or
shift responsibility, the application of Kentucky law of apportionment would not
conflict with the application of Article 21 the Convention. See id.
201 Id. at *10.
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to amend its third party complaint to add claims for apportion-
ment under Article 37 of the Convention.20 2
In In re Air Crash at Lexington, Kentucky, the court dismissed
punitive damage claims asserted against one of the aircraft's pi-
lots. 20 3 Plaintiffs had conceded that the Montreal Convention, if
applicable, precluded punitive damage claims against the air
carrier, but argued that the language of Article 30(1), which ex-
tended the same "conditions and limits of liability which the car-
rier itself is entitled to invoke under [the] Convention" to
agents or servants acting within the scope of their authority, was
modified by the language of Article 30(3), which stated that lim-
itations on liability were "not applicable when the servant's or
agent's conduct causing damage was 'done with intent to cause
damage or recklessly and with kn6wledge that damage would
probably result.' "204
The court examined the jurisprudence under the Warsaw
Convention, particularly the decisions rejecting punitive dam-
ages, because to permit such damages would undermine the ba-
sic purposes of the Warsaw Convention of certainty and
uniformity.205 The court concluded that the Montreal Conven-
tion was patterned after the Warsaw Convention, and the sec-
tion by section comparison was intended to show where they
differed from one another.20 6 "While the Montreal Convention
in Article 21 'eliminates all arbitrary limits on air carrier liability
with respect to accident victims,' "207 Article 29 also expressly
prohibits punitive damages, stating that in any such action pur-
suant to the Montreal Convention, "punitive, exemplary or any
other non-compensatory damages are not recoverable. '20 8 The
court recognized that within the Montreal Convention there are
"limits on the liability of carriers or their servants or all condi-
tions for recovery[,]" such as the limit on the amount of dam-
ages for "delay of passengers, baggage or cargo to 4150 Special
Drawing Rights (SDRs)" and for "destruction, loss, damage or
delay of baggage to 1000 [SDRs] ."209 The court held that these
202 Id.
203 No. 5:06-CV-316-KSF, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41337, at *15 (E.D. Ky. May 23,
2008).
204 Id. at *6.
205 Id. at *8-11.
206 Id. at *13.
207 Id. at *12.
208 Id.
209 Id. at *13.
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limitations on the amount of damages contained within the
Convention itself were the subject of Article 30(3), and that
nothing in that article was intended to expand the scope of rem-
edies available under the Montreal Convention to include the
punitive damages expressly prohibited under Article 29.210 The
court held that such a limitation was essential to assuring the
"cardinal purpose of the Warsaw Convention,... is to 'achiev[e]
uniformity of rules governing claims arising from international
air transportation .... Interpreting the Montreal Convention to
allow punitive damage claims against servants would 'undoubt-
edly destroy uniformity' since [n]o other signatory allows
them."211
B. WARSAW CONVENTION
1. Exclusive Cause of Action
In Sompo Japan Insurance, Inc. v. Nippon Cargo Airlines Co., the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered a case in which the
insurer as subrogee to the rights of Hitachi Data Systems Corpo-
ration (HDS), brought an action against Yusen Air and Sea Ser-
vice Company (Yusen), Nippon Cargo Airlines (NCA), and Pace
Air Freight (Pace).212 HDS had contracted with Yusen to trans-
port computer equipment from Japan to Indiana.213 Yusen then
contracted with NCA to transport the cargo by air to Chicago's
airport.214 HDS retained Pace to transport the cargo from
O'Hare to Indiana.215 Some of the cargo was damaged while it
was being transferred from the loading dock to Pace's trucks at
NCA's cargo facility at the Chicago airport.216 The value of the
damage to the cargo was $271,304.217 Plaintiff settled with
Yusen for $8,500 and with Pace for $100,000.218 Plaintiff moved
for summary judgment against NCA, seeking damages under the
Warsaw Convention, as amended.2 1 9 NCA filed a cross-motion
for summary judgment, seeking a setoff for the settlement
210 Id.
211 Id. at *14.






218 Id. at 779.
219 Id.
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amount that plaintiff had received from Yusen and Pace.22 ° The
district court awarded the plaintiff $74,450.84, the maximum
amount permitted by the Warsaw Convention, as amended by
Montreal Protocol No. 4.221 In doing so, the court took the
$271,304 proven damages and the setoff of the $108,500 settle-
ment amount, reducing the value of damage to the cargo to
$167,114.222 The court then awarded the maximum amount
permitted under the Warsaw Convention of $74,450.84.223
NCA appealed the decision claiming that the setoff should
have been against the limited liability amount, not the proven
damages, rendering judgment against NCA to $0.224 Plaintiff
also appealed the district court's decision to deny pre-judgment
interest.225
The Seventh Circuit noted that, under the Warsaw Conven-
tion, NCA is presumptively liable for damages to the goods while
they were in its possession; however, that liability is capped by
the Warsaw Convention, as amended by Montreal Protocol No.
4, which amended the Convention by increasing the damage
cap to cargo to 17 SDRs per kilogram.226
Sompo contended that the Warsaw Convention contained its
own setoff provision under Article 25A. 227 But the appellate
court found that Article 25 "addresses whether an airline may
effectively be held liable for damages above the Convention's
liability cap because of judgments against its agents. . . . [It]
fulfills the purpose of the Convention by precluding suits
against agents that could increase effectively the liability of the
airlines. ' 228 Article 25 does not deal with joint and several liabil-
ity where the "money flows from different sources. 229
The Convention precludes both state causes of action and suits
against agents because of their potential to erode the effective-
ness of the treaty's liability limitations. The airline's relationship







226 Id. at 779-80.
227 Id. at 781.
228 Id. at 782.
229 Id.
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uniformity in this context is, under the scheme of the Conven-
tion, less important. 230
Further, the Convention expressly recognizes a right of recourse
in favor of the carrier against other tortfeasors, thereby refusing
to explicitly preempt state based rights of setoff and
contribution.23'
The court then looked to Illinois state law to determine
NCA's right of setoff.21 2 Under Illinois law, NCA was entitled to
a setoff.233 The Seventh Circuit concluded that the district court
had correctly applied the setoff to the full amount of the dam-
ages and, therefore, "because [the] post-settlement uncompen-
sated damages far exceeded Sompo's liability under the Warsaw
Convention, the award of $74,450.84 was correct. 234
The court also emphasized that the following italicized lan-
guage of Article 24 of the Convention applies to the carriage of
cargo: "any action for damages, however founded, whether under
this Convention or in contract or in tort or otherwise, can only be
brought subject to the conditions and limits of liability set out in
this Convention. ' 23 5 The court interpreted this to mean "that
an action may be brought in contract or in tort" and that the
Convention's limitation of liability provisions merely serve as an
affirmative defense to such state causes of action and that the
limited preemption under the Convention does not preclude
the application of state contribution claims but only precludes
claims "to the extent that those state rules conflict with [the
Convention's] own regulatory structure. "236
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 782-83.
233 Id. at 786-87.
234 Id. at 789.
235 Id. at 785. In doing so, however, the court, having concluded that state law
must govern rights of contribution against a party under the Warsaw Convention,
was faced with deciding whether the liability of a party inder Warsaw was that of
a "joint tortfeasor" under state law. Id. at 786. The court stated that since the
Warsaw Convention created an affirmative defense, the underlying liability of the
party may have been in contract or in tort, thereby satisfying the state law require-
ment that a party must have been a joint tortfeasor in order to obtain contribu-
tion. Id. at 785-86. Hence, the discussion of whether the Warsaw Convention
created an exclusive cause of action was only incidental to the court's analysis of
whether state contribution law would support a contribution claim or not.
236 Id. at 785. The court further noted that two other circuit courts of appeals
in Lloyd v. American Airlines, Inc., 291 F.3d 503, 516-17 (8th Cir. 2002), and
Cortes v. American Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1305 (11th Cir. 1999) had per-
mitted contribution under the Warsaw Convention, and that those cases pro-
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In Raddatz v. Bax Global, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin considered a case in which the
plaintiff brought state based claims for negligence and breach
of contract for the untimely release and delivery of a shipment
of elephant hides from Zimbabwe to Chicago, Illinois.23 v The
defendant removed this case to federal court and filed a motion
to dismiss arguing that the Warsaw Convention preempted
plaintiff's state causes of action.23 " The court, which sits in the
Seventh Circuit, found that the Warsaw Convention did apply,
but questioned how broad the Convention's preemptive
breadth was.2 9 The court followed its Circuit's precedent and
found that Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention does not com-
pletely preempt state-law based causes of action; rather, the
court held that where a state-law based action is alleged, the
Convention only limits the plaintiffs recovery. 240 "The liability
limitation provisions of the Warsaw Convention simply operate
as an affirmative defense. 241' Defendant's motion to dismiss was
denied and the plaintiff was permitted to amend his complaint
to conform to the Warsaw Convention.242 The court deter-
mined that the amendment would relate back to his original fil-
ing, and therefore, he was in compliance with the two-year
statute of limitations imposed by the Warsaw Convention.243
In Campbell v. Air Jamaica, Ltd., the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Florida considered a case in which aJamai-
can resident sued Air Jamaica claiming that his return flight
from Jamaica to Fort Lauderdale was dishonored and sought
damages under the Warsaw Convention.244 The court held that
"there is no cause of action for total non-performance of a con-
tract under the Warsaw Convention. ' 24 Plaintiffs flight was not
delayed, rather, defendant failed to perform under the con-
vided further support for the "conclusion that the Warsaw Convention is
compatible with a state law contribution scheme .... Id. at 786.
237 No. 07-CV-1020, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51661, at *1-2 (E.D. Wis. June 16,
2008).
238 Id. at *2. Presumably because Zimbabwe is not a signatory under the Mon-
treal Convention, the Court applied the Warsaw convention.
239 Id. at *4, *6.
240 Id. at *7-8.
241 Id. at *8.
242 Id. at *10.
243 Id.
244 No. 08-60228-CIV-Huck/O'Sullivan, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50657, at *1
(S.D. Fla. July 2, 2008).
245 Id. at *2.
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tract.24 6 A claim for non-performance cannot be brought under
the Convention.247 Further, the court determined that it did
not have jurisdiction to hear the case because there was no di-
versity between the parties and the amount in controversy did
not exceed $75,000.248 The court granted defendant's motion
to dismiss.249
In Hesamzadeh v. Schenker, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Texas denied plaintiff's motion to re-
mand.250 Defendant had contracted to ship the plaintiff's goods
from Texas to Dubai. 251 Due to an alleged failure to follow ex-
port regulations, the U.S. Government seized the goods and de-
stroyed them.2 5 2 Plaintiff contended that the goods were seized
and destroyed before the operation of international law.25 13 But
the court found the argument unpersuasive, stating that "the
damages Plaintiff seeks are based on alleged losses that resulted
when goods were in possession of the Defendant-shipper and
being shipped in accordance with federal export law and the
Warsaw Convention. ' 254 Thus, even though the complaint only
alleged state law contract and tort claims, the fact that the case
would require interpretation of the Convention presented a fed-
eral question.25 5 Furthermore, the court held that " [c] ases aris-
ing out of international air transportation are governed by the
Warsaw Convention and are within federal court original
jurisdiction. '"256
2. Warsaw Notice Requirements
In Warner Lambert Co. v. LEP Profit International, Inc., the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that the defendants
could not avail themselves of the liability limitations provided
for in the Warsaw Convention because the air waybills governing
246 Id.
247 Id. at *3.
248 Id.
249 Id. at *4.
250 No. H-08-0442, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28589, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2008).
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 Id. at *4.
254 Id. Since the United Arab Emirate is a party to the Montreal Convention, it
is unclear why the court makes reference to the Warsaw Convention as opposed
to the Montreal Convention.
255 Id.
256 Id. (quoting Luna v. Compagnie Panamena de Aviacion, 851 F. Supp. 826,
829 (S.D. Tex. 1994)).
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the shipment had failed to include the shipment's agreed stop-
ping places, as required under Article 8(c) of the Warsaw
Convention.2 57
3. "Carriage by Air"
In Levy v. United Parcel Systems, the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey considered a case in which the plaintiff
brought a cause of action against United Parcel Systems, as suc-
cessor entity of Emery Freight, in state court for breach of con-
tract, claiming that one of his paintings had been lost during
transportation by Emery Freight from France to New York.258
United Parcel Systems removed the action and filed a motion to
dismiss arguing that the plaintiffs claims were barred under the
Warsaw Convention's two-year time limitation.259 The shipment
occurred in October 2000, and plaintiff only filed his claim in
2006.260 The court stated that a party trying to show that the
Warsaw Convention applies must prove
(1) that the goods at issue [were] shipped via international trans-
portation by aircraft; (2) that, at the time the goods were
shipped, the country of destination and the country from which
the goods were shipped were signatories to the Warsaw Conven-
tion; and (3) that the damage to the goods in question occurred
during carriage by air.261
Plaintiff attempted to argue that "the loss occurred after the end
of 'carriage by air.' ,,262 But the court noted that,
When a contract for transportation includes door-to-door trans-
portation under a single air waybill and the goods remain in the
carrier's actual or constructive possession, courts hold that the
presumptive period of carriage by air is extended until the time
of delivery. Thus, the air waybill in this case served to extend the
257 517 F.3d 679, 682-83 (3rd Cir. 2008) (rejecting the district court's conclu-
sion that Article 8 (c) only requires notice of the "international nature of the
shipment"). The court stated that "we find the jurisprudence of the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, which requires the listing of all stopping places
contemplated by the carrier and which represents the 'prevailing' view in this
area [cits. omitted], to be both persuasive and on point." Id. at 682.
258 No. 06-5738 (FSH), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11543, at *1-2 (D.N.J. Feb. 14,
2008).
259 Id. at *1.
260 Id. at *1-2.
261 Id. at *5-6.
262 Id. at *6.
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presumptive liability period of "carriage by air" through delivery
to Plaintiffs premises.263
The court concluded that the Warsaw Convention applied and
that plaintiffs claims were time-barred under the Convention's
two-year limitation for commencing an action.264 Defendant's
motion for summary judgment was granted.2 65
In Universal Imports, Inc. v. Federal Express Corp., the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Middle District of Florida considered a case
in which the plaintiff brought causes of action in state court al-
leging that Federal Express Corporation (FedEx) had delivered
his package to the wrong address.266 The defendant removed
the case, contending that the district court had jurisdiction be-
cause the Warsaw Convention preempts plaintiff's state causes of
action or, in the alternative, federal common law or the ADA
control.26 7
The shipment was sent from India in March 2003 and was de-
livered in Florida in April 2003.268 The plaintiff argued that the
Warsaw Convention was inapplicable because the misdelivery oc-
curred after the package had been processed at the airport and
passed on to FedEx personnel for ground delivery. 269 The dis-
trict court held that the Warsaw Convention only applies to air
transportation. 270 The court cited Victoria Sales Corp. v. Emery Air
Freight, Inc., a Second Circuit case stating that "[t]he plain lan-
guage of Article 18 draws the line at the airport's border.
271
The court further noted that Article 18(3) "excludes from the
263 Id. at *6-7 (citingJaycees Patou, Inc. v. Pier Air Int'l, Ltd., 714 F. Supp. 81
(S.D.N.Y. 1989)).
264 Id. at *7-8.
265 Id. at *8. Again, presumably the court applied the Warsaw Convention be-
cause delivery occurred in 2000 and the Montreal Convention did not become
effective until Nov. 4, 2003.
266 No. 8: 08-CV-00309-T-30TGW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60758 (M.D. Fla. July
30, 2008).
267 Id. at *3-4.
268 Id. at *1-2. Presumably because the shipment occurred in Oct. 2003, the
court applied Warsaw Convention, since the Montreal Convention still had not
come into effect.
269 Id. at *5.
270 Id. at *6. "The carrier [is] liable for damage sustained ... if the occurrence
which caused the damage so sustained took place during the transportation by
air. [Article 18(3)] excludes from the definition of transportation by air 'any
transportation by land, by sea, or by river performed outside an airport." Id.
(citing Montreal Convention, supra note 2, at art. 18(1), 18(3)).
271 Id. (citing Victoria Sales Corp. v. Emery Air Freight, Inc., 917 F.2d 705,707
(2d Cir. 1990).
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definition of transportation by air 'any transportation by land,
by sea, or by river performed outside an airport.' "272 The court
reasoned that if the package was misdelivered, the misdelivery
occurred outside the airport during carriage by land and, there-
fore, the Warsaw Convention did not apply. 273 Accordingly, the
court granted plaintiffs motion to remand the case.274
4. "Accident"
In Doe v. United Airlines, Inc., the plaintiffs father brought
charges against the defendant on behalf of his daughter, a mi-
nor, after his daughter had been sexually assaulted by Samson,
another passenger, during a United Airlines flight from the
United States to Korea.275 The court granted defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff
could not show that she had suffered bodily injury within the
meaning of the Warsaw Convention.276 Since this was an inter-
national flight involving the carriage of persons, the Warsaw
Convention applied to the plaintiffs claims. 277 To recover
under the Convention, the plaintiff had to show that she "suf-
fer[ed] (1) bodily injury in (2) an accident that occurred while
(3) on board, embarking, or disembarking. '' 278  The court
272 Id. It is unclear why the court omitted the remaining language of Article
18(3):
If, however, such a carriage takes place in the performance of a
contract for carriage by air, for the purpose of loading, delivery or
transshipment, any damage is presumed, subject to proof to the
contrary, to have been the result of an event which took place dur-
ing the carriage by air.
Montreal Convention, supra note 2, at art. 18(4); cf Levy v. United Parcel Sys-
tems, No. 06-5738 (FSH), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11543 (D.N.J. Feb. 14, 2008) (in
which the plaintiff could not identify the location of the loss and in which the
court applied the presumption to hold that the loss occurred during the "car-
riage by air" and therefore was subject to the Warsaw Convention).
273 Universal Imps., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60758, at *7.
274 Id. at *9-11. The court also rejected arguments that plaintiffs state law
claims pled in the complaint where in reality federal common law claims, or that
the claims were preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act. Id. The court held
that any federal common law limitations on liability were merely affirmative de-
fenses that did not provide a basis for federal question removal jurisdiction, and
that the ADA did not preempt "'routine' contract claims" or "'run-of-the-mill'
injury claims." Id. at *9 (citing Read-Rite Corp. v. Burlington Air Express, Ltd.,
186 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 1999), and Greer v. Fed. Express, 66 F. Supp. 2d
870, 872 (W.D. Ky. 1999)).
275 160 Cal. App. 1500, 1504 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
276 Id.
277 Id. at 1505.
278 Id. at 1505-06.
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looked to Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, in which the Supreme
Court determined that the term "bodily injury" was to be nar-
rowly construed, concluding that a carrier cannot be held liable
for stand-alone mental injury damages.279 To be liable under
Article 17, an accident has to have caused the passenger to "suf-
fer death, physical injury, or physical manifestation of injury. "280
The plaintiff argued that she suffered from post-traumatic
stress disorder, with change in her brain and nervous system.28 l
The court noted that the majority of courts have found "that
alterations in an individual's body and behavior intrinsically or
characteristically associated with mental distress do not consti-
tute bodily injury under the Warsaw Convention. This rule en-
compasses alterations or changes in an individual's brain and
nervous system characteristically tied to PTSD." 282
Plaintiff attempted to argue that Samson's actions by them-
selves constituted bodily injury, even if they did not cause bodily
injury.283 The court, again following the Floyd definition of bod-
ily injury, carefully analyzed the cases involving the definition of
"injury," distinguished those cases that had found such a physi-
cal contact to constitute an "accident," and found that nothing
in Article 17 provided for a passenger recovering from physical
contact, no matter how offensive, in the absence of the requisite
bodily injury.284
In Kim v. Northwest Airlines, the plaintiff was a passenger who
claimed that the defendant failed to provide her with food and
drink, resulting in her not being able to take her medication. 2 5
The failure to take her medication allegedly resulted in her hav-
ing some form of psychological injury.286 Plaintiff had filed her
complaint four years after the incident and therefore was time-
barred under the Warsaw Convention's two-year statute of limi-
tation.28 7 Regardless, the court held that she had failed to state
a claim under the Convention, since "mental or psychic injuries
279 Id. at 1506 (citing E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 536-42 (1991)).
280 Id. at 1508.
281 Id.
282 Id. at 1512.
283 Id. at 1513.
284 Id. at 1514-15.
285 No. 07-CV-3276 (NGG) (LB), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32952, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.
Apr. 22, 2008).
286 Id.
287 Id. at *8-9.
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unaccompanied by physical injuries are not compensable under
Article 17 of the Convention. 288
In Twardowski v. American Airlines, Inc., the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals considered consolidated appeals from sum-
mary judgment in favor of air carriers for claims against them
based on failure to warn of the risk of Deep Vein Thrombosis
(DVT) .29 The plaintiffs claimed that several public agencies
had requested that the carriers issue such warnings; but the
court held "that developing DVT in-flight is not an 'accident'...
and that failing to warn about its risk is not an 'event' for pur-
pose of liability for an 'accident' under Article 17."290
An "accident" is an "unexpected or unusual event or happening
that is external to the passenger"... "when the injury indisputa-
bly results from the passenger's own internal reaction to the
usual, normal, and expected operation of the aircraft, it has not
been caused by an accident, and Article 17... cannot apply. 291
The court further held that," [g] eneralized requests by public
agencies to warn are quite different from the particularized re-
quests by individual passengers for assistance, and the airline's
response to them[.] "292 The plaintiffs contended that the carri-
ers had represented that preventing passenger injury was a pri-
ority.2 3 But, the court found that just because airlines have
stated that avoiding injury is a priority, does not mean that every
injury to a passenger is an "'event' for purpose of liability for an
'accident' under Article 17. ' '294
5. Embarking and Disembarking
In Pacitti v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York considered a case in which the
plaintiff brought claims for injuries he suffered when he fell
from a wheelchair being pushed by a Delta agent.29 5 Plaintiff
was being transported between connecting flights in the termi-
nal at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) .296 The
288 Id. at *9.
289 535 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2008).
290 Id.
291 Id. at 959-60.
292 Id. at 960.
293 Id. at 958.
294 Id.
295 No. 04-CV-3197 (DLI) (MDG), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27046, at *3-5
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2008).
296 Id. at *3-4.
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court found that the Warsaw Convention did not apply since the
plaintiff was not in the process of disembarking or embarking a
flight.297 The court remarked that the terms "embarking" and
"disembarking" are not defined by the Convention, which has
"allowed courts to apply a flexible fact-specific approach to
resolving cases under Article 1 7.''298 "Generally speaking, courts
within [the Second Circuit] and elsewhere have declined to
hold that a passenger who is injured in the common area of a
terminal is subject to the Warsaw Convention. ' 299 The court
found that the area of the terminal the plaintiff was being trans-
ported through qualified as a common area, since it was utilized
by multiple airlines for domestic and international flight and
also had a restaurant within it.300 Plaintiff argued that he was
not acting as a free agent because he was being pushed by an
agent of Delta and was therefore under Delta's control.' 1 The
court followed the holding in Dick v. American Airlines, Inc., by
finding that "a passenger who requests to be transported in a
wheelchair is not, by virtue of such request, submitting to the
airline's control. ' 30 2 Further, after falling out of the wheelchair,
the plaintiff walked to the gate. 3  The fact that plaintiff's acci-
dent occurred approximately ninety-five yards away from the de-
parture gate also factored into the court's decision. 04 "In
embarkation cases, courts generally have applied the Warsaw
Convention only where the plaintiff had already passed through
the departure gate. 30 5 The court found plaintiff's claim that he
only had fifteen minutes to board his next flight the only argu-
ment with plausible merit; however, since Delta requires passen-
gers to board their flights ten minutes prior to departures, to a
degree, plaintiff "was not free to engage in any pursuits of his
own choosing except at risk of missing his plane. ' 30 6 But, the
297 Id. at *19-20.
298 Id. at *12 (citing Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir.
1975)) (discussing the "Day factors").
299 Id. at *13 (citing Rabinowitz v. Scandanavian Airlines, 741 F. Supp. 441, 446
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), stating that "courts have consistently refused to extend coverage
of the Warsaw Convention to injuries incurred within the terminal, except in
those cases in which plaintiffs were clearly under the direction of the airlines.").
300 See id.
301 Id. at *16.




305 Id. at *17-18.
306 Id. at *18.
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court rested with the fact that he was still "almost one hundred
yards, and several gates, away from Gate 9, and he was in a com-
mon area of the airport accessible to domestic and international
passengers alike" when the injury occurred. ° v
In Bowe v. Worldwide Flight Services, Inc., the Florida Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeals considered a case in which a request had
been made for a wheelchair for Mrs. Ferguson, an elderly wo-
man, which was not fulfilled. 30 The plane had landed at a free-
standing building and the plaintiffs took an American Airlines
bus to the main terminal.3 0 9 The plaintiffs then took an escala-
tor up, at which time the elderly woman fell backwards onto the
other plaintiffs. 31 0 The court held that the Warsaw Convention
did not apply to the county as it is not a carrier within the mean-
ing of the treaty.3 11 It held that Worldwide, as agent of Ameri-
can, and American itself, both fell within the definition of
carrier, and therefore, the Warsaw Convention applied to both
entities.312
The court moved on to the next part of its analysis-whether
plaintiffs were disembarking.313 The court recognized that the
"term does not automatically exclude events transpiring . ..
within an airline terminal building. ' 314 It adopted the three-
prong test used by other courts to determine whether plaintiffs
are entitled to seek recovery under the Convention: "(1) the
passenger's activity at the time of the accident; (2) the passen-
ger's whereabouts at the time of the accident; and (3) the
amount of control being exercised by the carrier at the time of
the injury. "315 The court found that American had failed to
show the absence of any material fact concerning its control
307 Id. at *19.
308 979 So. 2d 423, 424-25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
309 Id. at 425.
310 Id. at 424-25.
311 Id. at 426.
The County admits it is not a "carrier" within the meaning of the
Convention, but argues the services it provided the plaintiffs as op-
erator of the airport entitle it to seek the benefit of the Convention.
We disagree. We find no interpretive authority supporting the
County's position, and decline to extend the reasoning of [Johnson




313 Id. at 427.
314 Id. (citing Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1975)).
315 Id.
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over the area where plaintiffs fell.316 The court could not make
a determination as to whether plaintiffs were disembarking for
purposes of the Warsaw Convention and reversed the summary
judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further
proceedings. 317
6. Damages
In Muoneke v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Texas denied the plaintiff's
motion for reconsideration and request for attorneys' fees. 318 In
her motion, plaintiff contends that the defendant forced her to
check luggage that she had intended to carry on to the air-
craft. 19 While the luggage was checked, she alleges that items
went missing.32 Plaintiff argues that defendant's liability for her
loss should be subject to the higher limit of recovery applicable
to carry-on bags under the Warsaw Convention, since the only
reason she checked the bag was because defendant required her
to do so at the last minute.321 The court held that the luggage
was checked, so the checked bag limit of the Warsaw Conven-
tion applied.322 Further, the Warsaw Convention limitation on
damages was not altered by the fact that the defendant did not
give her time to rearrange the contents of her bag before requir-
ing her to check it.323 The court denied plaintiffs motion for
316 Id.
317 See id.
31S No. H-05-4289, 2008 U.S. Dist LEXIS 23369, at *3-4 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
319 Id. at *2.
320 Id.
321 Id. at *2. The district court had previously denied plaintiff's motion to re-
mand on the grounds that the Warsaw Convention governed the case. See Order
(Feb. 27, 2006), Muoneke, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23369. The court had also
granted summaryjudgment to defendant on the basis that the plaintiff had failed
to comply with the Convention's notice of loss requirements. See Final J. (Apr.
14, 2006), Muoneke, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23369. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of motion to remand, but held
that there were issues of material fact as to whether plaintiff had provided notice
of loss. Muoneke, 247 Fed. Appx. 570, 572 (5th Cir. 2007). Consequently, al-
though the 2008 district court opinion does not state that plaintiff is referring to
the Warsaw Convention liability limitations with regard to recovery for carry-on
luggage versus checked luggage, the assumption is being made based on the his-
tory and holdings of this case. See generally Warsaw Convention, at art. 22 (listing
the limit of liability for checked and carry-on luggage).
322 Muoneke, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23369, at *2. (The satchel was checked; the
checked limit applies.).
323 Id. at *2-3 ("Neither Air France's misperception of a rush nor its rude-
ness-if either was in fact the case-avoids the damage limitation.").
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reconsideration.1 4 The court also denied plaintiffs request for
attorneys' fees, reasoning that the amount prayed for surpassed
the carrier's liability for checked luggage and would undermine
the Convention, which "was not intended to set an amount that
would fully compensate travelers for the cost of lost baggage. "325
In Nissan Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Bax Global, Inc., the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that by
ratifying Montreal Protocol No. 4 in 1999, the United States au-
tomatically became a party to the Hague Protocol.3 26 Therefore,
because plaintiffs claims regarding cargo damaged during ship-
ment from the United States to Hong Kong arose in 2001, the
district court should have applied provisions of the Hague Pro-
tocol to decide the issue of recovery. 327 The court also held that
the district court had erred by applying federal common law to
the issue of attorneys' fees, since the Warsaw Convention, as
amended by the Hague Protocol, permits the court to apply its
own law in determining whether to award "expenses of litiga-tion. ''328 The court, however, held that the district court did not
abuse its discretion when it awarded prejudgment interest pur-
suant to federal statute, since the Hague Protocol was silent on
the issue of the rate of prejudgment interest. 29
II. AIR CARRIER LIABILITY
In In re Air Crash at Lexington, Kentucky, August 27, 2006, the
district court held that partial summary judgment should be en-
tered in favor of the airline defendants on plaintiffs' claims
against the airlines alleging breach of implied warranties associ-
ated with the purchase of the airline tickets.330 The district
court concluded that Kentucky law applied to these claims and
that the implied warranties contained in Kentucky's version of
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) did not apply to the pro-
vision of services. 331 The court also noted that prior to the adop-
tion of the UCC, passengers on common carriers could bring an
action for personal injuries based upon either tort or contract,
324 See generally id. at *3.
325 Id.
326 282 Fed. Appx. 546, 548 (9th Cir. 2008).
327 Id.
328 Id. at 548-49.
329 Id. at 549.
330 No. 5:06-CV-316-KSF, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51062, at *31-32 (E.D. Ky. July
2, 2008).
331 Id. at *28-29.
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but that the contract claim depended upon the express contract
between the parties.3 2 Since the adoption of the UCC, how-
ever, the Kentucky appellate courts had declined on several oc-
casions to judicially extend the implied warranties created by
statute to include services.33 Accordingly, the district court con-
cluded that "plaintiffs [had] no viable breach of warranty claim
under Kentucky law against the [air carriers]."
In In re Air Crash at Lexington, Kentucky, August 27, 2006, the
district court granted summary judgment to defendant Delta
Airlines on plaintiffs' claims that Delta was negligent, that it was
vicariously liable for any negligence of Comair, and that it had
breached implied warranties arising under its contract with the
passengers aboard the Comair flight that crashed upon take off
in Lexington, Kentucky. 3' The allegations of negligence
against the air carrier focused on the conduct of the flight crew
in taking off in the darkness from the wrong runway, mistakenly
taking off from an unlighted, shorter runway, rather than the
longer, lighted runway on which they had been cleared to take
off by the control tower. 33 6 Comair is a wholly-owned subsidiary
of Delta and its flights are operated as Delta flights under a
code-sharing arrangement between the two airlines 7.3 3  The dis-
trict court first examined the allegations that Delta had been
negligent and concluded that no Delta employees had been in-
volved in the alleged negligent conduct and that the role of
Delta employees was primarily in making reservations and
checking in passengers at the terminal. 3 Once the passengers
proceeded to the boarding gate, they were boarded on the flight
by Comair employees, their luggage was placed on the aircraft
by Comair employees, and the flight was operated by Comair
employees.3 39 For those reasons, the district court granted sum-
mary judgment as to the claims of direct negligence against
Delta. 40
Plaintiffs also claimed that Delta was vicariously liable for the
negligence of Comair based either on common law agency prin-
332 See id. at *29.
333 Id. at *28-31.
334 Id. at *31.
335 No. 5:06-CV-316-KSF, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53103, at *31 (E.D. Ky. July 8,
2008).
336 Id. at *9-10.
337 Id. at *16.
338 Id. at *17-19.
339 Id. at *17-18.
340 Id. at *19.
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ciples or under the "common enterprise" doctrine .341 The dis-
trict court first examined the issue of agency under Kentucky
law and it considered Kentucky decisions involving franchisor-
franchisee relationships. 42 Kentucky courts had previously held
that a franchisor is not liable under agency principles for the
torts of the franchisee's employees unless the franchisor has the
right and the ability to control the activities of the franchisee. 43
The district court applied the same principles to the present
case and concluded that there was no evidence that Delta had
control over the aircraft, dispatching the flight, the conduct of
the flight, or the conduct of the flight crew. 44 Similarly, the
flight crew was hired, trained, and employed by Comair 45
Based upon the absence of either the right or the ability to con-
trol the flight crew, whose alleged negligence caused the acci-
dent, the district court granted summary judgment to Delta.346
The district court next considered plaintiffs' "common enter-
prise" claims and held that Kentucky law does not recognize the
"common enterprise" doctrine as a basis for tort liability.347 In-
stead, the Kentucky cases upon which the plaintiffs relied were
actually concurrent negligence claims giving rise to joint and
several liability under Kentucky law. 4' To assert such a claim,
the agents or employees of both defendants must have been
concurrently negligent, resulting in plaintiffs' injuries. 49 In this
case, since the district court had concluded that there was no
evidence of any negligence by any Delta employees, the doctrine
of concurrent negligence did not apply and the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of those claims as well. 5°
Finally, for the same reasons that the district court had
granted summary judgment to all of the air carrier defendants
as discussed above, with regard to plaintiffs' breach of implied
warranty claims against all the air carriers, under Kentucky law,
341 Id. at *13.
342 Id. at *13, *21-26 (citing Papa John's Int'l, Inc. v. McCoy, 244 S.W.3d 44
(Ky. 2008)).
343 Id. at *22-23.
344 Id. at *24-25.
345 Id. at *24.
346 Id. at *25.
347 Id.
348 Id. at *25-26.
349 Id. at *26.
350 Id. at *26, *31.
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the district court granted summary judgment against plaintiffs
on the implied warranty claims as well. 51
In Raube v. American Airlines, Inc., the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment to
defendant in a slip-and-fall case involving a fall on a jet bridge
from the aircraft to the terminal. 5 2 The district court held that
the passenger was in the process of disembarking from the air-
craft and, therefore, was owed the "highest duty of care" as a
passenger aboard a common carrier. 53 Nevertheless, the plain-
tiff failed to identify any specific dangerous condition as a proxi-
mate cause of the fall, but admitted that the fall occurred when
"nudged" by another passenger on the jet bridge. 54 She did not
testify that she fell as a result of any uneven surfaces on the jet
bridge. 55 Furthermore, the defendant had affirmatively shown
that it was not aware of any dangerous condition on the jet
bridge at the time of the fall and that signs warned passengers of
uneven surfaces on the jet bridge. 56
In Rodriguez v. JetBlue Airways Corp., the California appellate
court held that a Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
agent's claims against the air carrier for permitting a passenger
to carry an excessively large bag through the security check
point were barred by the doctrine of "primary assumption of the
risk. ' 357 The court thoroughly examined the authorities under
what is often called the "firefighter's rule," and concluded that
third persons had no duty to protect employees from the very
conditions that they were hired to confront or that were inher-
ent in their employment, such as handling passengers' luggage
at the security check point.358 The court stated that such a rule
did not apply to conduct that might cause additional risk over
and above that inherent in the employment, but the risks inher-
ent in the employment were assumed and there is no cause of
351 Id. at *28-30.
352 539 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1036 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
353 Id. at 1033-35.
354 Id. at 1035-36.
355 Id. at 1035.
356 Id. Notably, there was no claim of federal preemption discussed in this
opinion and the court applied the Illinois duty of care applicable to common
carriers. Compare Landis v. US Airways, Inc., No. 07-1216, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21300 (W.D. Penn. Mar. 18, 2008), with Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., 32
CCH Ave. Cases 16, 689 (E.D. Penn. 2008).
357 No. RG05199079, 2008 WL 788689, at *5-6 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
358 Id. at *3-6.
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action against those creating those risks.159 The court also con-
cluded that the employee is often in the best position to avoid
the consequences associated with those risks and, also, that im-
posing a duty on airlines to weigh each passenger's carry-on lug-
gage before allowing it to proceed to the security check point
would create an additional burden on a system already heavily
burdened by security concerns.3 60 Finally, the court noted that
the imposition of such a duty was "particularly unnecessary be-
cause of the highly regulated and structured nature of airport
security screening and the ability of TSA and its screeners to
cope with the risks presented by heavy luggage. '3 61
In Rottman v. El Al Israel Airlines, a foreign air carrier was held
liable for damages incurred by a passenger who missed his inter-
national flight because a travel agent had booked him on a do-
mestic connecting flight that arrived after the closing time of
the international flight.362 The passenger had bought tickets
from a travel agent for travel between Baltimore and Tel Aviv. 63
The passenger was to take a flight from Baltimore Washington
International Airport (BWI) to JFK on a domestic airline and
then from JFK to Tel Aviv on El Al Israel Airlines (El Al) .364 The
ticket issued by the travel agent from BWI to JFK did not allow
the passenger sufficient time to comply with El Al's rule requir-
ing that passengers check in at least three hours before depar-
ture. 65 The passenger was deemed a "no show" when he did
not show up three hours before departure and was forced to
purchase a ticket to Tel Aviv from a different airline.366 The
passenger sued El Al for breaching the parties' contract by refus-
ing to transport him.367
The court held that the airline did not breach the contract
because the passenger did not attempt to check in until less
than one hour before the flight's departure. 368 However, the
small claims court stated that "the court's inquiry does not end
359 Id. at *5.
360 Id.
361 Id.
362 18 Misc. 3d 885, 886, 888-89 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2008).
363 Id. at 886.
364 Id.
365 Id. at 887.
366 Id. at 886.
367 Id. at 885. This was a small claims action and the court described the action
against El Al as an action "for breach of contract for bumping [the plaintiff] from
its flight and not arranging alternative transportation." Id.
3 Id. at 887.
196
2009] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION LAW
here," noting that "[t] he ticket issued by the travel agent to [the
plaintiff] made it impossible for him to comply with El Al's rule
requiring a minimum of three hours for check-in. '36" The air-
line attempted to argue that it was not liable because the travel
agent was the airline's independent contractor, not its agent.3 70
The court disagreed and found that the travel agent, who was
bound by the foreign air carrier's rules, had acted as the car-
rier's agent when it sold the ticket.3 71 Therefore, the carrier, as
principal, was responsible for the travel agent's error, and judg-
ment was rendered for the passenger in the amount of the
purchase price of his replacement ticket.3 7 2
In Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane v. Airline Tariff Publishing Co., the
federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendant Airline Tariff Publishing Co. (ATPCO) in a case stem-
ming from ATPCO's posting of certain Alitalia fares without not-
ing that the fares were only available in a "low season. '373 In
1986, Alitalia, the national carrier of Italy, and ATPCO, a com-
pany that collects and electronically distributes fare data to
nearly all of the world's airfare quotation and airline ticketing
systems, entered into a written contract that governed ATPCO's
provision of fare data services to the airline.3 7 ' The contract
contained a clause in which ATPCO disclaimed liability for con-
sequential damages resulting from any error made in incorpo-
rating or distributing Alitalia's fare data.3 75 The contract also
contained ATPCO's agreement to act as Alitalia's "agent" for
purposes of incorporating and distributing the airline's fare
data. 76
In early February 2004, Alitalia sent a fax to ATPCO setting
forth instructions for reducing fares during the airline's "low
season."3 77 In entering the fare information into ATPCO's
database, an ATPCO employee made a coding mistake-the em-
ployee typed the number "41" rather than "40" into a certain
field-which resulted in the reduced fares being entered, and
subsequently distributed, without any date restriction.378 The
369 Id.
370 Id.
371 Id. at 888.
372 Id. at 888-89.
373 580 F. Supp. 2d 285, 286, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
374 Id. at 286-87.
375 Id. at 287.
376 Id.
377 Id. at 288.
378 Id. at 288-89.
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mistake was not caught until three days later, after numerous
customers had bought Alitalia tickets at a heavily discounted
fare, causing an alleged loss to Alitalia of over $3.7 million? 79
Alitalia filed suit, alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduci-
ary duty, negligence, and gross negligence. 8 ° ATPCO defended
the suit based on the limitation of liability clause, and the court
granted summary judgment in favor of ATPCO on that basis.3 '
The court held that the limitation of liability clause applied to
ATPCO's error and precluded Alitalia from recovering its lost-
revenue consequential damages from ATPCO. 3 2 Furthermore,
the court held that, even though ATPCO had been acting as
Alitalia's "agent," Alitalia's breach of fiduciary duty cause of ac-
tion was also subject to the limitation of liability clause. 3  Fi-
nally, the court rejected Alitalia's negligence and gross
negligence causes of action because the parties' duties to each
other were set forth in the contract.38 4 In sum, the court found
that all of Alitalia's claims against ATPCO were contractual in
nature and that Alitalia had contracted away its ability to recover
via the limitation of liability clause. 5
In Hanson v. America West Airlines, Inc., an airline was held not
liable for the loss of a passenger's carry-on bag containing valua-
ble personal property.3 86 The passenger, a roboticist, forgot to
take his carry-on bag with him when he exited the plane.38 7 The
passenger's bag contained "an artistically and scientifically valua-
ble robotic head modeled after famous science fiction author
Philip K Dick. '38 8 Upon contacting the airline to report the
loss, the passenger was allegedly informed by a representative of
the airline that the airline had found his bag and that "special
security procedures" would be taken to protect and return the
bag to him.38 9 However, the bag was never returned. 9 °
The passenger sued the airline for conversion, negligence,
and involuntary bailment, seeking damages for the value of the
379 Id. at 289.
380 Id. at 286, 289.
381 Id. at 293.
382 Id.
383 Id. at 294-95.
384 Id. at 295.
385 Id.
386 544 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1044 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
387 Id. at 1039-40.
388 Id. at 1039.
-9 Id. at 1040.
390 Id.
198
2009] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION LAW 199
head in the amount of $750,000.' The airline removed the
case to federal court.392 The airline then moved for summary
judgment on the grounds that its contract of carriage, which
provided that the airline "assumes no responsibility or liability
for baggage, or other items, carried in the passenger compart-
ment of the aircraft," barred any recovery by the passenger,
given that the passenger had notice of the limited liability provi-
sion.3 93 The court agreed with the airline and rejected the pas-
senger's argument that (1) the airline materially deviated from
the original contract of carriage 94 and that (2) the airline em-
ployee who promised the passenger that the head would be de-
livered to him had altered the original contract of carriage,
causing the airline to become liable for the loss of the head. 95
The court also held that even if the airline employee had the
authority to alter the contract of carriage, which the court held
the employee did not,3 9 6 the passenger presented no evidence
that the airline had breached the altered contract, stating that
the airline "may have done everything as promised, only to fall
victim to a head hunting thief or other skullduggery." '397 The
court concluded by stating that "[w] hen Plaintiff chose to enter
the Contract of Carriage with Defendant he agreed, among
other things, to limit Defendant's liability for lost baggage," and
"[f] ailing to show relief from that agreement, Plaintiff is bound
by the terms of that [agreement]. "398
In St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
the district court denied Delta's motion for summary judgment
on a contract claim brought by an insurance company acting as
a subrogee of a freight forwarding company.3 99 Delta argued
that summary judgment was proper because the subrogor did
not comply with a notice-of-claim clause, since it did not ex-
pressly state in the notice it provided to Delta either the nature
of the loss or the amount of damages.40 The district court ini-
tially determined that federal jurisdiction was proper since fed-
eral common law governs actions for damage to interstate air
391 Id.
392 Id.
393 Id. at 1041.
394 Id. at 1041-42.
395 Id. at 1042-43.
396 Id. at 1043.
397 Id. at 1044.
398 Id.
399 583 F. Supp. 2d 466, 467, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
400 Id. at 469-71.
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shipments. °1 The court reasoned that the purpose of a notice-
of-claim requirement is to allow the carrier to begin an investiga-
tion into the claim and that the notice provided Delta with all
the information it needed to initiate an investigation into the
matter.
4 °2
III. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
Absent a statutory or treaty-based exception to the grant of
immunity, foreign states, their agencies, and instrumentalities
are immune from suit in federal court.40 3 The Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act (FSIA) grants immunity "[s]ubject to ex-
isting international agreements to which the United States is a
party at the time of enactment of this Act."4 4 The FSIA recog-
nizes an additional exception to the general grant of immunity
if "the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or
by implication. "'405
A. APPLICABILITY
Auster v. Ghana Airways Ltd. is an excellent example of the in-
terplay between the FSIA and international treaties, specifically
the Warsaw Convention.40 6 There, the court found that because
the Warsaw Convention did not apply to claims brought against
a foreign state and its agencies and instrumentalities on behalf
of passengers injured or killed on a domestic flight, it could pro-
vide no basis for a waiver the defendants' immunity under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976.407 On June 5, 2000,
Airlink Flight 200 took off from Tamale, Ghana, en route to Ac-
cra, Ghana.40 The aircraft crashed on approach in Accra, kill-
ing one passenger and injuring two others.40 9 Plaintiffs brought
this action seeking damages against the Republic of Ghana, Air-
link (the name given to the commercial operations of the
Ghana Air Force), and Ghana Airways Ltd., which is wholly-
401 Id. at 468 (citing Nippon Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Skyway Freight Sys., Inc.,
235 F.3d 53, 59 (2d. Cir. 2000)).
402 Id. at 471.
403 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1604 (2006).
404 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
405 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2006).
406 514 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
407 Id. at 46 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611).
408 Id. at 45.
409 Id.
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owned by Ghana.41 ° The court first found that all three defend-
ants were "foreign states" within the meaning of the FSIA so
that, absent some exception, the defendants were immune from
suit.4 1' The court then analyzed whether, under the Warsaw
Convention, to which both the United States and Ghana are sig-
natories, the flight in question constituted "international trans-
portation."' 2 A flight constitutes international transportation,
so as to come within the ambit of the Warsaw Convention, if it is
part of an international itinerary "regarded by the parties as a
single operation. "413 Both the passengers and defendant carrier
must regard the itinerary at issue as an international one.41"
Even though the plaintiffs presented evidence that they believed
the Airlink flight within Ghana was part and parcel of a single,
international itinerary, the evidence indicated that the carrier
did not."' 5 The tickets for the trip from Tamale to Accra were
marked "DOMESTIC" and did not refer to any international
flight."' 6 Further, "Airlink operated only domestic flights and
had no operations outside Ghana.' 4 17 Therefore, the court held
that the Warsaw Convention did not apply to the passengers'
flight and the entire action should have been dismissed for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction because the defendants retained
their sovereign immunity.4
18
In La Reunion Arienne v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court's determination that
it had subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of a French
insurer against the Libyan government and certain Libyan offi-
cials acting in their individual capacities .419 The French com-
pany had brought the claims seeking subrogation of
compensation payments it made to the survivors and estates of
certain victims of the September 1989 terrorist bombing of a
French airliner over Africa in which seven U.S. citizens had been
killed.420 The insurer alleged in its complaint that the district
410 Id. at 45-46.
411 Id. at 46.
412 Id. at 46-48.
413 Id. at 46.
414 Id. at 47.
415 Id. at 47. ("The convention requires notice [to the air carrier of the inter-
national character of the flight], not clairvoyance.").
416 Id.
417 Id.
418 Id. at 48.
4'9 533 F.3d 837, 843-44 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
420 Id. at 840.
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court had subject matter jurisdiction under the "'terrorism ex-
ception' to foreign sovereign immunity."4 2' The terrorism ex-
ception provides no immunity for foreign states from American
jurisdiction "in cases in which 'money damages are sought
against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was
caused by an act of ... aircraft sabotage,"' and further provides
that the "immunity for the foreign state is not waived if in such a
case 'neither the claimant nor the victim was a national of the
United States.' "422
The court first found that even though the appeal was inter-
locutory in nature, it had jurisdiction to hear the petition be-
cause the appeal met the "collateral order" exception to the
general bar to interlocutory appeals.4 23 The court pointed out
that when the issue on appeal is jurisdictional immunity, forcing
a party to delay appeal until final judgment "cannot repair the
damage" caused by forcing the defendant to litigate a case that
should never have gone forward in the first place.424
Second, the court held that the district court did not lack sub-
ject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA.4 25 The court was not
persuaded by Libya's argument that subject matter jurisdiction
was lacking because the FSIA prohibits claims by third-party cor-
porate claimants. 426 The court explained that the payments
made by the French company "to the victims' families and their
estates were for money damages for the deaths of the victims,
i.e., for the same claims for money damages that the families
and their estates could make directly against Libya under the
FSIA. ''427 Because an assignee or subrogee owns the substantive
right of the victim, and because these validly assigned or subro-
gated claims would legally be considered personal injury claims
under traditional common law principles, the claims were not
prohibited by FSIA.428 In addition, the court explained that the
victims were nationals of the United States, even though the ulti-
mate claimant, the insurance company, was not.4 29 The court
421 Id. at 840-41 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. (2006)).
422 Id.
423 Id. at 842.
424 Id. at 843.
425 Id. at 840-41, 845.
426 Id.
427 Id.
428 Id. at 844-45.
429 Id.
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stated that, "if either the claimant or the victim is a national of
the United States, then immunity is waived. 43 °
B. DAMAGES
In Pugh v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the court
awarded damages in accordance with state and federal law, as
well as prejudgment interest, to the estates and survivors of the
seven American victims of the bombing of a foreign airliner over
the African nation of Niger by agents of the Libyan government
in 1989.431 The action was brought by "[t~he Estates of the
seven American decedents, 44 of their immediate family mem-
bers, and Interlease," the owner of the aircraft, under the terror-
ism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976.432 The named defendants included the Socialist People's
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the Libyan External Security Organiza-
tion, and "six high-ranking Libyan government officials sued in
their personal capacities. ' 43 3 To determine the validity of the
plaintiffs' substantive tort claims, including claims for survival,
wrongful death, intentional infliction of emotional distress, bat-
tery, and loss of consortium, the court applied the various laws
of the states in which the plaintiffs' family members were domi-
ciled at the time of the bombing or where the estates of the
victims were probated. 4  After determining the appropriate
amount of damages under the respective state's law for each
plaintiff, the court trebled the damages against the individual
Libyan defendants in accord with the statutory trebling provi-
sion of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1991. 435 That statute provides
that
[a] ny national of the United States injured in his or her person,
property, or business by reason of an act of international terror-
ism ... may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of the
United States and shall recover threefold the damages he or she
sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorneys' fees.4 36
The court did not treble the damages assessed against the So-
cialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Libyan External
Security Organization because treble damages cannot be pur-
430 Id. at 844.
431 No. 02-02026, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4290, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 23, 2008).
432 Id. at *3 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (7) (2006)).
433 Id. at *3-4.
434 Id. at *126.
435 Id. at *127 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2000)).
436 Id.
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sued against the foreign state itself4 7 The court, in its discre-
tion, also awarded prejudgment interest to the plaintiffs, finding
such an award particularly appropriate in this case because of
the defendants' persistent delay tactics over the course of the
litigation. 48 The court was quick to point out that the award
was not made to penalize the defendants but to compensate the
plaintiffs fully for the time value of money.
4 39
IV. FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958
A. FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958-FEDERAL PREEMPTION-
AIR CARRIER AND AIRCRAFT OPERATOR LIABILITY
In Booth v. Santa Barbara Biplanes, LLC, the California appel-
late court upheld a release against liability, even though it con-
cluded that the appellee, Santa Barbara Biplanes, LLC, was a
common carrier under California law.44 ° The California court
relied upon a California statute that provides that releases set
forth in "special contracts" between passengers and common
carriers are enforceable provided they (1) do not release claims
for "gross negligence, fraud, or willful wrong" by the carrier;441
(2) there had been no violation of law or statute alleged in the
activity;44 2 and (3) the common carrier is not providing an es-
sential service or otherwise providing a service in the public in-
terest.44 3 The California appellate court also rejected an
argument that such releases were preempted by the Federal Avi-
ation Act of 1958 (FAA of 1958) because, according to the Cali-
fornia appellate court, even though the regulations
promulgated by the FAA under the Act wholly occupied the reg-
ulation of air safety,44 4 the regulations were not inconsistent with
this standard because the Federal Aviation Act only required
that aircraft not be operated in a "careless or reckless" man-
ner.44 5 The California appellate court held that such a standard
was the equivalent of "gross negligence," and that the California
law upholding releases for lesser negligence or misconduct was
not inconsistent with that federal standard and therefore was en-
437 Id.
438 Id. at *129-30.
439 Id. at *131.
440 158 Cal. App. 4th 1173, 1181 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
441 Id. at 1177.
442 Id.
443 Id. at 1178.
444 Id. at 1180 (citing Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464 (9th Cir. 2007)).
-5 Id. at 1181.
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forceable. 446 The court also recognized that the FAA of 1958
not only expressly preserved state law remedies, which include
remedies for personal injury resulting from negligence, but also
preserved state law defenses to such actions, such as the release
defense at issue in this case.447
In Diana v. NetJets Services, the superior court denied motions
to dismiss filed by defendants NetJets and Midwest Air Traffic
Control Services (Midwest).448 Plaintiffs claims arose from an
incident in which he was walking in the grassy median adjacent
to a taxiway on the way to another aircraft when he was struck by
the wing of a taxiing NetJets aircraft."49 The complaint alleged
that the NetJets pilots were acting "negligently and carelessly"
and that the accident was due to the "negligence and careless-
ness of the airmen." 50 In an extensive analysis of federal pre-
emption cases, the Connecticut trial court adopted the
reasoning and preemption analysis of Aldana v. Air East Airways,
Inc.451 and Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc.,, 52 concluding that
federal regulations impliedly preempted the field of aviation
safety, and that the proper standard of care in any tort action
would be a federal standard. 453 The court concluded that the
appropriate "comprehensive" federal standard of care for such
claims was whether the aircraft had been operated in a "careless
or reckless" manner as prohibited in 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a).151
While the allegations of the complaint did not refer to a federal
standard, the court denied the motion to dismiss based on the
legal sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint.455 Notwith-
standing preemption of the standard of care, however, the trial
court followed the reasoning of earlier U.S. Supreme Court
446 Id.
447 Id.
448 No. CV075011701S, 2007 WL 4822585, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 14,
2007).
449 Id. at *1.
450 Id. at *6.
451 477 F. Supp. 2d 489 (D. Conn. 2007).
452 181 F.3d 363 (3rd Cir. 1999).
453 Diana, 2007 WL 4822585, at *6.
454 Id. at *4. Notably, the trial court included footnote 17, describing the ap-
plication of the "careless or reckless" standard in other cases, in which such "care-
less or reckless" allegations were held to be sufficient since the complaint "alleges
conduct that constitutes an extreme departure from ordinary care in a situation
that involves a high degree of danger." Id. at *7 n.17.
455 Id. at *7.
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cases, 456 which held that Congress did not intend to preempt all
tort actions (for example, by expressly requiring airlines to carry
liability insurance), and that the savings clause of the FAA of
1958 expressly preserved state law remedies, such as claims for
personal injury.457 The court held that the federal preemption
of the standard of care did not require dismissal because state
courts routinely apply federal standards of care, particularly
where state law remedies are claimed as expressly permitted
under the FAA of 1958.458
In Landis v. US Airways, Inc., the federal magistrate in the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania consid-
ered a motion to dismiss filed by defendant US Airways and a
motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by defendant Boe-
ing, in a case involving personal injuries resulting from a nose
gear collapse during push back from the terminal.459 Plaintiff
alleged that prior to push back, the flight crew had been advised
that the nose wheel was not aligned with the nose of the aircraft,
but the flight crew ignored this information and the aircraft was
pushed back.4 60 Applying the combination of the U.S. Supreme
Court's recent decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly461 to find
that the district court could consider whether the factual allega-
tions were sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the specula-
tive level" in considering the pleadings, and the Third Circuit's
decision in Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc.,4 62 which held that
the FAA of 1958 completely preempts the field of aviation safety,
the federal magistrate dismissed the plaintiff's complaint.
4 63
Even though the plaintiff referred to the FAA of 1958 and gen-
erally alleged facts that demonstrated "careless or reckless oper-
ation," which the federal magistrate found necessary to establish
a violation of the federal standard of care, she failed to identify
and allege in the complaint the specific regulations violated.464 In
the absence of references in the pleadings to specific regulations,
the federal magistrate concluded that the allegations of the
complaint of "careless and reckless" operation did not rise above
456 See generally Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374 (1992); American
Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995).
457 Diana, 2007 WL 4822585, at *2.
458 Id. at *5-6.
459 No. 07-1216, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21300, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2008).
460 Id.
461 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
462 181 F.3d 363 (3rd Cir. 1999).
463 Landis, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21300, at *2-6.
464 Id. at *11.
206
2009] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION LAW 207
the speculative level in asserting claims for relief.465 Signifi-
cantly, the federal magistrate's opinion referred to references in
the complaint to common law standards of care, and state stat-
utes and ordinances, as being insufficient to state a claim. 466 Fi-
nally, the federal magistrate also dismissed the express warranty
465 Id. at *14. This case demonstrates the impracticality of using the provisions
of Part 91 of the Federal Aviation Regulations as the sole standard of care in tort
cases. If the standard of care is merely "careless or reckless" operation as referred
to in Part 91, then it is a speculative legal standard-meaning anything from
"gross negligence" as suggested in Booth and Diana-to simply meaning that an
accident occurred due to pilot error (without a mechanical or systems malfunc-
tion), and therefore the pilot must have been "careless" in some aspect of opera-
tion, as is frequently seen in the context of FAA regulatory proceedings against
pilots. To attempt to solve this problem of uncertainty by requiring reference to
specific regulations, as the federal magistrate did in this case, simply imposes an
additional impractical hurdle. This is because the specific provisions of Part 91
(and other FAA regulations) do not attempt to describe all of the standards for
safe operation of an aircraft as is evidenced by the volumes of additional materi-
als published by the FAA regarding aviation safety, from the Airman's Informa-
tion Manual, to flight training manuals for private pilots, instrument pilots, flight
instructors, and advisory circulars. Even the manufacturer's FAA approved flight
manuals prescribe standards for safe operation. If only the regulations them-
selves are the standard, then the wisdom contained in all of these other publica-
tions will be irrelevant to a claim of negligence under the new federal standard.
On the other hand, if they are all relevant and the FAA then becomes the sole
source of information as to safe aviation practices, either directly or by approving
other publications such as FAA approved manufacturers flight manuals, then the
standard has returned very close to that of the reasonably prudent pilot-as de-
fined by the common law of negligence in every jurisdiction-except that the
jury in evaluating the reasonably prudent pilot standard will not be able to refer
to any non-FAA publication or authority in deciding what is and is not a prudent
course of conduct. Additionally, there are many ways that pilots can cause acci-
dents and personal injuries that have not even been expressly discussed in the
FAA publications, or that seem so obvious that they would never be in a specific
FAA publication; for example, "scud running" in uncontrolled Class G airspace
or low visibility accidents in marginal VFR conditions (both legal, but not neces-
sarily prudent), spatial disorientation in VFR conditions on dark nights over re-
mote areas by pilots not adequately trained to fly on instruments (again, legal,
but not necessarily prudent), and undoubtedly many more that may not be tech-
nically a violation of a regulation or may not even be specifically referenced in
the applicable FAA publications, but are clearly unsafe and avoidable by prudent
practices. Requiring a rigid regulatory-based standard of care, as in Landis, is
neither practical nor sufficient in defining a standard of care for all of these
liability cases. Such a standard is the equivalent of requiring a claimant to allege
and prove negligence per se in every case, and it is significantly different than the
tort standard of care in other areas of tort law. It is questionable whether any act
of Congress evinces an intent to replace the "reasonably prudent pilot" standard
of care in aviation personal injury cases, particularly since the FAA of 1958 in-
cludes an express savings clause for state remedies.
466 Id. at *9.
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claims because there were no allegations as to the content of any
express warranty, or any allegation that Boeing intended to ex-
tend the terms of any express warranty to her as a third-party
beneficiary, or that she was even aware of the terms of any ex-
press warranty. 4
67
In Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., the district court granted
summary judgment against a personal injury plaintiff who al-
leged that Delta violated federal regulations relating to disabled
passengers on aircraft by failing to offer a wheelchair to the
plaintiff, an above the knee amputee who used crutches rather
than a wheelchair. 468 The plaintiff fell and injured his shoulder
upon disembarking. 469 The plaintiff did not ask for or receive
assistance in disembarking. 47" The district court noted prelimi-
narily that "federal law establishes the applicable standards of
care in the field of air safety," preempting the entire field from
state and territorial regulation.4 71 The court held that the air-
line had not violated federal law because federal law only re-
quired the provision of a wheelchair if (1) the passenger
requested one or (2) an airline employee offered assistance and
the plaintiff accepted it. 472 The district court further held that
the airline was not required to inform the plaintiff of the availa-
bility of a wheelchair, in the absence of a request for a wheel-
chair, because the plaintiff did not use a wheelchair. 47 ' Finally,
the district court held that the plaintiff could not make out a
claim based upon a violation of the more general "careless or
reckless" standard because the more specific standards under 14
CFR 382.39, 382.7 and 382.45 (a) (2) applied, and because plain-
tiff did not establish any support for his claim that failure to
offer a wheelchair constituted careless or reckless conduct.4 74
B. FEDERAL PREEMPTION-FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958-
MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITy
In Wong v. Precision Airmotive, LLC, the district court denied a
motion for judgment on the pleadings seeking to assert a com-
plete defense to all product liability claims based upon implied
467 Id. at *14.




472 Id.; see also 14 CFR §§ 382.39, 382.7 (2008).
473 Elassaad, 2008 WL 3895566, at *1; see also 14 CFR § 382.45(a)(2) (2008).
474 Elassaad, 2008 WL 3895566, at *2.
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federal preemption of the field of aviation.47 5 The district court
held that state law product liability standards had long coin-
cided with federal regulation in this field, 476 that Congress had
specifically rejected legislation seeking to create a national prod-
uct liability standard in 1990,47 7 and that subsequent federal leg-
islation had included specific express preemption provisions
relating to the federal statute of repose under the General Avia-
tion Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA).4 78 The district court
also relied upon the Tenth and Eleventh Circuit decisions in
Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp.479 and Public Health Trust v. Lake
Aircraft, Inc.,48 0 which rejected implied field preemption of avia-
tion product liability cases based in part upon Congress's ex-
press preemption of airline routes, rates, and services in the
ADA.48  The district court concluded that the reasoning of
those cases was reinforced by the express preemption provisions
contained in Congress's subsequent enactment of GARA.482
The decision in this case suggests that the better approach for
manufacturers seeking to establish a federal preemption de-
fense is to seek a ruling from the court based upon conflict pre-
emption on specific issues of defect, rather than field preemption.
Once the case has moved beyond the pleading stage, any con-
flicts between specific defect claims and specific federal aircraft
design and manufacturing regulations483 can be more clearly
identified and established from the record, and summary judg-
ment may be appropriate.
475 No. 05cv1604 (WWE), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2201, at *5, *8 (D. Conn.June
10, 2008).
476 Id. at *5 (citing Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 299 (1976)).
477 Id. at *6-7 (citing S. Rep. No. 101-303 (May 23, 1990), relating to the pro-
posed General Aviation Accident Liability Standards Act).
478 Id. at *7.
479 985 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1993).
480 992 F.2d 291 (lth Cir. 1993).
481 Wong, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2201, at *7-8.
482 Id.
483 Of course, in such cases, a claimant will rely upon the claim that federal
standards are only "minimum standards." However, many federal regulations do
not permit alternative methods of design or standards, and in those cases, con-
flict preemption may still exist notwithstanding any attempt to characterize such
a federal regulation as merely a "minimum standard." This is the approach ap-
parently applied in part by Cirrus in Glorvigen v. Cirrus Aircraft Corp., discussed
below. Again, the specific requirements of the particular FAA design regulation
and whether the regulation accommodates alternative designs are critical to a
claim of conflict preemption.
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In Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., the federal district court de-
nied the aircraft manufacturer's motion for summary judgment
claiming "complete preemption" of the field of aviation safety by
the FAA of 1958, and "conflict preemption" claims that it would
be impossible for Cirrus "to comply with both FAA standards
and state negligence standards. '4 4 The district court, relying
on its previous decision in Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp.
(Glorvigen J),4815 held that Congress had expressed no federal in-
tent of field preemption and, specifically, that the "federal regu-
lations were intended to prevent accidents and not to 'provide a
remedial mechanism for individuals injured by a violation of avi-
ation safety standards,' and that 'state tort remedies remain for
violation of the federally established standards of care. '4 6 The
district court also found no "clear and manifest purpose" to su-
persede state authority by federal statutes and regulations, and
that the savings clause in the FAA of 1958487 "evinces a clear
congressional intent against conflict preemption.
488
V. AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT-
FEDERAL PREEMPTION
In Hanni v. American Airlines, Inc., plaintiff Kathleen Hanni, a
passenger on an American Airlines flight from San Francisco,
connecting at Dallas Fort Worth Airport, to Mobile, Alabama,
filed a class action suit against defendant American Airlines, Inc.
on December 28, 2007.489 Plaintiffs claims arose from a seven
hour trip that allegedly took over fifty hours due to various de-
lays and included nine-and-one-half hours confined in the air-
plane on the tarmac.490 Plaintiffs complaint included claims for
false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotion distress,
negligence, breach of contract, and intentional misrepresenta-
tion.49 Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis
that plaintiffs claims were preempted by the FAA of 1958 and
484 No. 06-2661 (PAM/JSM), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10899, at *8-9 (D. Minn.
Feb. 11, 2008).
485 No. 06-2661 (PAM/RLE), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91731 (D. Minn. Oct. 24,
2006) [hereinafter Glorvigen I].
486 Glorvigen, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10899, at *8 (citing Abdullah v. Am. Air-
lines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 375 (3d Cir. 1999)).
487 Id. at *9 (citing 49 U.S.C. Section 40120(c) (2000 & Supp. V 2006)).
488 Id.
489 No. C08-00732CW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58613, at *1 (N.D. Cal., Jul. 11,
2008).
490 Id. at *1-2.
491 Id.
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the ADA and, in the alternative, on the basis that each of plain-
tiffs causes of action failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted and that plaintiff failed to plead her fraud
claim with particularity. 492 The court granted the motion in
part and denied it in part.493 The court found that "Plaintiffs
claims were field preempted by the [FAA of 1958] to the extent
they were based on Defendant's decision to re-route her flight
from Dallas Fort Worth Airport to the Austin Airport rather
than delaying or cancelling it," 49 4 and that "Plaintiffs claims
were explicitly preempted by the ADA to the extent that they
were controlled by specific regulations. ' 495 However, because
the bulk of the claims related to the airline's actions after the
flight had been diverted, the court held that the claims survived
preemption because they were not related to safety and were not
the type regulated by federal safety regulations.496 As to the
plaintiff's breach of contract claim, the court held that the claim
"was explicitly preempted by the ADA to the extent it was based
on a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing. ''49 7 Finally, the court held that Plaintiff failed to allege facts
sufficient to state a claim for false imprisonment, negligence,
breach of contract or fraud, and that the plaintiff could seek
punitive damages on her surviving tort claims.498
On May 15, 2008, the plaintiff filed a first amended com-
plaint, again alleging claims for false imprisonment, negligence,
breach of contract, and fraud, and additionally, asserting causes
of action for conversion, civil conspiracy, and a claim pursuant
to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) .4 9 9 Defendant attempted to get the court to revisit its
preemption analysis regarding explicit preemption under the
ADA, but the court declined to do so. 50 0 Defendant next argued
that the plaintiff failed to comply with the court's order, dis-
missing the original complaint by failing to allege facts sufficient
to support her claims.5 ' In its July 11, 2008 order, the court
addressed each of plaintiffs claims in turn. As to plaintiffs false
492 Id.
493 Id. at *25-26.
494 Id. at *2.
495 Id. at *2-3.
496 Id. at *4-5.
497 Id. at *3.
498 Id.
499 Id. at *3-4.
500 Id. at *4-5.
501 Id. at *5.
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imprisonment claim, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
would not let her off the plane during the lengthy stop on the
ground and that her confinement was unlawful.5 °2 But, the FAA
of 1958 gives pilots "broad authority over passengers," providing
that the pilot is responsible for their safety and the ultimate au-
thority on the airplane's operation. °3 With this in mind, the
court found plaintiffs false imprisonment claim to be "con-
clusory," and dismissed the claim.5 4 The court also dismissed
plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
for failing to allege "facts to support a finding that Defendant
acted with the intent of causing her distress. '5 5 As to plaintiffs
negligence claim, the plaintiff stated that the defendant violated
its duty as a common carrier by depriving the plaintiff of her
basic needs while being kept on the aircraft. 50 6 The court de-
nied defendant's motion to dismiss these claims, stating that
there are no specific controlling regulations, and common carri-
ers are held to a heightened standard of care. 50 7 Additionally,
the plaintiff asserted that the Contract of Carriage required de-
fendant to reroute passengers on the next flight with available
seats, but defendant refused to do so. 50 The court stated that, if
true, this could establish a breach of contract claim.50 9 Plaintiff
also attempted to assert a claim of fraud, specifically, that she
relied on fraudulent statements made by the defendants regard-
ing remaining in the aircraft; the court dismissed this claim,
finding that the plaintiff failed to adequately allege that she rea-
sonably relied on fraudulent statements.510  Plaintiff claimed
that the defendant wrongfully withheld her luggage, and
brought an action for conversion."' Since the plaintiff was not
claiming her luggage was lost or damaged, the court held that
the claims were not preempted, but doubted plaintiffs ability to
prove damages.512 The court granted plaintiff leave to amend
502 Id. at *5-6.
503 Id. at *6.
504 Id.
505 Id. at *7-8.
506 Id. at *9-10.
507 Id.
508 Id. at *15-16.
509 Id. at *15.
510 Id. at *20-22.
511 Id. at *22.
512 Id. at *23.
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the complaint as to her civil conspiracy claim.513 Finally, plain-
tiffs RICO claim was dismissed without prejudice. 14
On August 13, 2008, the plaintiff filed a third amended com-
plaint, following a stipulation between the parties that her sec-
ond amended complaint could be amended.51 5  The court
dismissed "Plaintiff's negligence allegations that include charges
of false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress and violation of the Fourth Amendment" with prejudice,
stating that the court's July 11, 2008, order only permitted the
plaintiff to assert allegations for "failure to provide adequate
food, water, restroom facilities and ventilation in violation of its
duties as a common carrier. '51 6 Similarly, as to plaintiffs breach
of contract claim, in which plaintiff alleged that the defendant
failed to meet plaintiffs special needs by denying her access to
medications that were in her checked baggage, in violation of
the Contract of Carriage, the court dismissed the claim with
prejudice because the court had not given the plaintiff leave to
amend this portion of her complaint.517 Plaintiffs claim for civil
conspiracy based on negligence and breach of contract was dis-
missed with prejudice because, as the court stated, civil conspir-
acy based on negligence and breach of contract is not a
supportable cause of action.518 Plaintiffs claim of conspiracy to
commit fraud was also dismissed with prejudice because the
plaintiff failed to plead "reasonable reliance. 51 9
In addition, in filing her third amended complaint, the plain-
tiff moved for
an order certifying an interlocutory appeal on the portions of the
July 11, 2008, order which dismissed with prejudice the causes of
action in [plaintiffs first amended complaint] and for false im-
prisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress and
fraud, and parts of the causes of action for negligence and
breach of contract.520
The court denied plaintiffs motion, stating that "an interlocu-
tory appeal on the issues identified by Plaintiff will not advance
513 Id. at *23-25.
514 Id. at *25.
515 Hanni v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97369, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 21, 2008).
516 Id. at *7.
517 Id. at *8.
518 Id. at *13-14.
519 Id. at *14-15.
520 Id. at *17.
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the ultimate termination of the litigation" and because there
were "no exceptional circumstances warranting interlocutory ap-
peal.15 21 Finally, the plaintiff moved to appeal based on the col-
lateral order doctrine, which the court denied on the basis that
plaintiff can appeal after a final judgment is entered.522 While
granting in part and denying in part defendant's motion to dis-
miss the third amended complaint, the court stated that the
plaintiff could, without filing an amended complaint, pursue
the following claims: (1) negligence based on defendant's fail-
ure to provide food, water, restroom and ventilation; (2) breach
of contract claim to the extent it is based on paragraph five or
eighteen of the Contract of Carriage, and (3) conversion.523
In Farash v. Continental Airlines, Inc., the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York determined that a pro se pas-
senger's tort claims were not preempted by the ADA,5 24 but nev-
ertheless found that the claims were patently frivolous and failed
to state a cognizable tort claim under New York law.525 The
plaintiff was asked by a flight attendant to vacate his first-class
aisle seat for a window seat in a different row so that an adult
and his pre-teen son could sit next to each other.526 The plain-
tiff alleged that the flight attendant harassed him throughout
the flight and that the flight attendant's conduct was discrimina-
tory behavior predicated upon the passenger "having Semitic
looks and a middle eastern last name. 5 27 The plaintiff asserted
negligence, gross negligence, and civil assault.528 The court re-
lied upon Rombom v. United Air Lines, Inc.529 for its preemption
analysis and considered a three-part test that involves whether
the alleged tortious activity (1) involved an "airline service"; (2)
directly or tenuously affected the airline service; and (3) was rea-
sonably necessary to the provision of the airline service.53 ° As
the case was decided upon a motion to dismiss, the court ac-
cepted as true the passenger's allegations of discriminatory in-
tent and ruled that the claims for discriminatory seat
reassignment and discriminatory reporting to an air marshal
521 Id. at *20.
522 Id. at *20-22.
523 Id. at *22.
524 574 F. Supp. 2d 356, 364-66 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
525 Id. at 367.
526 Id. at 359.
527 Id.
528 Id. at 359.
529 867 F. Supp. 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
530 Farash, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 363.
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were not preempted because actions predicated upon a discrim-
inatory intent do not constitute actions "reasonably necessary"
for the provision of airlines services and thus fail the third prong
of the Rombom test.531 The court ruled that the claims based on
the quality of in-flight services and post-flight customer service
were preempted because the alleged conduct was reasonable
and did not constitute the type of outrageous behavior needed
to defeat preemption. 2
In Eagle Air Medical Corp. v. Colorado Board of Health,53 the
court relied on the Younger abstention doctrine to grant a state
agency's motion to stay an air ambulance company's suit for de-
claratory and injunctive relief.534 The company asserted that
certain Colorado regulations governing the licensing of air am-
bulances are preempted by the FAA of 1958 and the ADA.535
The Colorado state agency temporarily revoked the air ambu-
lance's accreditation pending investigation of a crash,5 3 6 and the
agency argued that the case should be stayed pending resolu-
tion of the air ambulance's appeal of the state accreditation de-
cision.537 Under the Younger abstention doctrine, a federal
court must refrain from exercising jurisdiction when the federal
case interferes with an ongoing state proceeding that implicates
an important state interest, and the state provides an adequate
forum to adjudicate the claim.538 The court disagreed with the
argument that the Younger test should not be considered be-
cause the preemption claim was "facially conclusive '539 and in-
stead relied on the reasoning in Morales v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc.54 to find that it was not apparent that "the ADA's preclu-
sion of state regulation of carrier 'price, route, or service'
equates to preclusion of state regulation of emergency medical
air transportation service. "541 Turning to preemption based
upon Younger abstention, the court found that the accreditation
issue implicated an important state interest 542 and relied upon
531 Id. at 364-66.
532 Id. at 366.
533 570 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1295 (D. Colo. 2008).
534 Id. (relying on Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)).
535 Id. at 1290.
536 Id.
537 Id.
538 Id. at 1291.
539 Id. at 1293.
5- 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
541 Eagle Air Med., 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1293.
542 Id. at 1295.
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the Tenth Circuit's decision in Amanatullah v. Colorado Board of
Medical Examiners43 to determine that a Colorado state agency's
temporary revocation of accreditation pending the results of an
investigation conducted by another state agency qualified as an
ongoing state proceeding.5 44
In Malik v. Continental Airlines, Inc.,5  the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed the dismissal of Plaintiff Anjum Malik's (Malik) state law
claims and federal discrimination claims and reversed the dis-
missal of Malik's federal common law claim for lost luggage, re-
manding that claim to the district court.54 6 Malik, an Indian-
secular Muslim, was flying from Austin to Rhode Island via New
Jersey and had brought her only luggage on board, which con-
tained various valuables, including antique and exotic jewelry.547
While the plane was taxiing, Malik was informed by a flight at-
tendant that the overhead compartment was full and that her
luggage had been moved to the plane's under-cabin compart-
ment.548 Malik's luggage was lost and never found.54 9 Continen-
tal refused to compensate Malik for her losses and stated that
the contract of carriage placed its maximum liability at
$2,800.55o Malik filed suit alleging conversion and invasion of
privacy (under state law) and racial and religious discrimination
(under various federal statutes).551
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of
Malik's state law claims for conversion and invasion of privacy as
preempted by the ADA.55 2 The court held that "state law claims
having a 'connection' with an airline's baggage handling ser-
vices are preempted by § 41713(b) (1)." 553 When Malik argued
that her state tort claims do not relate to a "service" since she
did not anticipate Continental converting her luggage into
checked luggage, the court disagreed.554 The court also did not
543 Amanatullah, 187 F.3d 1160, 1163 (10th Cir. 1999).
544 Eagle Air Med., 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1294.
545 No. 08-50373, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 23178 (5th Cir. Nov. 10, 2008).
546 Id. at *1-2.
547 Id. at *2.
548 Id. at *3.
549 Id. at *3-4.
550 Id. at *4.
551 Id.
552 Id. at *5, *8-11 (citing Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (2000)).
553 Id. at *8 (citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383
(1992); Casas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 304 F.3d 517, 525 (5th Cir. 2002); Hodges v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 335 (5th Cir. 1995)).
554 Id. at *9.
2009] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION LAW
accept Malik's argument that, "like the personal injury claims in
Hodges, [her claims] are not preempted by [the ADA] because
they relate to the 'operation and maintenance of aircraft' rather
than 'service' of baggage handling.""55 The Fifth Circuit also af-
firmed the dismissal of Malik's federal claims for racial and relig-
ious discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 2000 et seq.
and 49 U.S.C. § 40127 for failing to plead facts in support of
intentional discrimination as required by the applicable stat-
utes.556 The court stated that "Malik has failed to allege any
facts establishing a connection between Continental's actions
and her racial and religious background. '557 Finally, as to
Malik's claim for lost luggage under federal common law, which
the district court did not address, the Fifth Circuit remanded
this claim to the district court.558 The court noted that the "fed-
eral common law provides airline passengers with a cause of ac-
tion for lost luggage. 559
In Qayyum v. US Airways, Inc.,5 60 plaintiff Rima Qayyum filed
suit in federal court against defendant US Airways after allegedly
being refused boarding on her flight. 561 The federal district
court granted in part defendant's motion to dismiss based on
ADA preemption of her state law claims and on the lack of state
action as to a § 1983 claim, but denied the motion to dismiss the
remaining federal civil rights claims.562 On August 9, 2006,
eight days prior to plaintiff's flight, "British authorities uncov-
ered a plot to use liquid explosives to bring down [air-
planes] ."563 "As a result, the TSA banned all liquids, gels, and
creams from carry-on containers. "564 On August 17, 2006, facial
cream and a bottle of water were discovered in Plaintiffs carry-
on bag at the security check line.565 While plaintiffs items were
subjected to a field test for explosives, plaintiff alleged that
"other passengers were simply allowed to throw away prohibited
items. '566 The initial field tests came back positive, and plaintiff
555 Id. at *10-11.
556 Id. at *11-13.
557 Id. at * 13.
558 Id.
559 Id. (citing Casas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 304 F.3d 517, 521 (5th Cir. 2002)).
560 No. 3:08-0996, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92365 (S.D.W.Va. Nov. 12, 2008).
561 Id. at *2-5.
562 Id. at *5.
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was subjected to a nine and a half hour interrogation.567 When
laboratory results revealed plaintiffs carry-on items contained
no explosive materials, plaintiff was issued a ticket for the first
morning flight. 568 Although laboratory results showed her items
contained no explosives, US Airways did not allow plaintiff to
redeem her ticket and board her flight. 569 Plaintiff filed suit
against US Airways, asserting six causes of action.57 °
Plaintiff brought a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
which is intended "to protect the equal right of 'all person[s]
within the jurisdiction of the United States to make and enforce
contracts without respect to race."' 57' The court found that the
claim was supported by allegations that US Airways refused to
allow plaintiff to board her flight and denied the motion to dis-
miss the claim.572 Despite US Airways's insistence that it does
not receive federal assistance sufficient to meet the statutory re-
quirement, 573 the court also did not dismiss plaintiff's federal
claim of discrimination under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, stating that the claim is at least plausible on its face.574
Plaintiff also asserted a federal claim for relief under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, which gives citizens a private cause of action to remedy
violations of the rights secured by the Constitution, but because
plaintiff failed to allege that US Airways acted under the color of
state law, an essential element of a § 1983 claim, the court dis-
missed this claim. 5
The court held that plaintiffs state law claims were pre-
empted by the ADA and dismissed all such claims.576 The court
found that plaintiffs state law claims have a "connection with or
reference to airline 'rates, routes, or services.' ''577 Specifically,
the court stated that plaintiffs claims of negligence and negli-
gent training and supervision directly implicate a boarding deci-
sion and, therefore were preempted by the ADA.578 Moreover,
567 Id.
568 Id. at *4.
569 Id. at *4-5.
570 Id. at *5.
571 Id. at *5-6.
572 Id. at *6-7.
573 Id. at *8.
574 Id. at *8-*9.
575 Id. at *9.
576 Id. at *10-*12.
577 Id. at *10 (citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 379-80
(1992)).
578 Id. at *11.
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the court found that plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress relied in part on denial of boarding and,
therefore was preempted. 57 9 Finally, the court held that plain-
tiffs state claims of false accusations and detainment also re-
lated to boarding procedures, which "falls squarely within the
scope of preemption. 58 0
In Westways World Travel, Inc. v. AMR Corp.,581 the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision to
grant summary judgment to the defendants on their breach of
contract claim.58 2 In this breach of contract action brought by a
group of travel agents against an air carrier and an airline ticket
clearinghouse, the Ninth Circuit held that the ADA did not pre-
empt breach of contract claims.583 Quoting an earlier U.S. Su-
preme Court decision, the Ninth Circuit found that the ADA
does not preempt "court enforcement of contract terms set by
the parties themselves. 58 4 Furthermore, summary judgment for
the defendants on the breach of contract claim was not appro-
priate because a provision in the parties' Agent Reporting
Agreement requiring travel agents to "comply with all instruc-
tions of the carrier" was ambiguous.585 The Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the
defendants on plaintiffs' RICO claims, holding that the plaintiffs
could not demonstrate the predicate racketeering activity re-
quired under the statute. 5 6 Likewise, the appellate court af-
firmed the district court's decision to decertify a class action by
the travel agents, recognizing its "very limited review" of a trial
court's decision to decertify a class,587 and holding that the trial
court had not abused its discretion in concluding that "individ-
ual inquiries would predominate over common questions of law
and fact."5 8
In Air Transport Ass'n of America, Inc. v. Cuomo, an air carriers'
trade group challenged the New York State Passenger Bill of
Rights. 589 The New York legislature enacted the Passenger Bill
579 Id. at *11-*12.
580 Id. at *12.
581 265 Fed. Appx. 472 (9th Cir. 2008).
582 Id. at 475.
583 Id.
584 Id. (quoting Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 222 (1995)).
585 Id.
586 Id. at 474.
587 Id. at 475.
588 Id. at 476.
589 520 F.3d 218, 219 (2d Cir. 2008).
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of Rights after "a series of well-publicized incidents during the
winter of 2006-2007 in which airline passengers endured
lengthy delays grounded on New York runways, some without
being provided water or food."59 The air carriers' trade group
filed suit in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New
York seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds
that the Passenger Bill of Rights is preempted by the ADA and
violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.591 The
district court held that the Passenger Bill of Rights was not ex-
pressly preempted by the ADA because it was not "related to a
price, route, or service of an air carrier. "592 The Second Circuit
reversed, holding that the Passenger Bill of Rights is related to a
price, route, or service of an air carrier.593 The Second Circuit
found a majority of the circuits to have construed "service"
under the ADA to include boarding procedures, baggage han-
dling, and food and drink,594 while the Third and Ninth Circuits
construed service more narrowly.595 The Second Circuit then
held:
requiring airlines to provide food, water, electricity, and
restrooms to passengers during lengthy ground delays does re-
late to the service of an air carrier and therefore falls within the
express terms of the ADA's preemption provision. As a result,
the substantive provisions of the PBR [(Passenger Bill of
Rights)], codified at section 251-g(1) of the New York General
Business Law, are preempted.596
In view of its determination that the New York Passenger Bill of
Rights was preempted by the ADA, the court declined to address
the scope of any FAA preemption.9 7
In Manassas Travel, Inc. v. Worldspan, L.P., a travel agency
claimed that a computer reservation system had intentionally in-
590 Id. at 220.
591 Id.
592 Id. (citing Air Transport Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Cuomo, 528 F. Supp. 2d 62,
66-67 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting 49 U.S.C. §41713(b)(1))).
593 Id. at 221. Finding that there is no implied private right of action for Air
Transport under the ADA, the Second Circuit nevertheless held that "Air Trans-
port was entitled to pursue its preemption challenge through its Supremacy
Clause claim." Id.
594 Id. at 223 (collecting cases from the 1st, 4th, 5th, 7th, and 11th Circuits).
595 Id.
596 Id.
597 Id. at 225.
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terfered with economic relations.598 The travel agency alleged
breach of contract and sought "extra-contract[ual] relief, such
as attorneys' fees, exemplary damages, and interest." '599 Defen-
dant Worldspan conceded that the breach of contract claims
were not preempted by the ADA, but contended that the extra-
contractual relief was preempted by the ADA.6 °° Finding that
other courts had held that claims for punitive damages are pre-
empted by the ADA in cases alleging breach of contract, the dis-
trict court dismissed the claim for punitive damages.6"'
Defendant Worldspan also contended that the two remaining
claims, intentional interference with business relationships and
civil conspiracy, were preempted by the ADA.60 2 The district
court dismissed those claims on other grounds and did not
reach the issue of preemption with respect to those claims.60 3
In Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Carey, an air carrier sued a travel
agency, alleging misuse of its frequent flyer program benefits.60 4
The travel agency counterclaimed, alleging antitrust violations
and various state law claims including fraud, conversion, defa-
mation, and tortious interference with business expectancy.
6 5
Citing the Supreme Court's decision in American Airlines, Inc. v.
Wolens,6 ° 6 the district court held that the travel agency's state law
counterclaims were preempted by the ADA.607 With respect to
the remaining antitrust claims comprising the defendants' coun-
terclaims, the district court found that there were factual dis-
putes which could not be resolved in a 12(b) (6) motion and
denied the carrier's motion to dismiss the antitrust
counterclaims.60 8
In In re Korean Airlines Co. Antitrust Litigation, a class action suit
was filed on behalf of purchasers of tickets of two foreign air
carriers. 609 The issue in this case was whether the term "air car-
598 No. 2:07-CV-701-TC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35217, *1 (D. Utah Apr. 30,
2008).
599 Id. at *6.
600 Id.
601 Id. at *6-7.
602 Id.
603 Id.
604 No. C07-5711 RBL, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88486, *4 (W.D. Wash. July 11,
2008).
605 Id. at *5.
606 Id. at *11 (citing Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995)).
607 Id. at *11 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (2000 & Supp. V 2006)).
608 Id. at *12-13.
609 567 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1215 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
rier" in the ADA included foreign air carriers.61 ° Acknowledg-
ing that the statute's explicit definition of "air carrier" would
appear to exclude foreign air carriers, the district court none-
theless deferred to the weight of authority applying the provi-
sion to foreign air carriers.61' Defendants listed more than a
dozen cases applying the ADA to preempt state law claims
brought against foreign air carriers. The trial court discussed
several of the decisions, and concluded that "while the plain lan-
guage of the ADA preemption provision arguably suggests that
'air carrier' is limited to domestic air carriers, Plaintiffs [sic] fail
to explain why this Court should ignore the uniformity of opin-
ion holding to the contrary.16 12 Having concluded that "air car-
riers" includes foreign air carriers, the district court dismissed
plaintiffs' state law claims under various state antitrust and con-
sumer protection laws that related to the "price of an air car-
rier".61' Finding that the defendants still faced the
consequences of violating federal antitrust law, the district court
also dismissed plaintiffs' state law claims related to pricing.614
In Al-Tawan v. American Airlines, Inc., plaintiffs, all of Iraqi de-
scent, filed suit alleging they were discriminated against by the
airline because the pilot identified them as security risks and
had them removed from the airplane.615 The plaintiffs brought
federal and state law claims.61 6 The district court addressed two
issues: (1) what must a plaintiff plead to state a claim for dis-
crimination, under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, when the airline asserts its
statutory authority, under 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) of the FAA of
1958, to remove a passenger it deems a security risk;6 17 and (2)
whether the ADA preempts a plaintiffs state law tort claims of
false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and negligence.618
The court first found that the highest priority in air com-
merce under the FAA of 1958 is safety.619 A pilot has "very
broad" discretion in determining which passengers "might be" a
610 Id. at 1216.
611 Id. at 1216-19.
612 Id. at 1219.
613 Id. at 1220-21 (citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374,
383 (1992)).
614 Id. at 1221.
615 570 F. Supp. 2d 925, 927-28 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
616 Id.
617 Id. at 928-31.
618 Id. at 932-40.
619 Id. at 929.
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safety risk to the passengers and crew.6 20 The court found that
§ 44902(b) not only creates an affirmative defense, but is an af-
firmative grant of permission to the air carrier to exercise discre-
tion in protecting the safety of a plane and its passengers.62
The district court held that an airline is not subject to liability
for discrimination unless a decision to refuse transport is arbi-
trary and capricious.622 The court found that the plaintiff had
alleged sufficient facts to establish that the defendant's motiva-
tion did not involve safety concerns, but was rather an arbitrary
and racially-motivated decision.6 23 The court concluded, how-
ever, that the plaintiffs' burden would be a "heavy one" at sum-
mary judgment.6 24
The court then addressed whether the ADA preempts a plain-
tiffs state law tort claims of false imprisonment, intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress, and negligence.6 25 The court held
that a claim for false imprisonment is not preempted by the
ADA.626 The court agreed that the "ADA is intended to preempt
economic regulation of airlines by states[, but] is not a safe har-
bor for airlines from civil tort claims. '627 The court also found
that an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is not
preempted where a plaintiff alleges that an airline held him
without any legitimate safety or security justification.628 Finally,
the court found that the ADA generally "does not preempt neg-
ligence actions against airlines based upon theories of failure to
train and failure to supervise if those actions are not related to
the airline's rates, routes, or services. '629 The court noted that
each of the three state law claims could be revisited at summary
judgment. °
In Butler v. United Air Lines, Inc., plaintiff filed a breach of con-
tract claim because she was prevented from boarding a flight for
which she had purchased a ticket.63 1 The airline claimed it
620 Id.'
621 Id. at 930.
622 Id.
623 Id. at 931.
624 Id.
625 Id. at 932-40.
626 Id. at 939.
627 Id. at 938.
628 Id. at 939.
62 Id. at 940.
630 Id.
631 No. C07-04369 CRB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36646, *1-7 (N.D. Cal. May 5,
2008).
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properly denied her passage because her credit card payment
had been denied.61 2 Plaintiff showed that she received emails
confirming her reservation and that her credit card statement
reflected a re-bill of the ticket.63 3 Plaintiff further alleged she
was told repeatedly that she had a valid reservation.6 34 The
court found that the applicable carriage agreement created a
binding contract.635 The court found that the airline had not
cited any particular tariff provision that prohibited its employee
from re-icketing the flight636 and that the employee did not fol-
low the airline's procedures 7.6 3  The airline's motion for sum-
mary judgment on plaintiff's contract and fraud claims was
denied .6 3  The court also found, however, that the plaintiffs
state law consumer protection actions were preempted by the
ADA.6 39 The court held that the ADA preempts claims based on
state law obligations outside the parties' agreement. 640 Since
the California Consumer Protection Act claims sought to regu-
late airline competition in the carrier's marketing practices, the
ADA preemption was in effect. 64 1
In Dejesus v. American Airlines, Inc., the court found that a de-
ceptive advertising claim filed against American Airlines by the
Puerto Rican government was preempted by the ADA.642 The
court found that the ADA preempts any attempt by a state to
regulate an airline's selection and design of marketing mecha-
nisms.643 The court found that any state activity regarding air-
line advertising relates to the airline's rates, routes, or services
and is completely preempted.644 The court thus granted the
carrier's motion for judgment on the pleadings.64 5
In Cathedral of Hope v. Fedex Corporate Services, Inc., a suit involv-
ing a misdelivered package, Cathedral of Hope (CH) and Fedex
Corporate Services, Inc. (FedEx) each moved for summaryjudg-
632 Id. at *8-9.
633 Id. at *7-8.
634 Id. at *1-5.
635 Id. at *11.
636 Id.
637 Id.
638 Id. at *16.
639 Id. at *13.
640 Id. at *13-14.
641 Id. at *15.
642 532 F. Supp. 2d 345, 349 (D.P.R. 2007).
643 Id. at 351.
6- Id. at 353.
645 Id. at 355.
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ment.6 46 The court denied CH's motion and granted in part
and denied in part FedEx's motion.6 47 "Ceridian Payroll Ser-
vices [(Ceridian)] contracted with FedEx to deliver to CH a
package containing payroll checks and related documents" con-
taining personal and financial information.648 "Ceridian com-
pleted a FedEx Airbill for the delivery of the package[, which]
incorporated by reference the terms of the FedEx Service
Guide."64 9 The FedEx Service Guide contained a liability limita-
tion clause stating that "unless a higher value is declared and
paid for, our liability for each package is limited to US $100."650
A FedEx employee mistakenly delivered the Ceridian package to
a thief (rather than to a CH employee), who greeted the FedEx
employee in CH's parking lot and stated that he would sign for
and accept delivery of the package. 651 "CH later discovered that
the payroll checks had been cashed, accounts and charge ac-
counts had been opened using employees' information, employ-
ees' accounts had been overdrawn, and forged driver licenses
had been obtained. 652
CH sued FedEx, claiming that FedEx "breached its contract
with Ceridian under the terms of the Service Guide, and that as
an intended third-party beneficiary of the contract, CH [was]
entitled to recover $ 20,000 [sic] in contractual damages and $
15,000 [sic] in attorney's fees," and, if the liability limitation pro-
vision is enforceable, an additional $100 in damages and
$15,000 in attorney's fees.653 CH moved for summary judgment
on this basis. 654 FedEx argued that CH's claims were preempted
by the ADA and that FedEx's liability was limited to $100.655 CH
replied that FedEx was estopped from invoking the Service
Guide's liability limitations provision because (1) FedEx made
pre-suit verbal offers to settle in excess of $100; and (2) FedEx
waived invocation of the liability provision through its pre-suit
offers. 656 FedEx moved for summary judgment on the basis that




649 Id. at *1-2.
650 Id. at *2.
651 Id.
652 Id. at *2.
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(1) CH's claims, request for attorney's fees, and its equitable es-
toppel and waiver defenses were all preempted by the ADA, and
(2) that its liability for breach of contract was limited to $100.657
The court held that CH was not entitled to summary judg-
ment on its breach of contract claim because it had not estab-
lished beyond peradventure that FedEx was liable under the
terms of the Service Guide.6  The court held that CH's negli-
gence and gross negligence claims were preempted by the ADA
and must be dismissed with prejudice. 659 Following Trujillo v.
American Airlines, Inc.,66 0 the court explained that CH's breach of
contract claim was the means by which it could enforce any
rights as a third-party beneficiary of the agreement between Cer-
idian and FedEx and, therefore CH's negligence and gross neg-
ligence claims were preempted.661 The court declined to decide
the issue of whether CH's reliance on the doctrines of equitable
estoppel and/or waiver were preempted by the ADA and stated
that, even assuming that the defenses are not preempted, FedEx
was entitled to summary judgment dismissing these defenses.662
The court found that CH could not establish each of the requi-
site elements of equitable estoppel since there was no proof that
FedEx concealed the existence of the $100 liability limitation
and no proof that CH did not have knowledge, or was without
means of knowledge, of the liability limitation.66 The court also
held that CH could not establish each of the requisite elements
of waiver, since there were no facts demonstrating that FedEx
intended to waive its right to invoke the liability limitation.664
Finally, the court held that CH's request for attorney's fees were
not preempted by federal law, citing Samtech Corp. v. Federal Ex-
press Corp.,6 6 5 where the court stated that "[a] state statute per-
mitting recovery of attorney's fees is 'too tenuous, remote, or
peripheral' to be subject to preemption. 666
In Feldman v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the Southern District of
New York granted summary judgment in favor of defendant
UPS on plaintiff Ron Feldman's state law claims for fraud, mis-
657 Id. at *4.
658 Id. at *5-7.
659 Id. at *11.
660 938 F. Supp. 392 (N.D. Tex. 1995).
661 Cathedral of Hope, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43031, at *11.
662 Id. at *24.
-3 Id. at *20-21.
664 Id. at *23-24.
665 No. H-03-24, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27130, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2004).
666 Cathedral of Hope, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43031, at *26.
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representation, deceptive business practices, tortious interfer-
ence, breach of duty, and fraudulent inducement as to the
contract for carriage.667 The court found that these claims were
preempted by the ADA.66 However, the court rejected UPS's
motion for summary judgment on Feldman's state law claims as
they related to the parties' contract claims for "failure to de-
liver"66 and claims based on the insurance contract relating to
the shipment.670
Feldman shipped a diamond ring valued at $57,000 through
UPS.6 71 Feldman asked to purchase insurance on the ring and
was told that he could only purchase insurance up to $50,000.672
UPS delivered the ring and when the box reached its destina-
tion, the recipient discovered that the ring was missing.673 The
court rejected his state law tort claims to the extent that they
related to his loss of shipment6 74 but construed the complaint to
allege a claim based upon federal common law negligence. The
court then denied UPS' motion for summary judgment, finding
questions of fact regarding the communication to the customer
of the notice provided of the limitations on liability contained in
the UPS tariff.675 Additionally, Feldman was allowed to proceed
with his state law claims based on the contract and on the insur-
6767
ance agreement. 6 These claims were not preempted by the
ADA.677
In McMullen v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., the district court granted
Delta's motion to dismiss nine claims involving Delta's alleged
failure to properly collect and distribute a tax on persons flying
into Mexico. 678 The court first determined that the claims were
667 Feldman v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 06-Civ.-2490 (MHO), 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 30637, 74 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2008), modified, Feldman v. United Par-
cel Serv., Inc., No. 06-Civ.-2490 (MHO), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48695 (S.D.N.Y.
June 25, 2008) (following Nippon Fire of Marine Ins., Co., Ltd. v. Skyway Freight
Sys., Inc., 235 F.3d 53, 58, 60-62 (2d Cir. 2000), limiting surviving claim to
breach of contract under federal common law, and further holding that under
federal common law the state law insurance contract claim also is preempted.).
668 Id. at *21 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(4)(A) (2000 & Supp. V 2006)).
669 Id. at *62.
670 Id. at *72-73.
671 Id. at *2.
672 Id. at *6.
673 Id. at *7-8.
674 Id. at *33.
675 Id. at *55.
676 Id. at *72-73.
677 Id.
678 No. 08-1523 JSW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75720 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2008).
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preempted by the ADA because they related to Delta's "price,
route, or service, ' 67 9 and then found that the claims were not
entitled to an exception to preemption that, as stated in Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 6 0 applies only when airlines breach
their "own, self-imposed undertakings" rather than a state-im-
posed obligation.6"'
In Med-Trans Corp. v. Benton, the district court granted an air
ambulance provider declaratory and preliminary injunctive re-
lief against North Carolina's enforcement of state regulations of
air ambulance services, based on federal preemption by the
ADA.682 The court first determined that the ADA expressly pre-
empted North Carolina's Certificate of Need (CON) law which
conditions the licensing of an air ambulance provider upon
demonstration that existing air ambulance services in the state
could not accommodate the projected public need for the ser-
vices. 6 8 3 The court rejected North Carolina's argument that its
CON law was not subject to preemption because it was limited to
purely intrastate activity, and instead found that the purpose un-
derlying the CON law directly contravenes the pro-competition
purposes underlying the ADA.684 The court then determined
that certain Emergency Medical Services (EMS) laws and regula-
tions, such as a requirement that an air ambulance synchronize
its voice-radio communications with local EMS, were purely
medical regulations that were appropriate state regulations and
not preempted;6 5 while other regulations, such as a require-
ment that an air ambulance have very high frequency (VHF)
aircraft frequency transceivers and provide continuous 24-hour
service, were aviation regulations and thus preempted by the
ADA.686 The district court subsequently entered permanent in-
junctive relief in accordance with a proposed injunction jointly
filed by the parties.68 7
679 Id. at *7.
680 Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 227-28 (1995).
681 Id. at *12.
682 581 F. Supp. 2d 721, 743 (E.D.N.C. 2008).
683 Id. at 736.
684 Id.
685 Id. at 740.
686 Id. at 739-40.
687 Med-Trans Corp. v. Benton, 591 F. Supp. 2d 812, 812 (E.D.N.C. 2008).
228
2009] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION LAW
VI. FEDERAL PREEMPTION-OTHER
FEDERAL STATUTES
A. AIR CARRIER ACCESS ACT OF 1986-DISCRIMINATION
IN BOARDING
In Wright v. American Airlines, Inc., the Missouri district court
determined that the Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA), which pro-
hibits air carriers from discriminating against private individu-
als, does not confer a private right of action.68 The district
court's decision parted from the governing law in the circuit as
stated in Tallarico v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,6" 9 because Tallarico
was based upon an analysis of private causes of action that the
Supreme Court has since refined.690 The district court deter-
mined that Congress intended the ACAA to preclude alternate
means of enforcement given the powers that the ACAA grants to
the Department of Transportation (DOT)691 The ACAA gives
the DOT the power to compel compliance, revoke an airline's
certificate, or impose fines.692 The ACAA also authorizes the
DOT to initiate an action in a federal district court or to request
that the Department of Justice do so.693 A private individual can
request that the DOT's enforcement decision be reviewed by a
United States Court of Appeals.694
In Thomas v. Northwest Airlines Corp., the district court granted
in part and denied in part an airline's motion to dismiss the
claims of five disabled individuals alleging that the airline dis-
criminated against them by imposing obstacles against disabled
individuals and failing to provide adequate access or assistance
on the aircraft and throughout the terminal.695 The plaintiffs
alleged violations of the ACAA, the Americans with Disabilities
Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.696 The airline
defended on grounds that the ACAA does not provide a private
right of action, that the Americans with Disabilities Act explicitly
bars claims against an airline, and that the Rehabilitation Act
688 249 F.R.D 572, 575 (E.D. Mo. 2008).
689 Id. at 574 (citing Tallarico v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 881 F.2d 566 (8th
Cir. 1989)).
690 Id. (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001)).




695 No. 08-11580, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66864, *1, *3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 2,
2008).
696 Id. at *1-'2.
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does not apply to airline carriers.697 The court relied on Alexan-
der v. Sandovar098 to find that the ACAA does not create a private
right of action.699 The court's analysis of the Americans with
Disabilities Act claim focused on whether airline service qualifies
as "specified public transportation" under that act, which bars
discrimination on the basis of disability in "public accommoda-
tions," which "is defined to include 'a terminal, depot, or other
station used for specified public transportation. ' ' 70 0 Finding
that the Americans with Disabilities Act only stripped "aircraft"
and not "airline-controlled terminals" from the definition of
specified public transportation,0 1 the court determined that the
Americans with Disabilities Act claim could not proceed against
the aircraft, but could proceed as to the allegation that the ter-
minal did not meet its provisions.70 2 The court also commented
that the airline's interpretation of the ACAA would allow it to
discriminate against disabled individuals in its multiple World-
Clubs situated throughout the airport.73  The Rehabilitation
Act prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities
in any program or activity that receives federal financial assis-
tance, and the airline argued that it does not receive such fed-
eral assistance and that the Supreme Court 704 and the Eleventh
Circuit 70 5 have found that the Rehabilitation Act does not apply
to commercial airline carriers.706 The district court denied the
airline's motion to dismiss finding that discovery was needed to
examine the contractual relationship between the airline and
the airport in order to determine whether the airline had suffi-
697 Id. at *4.
698 Id. at *6-7 (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001)).
699 Id. at *12.
700 Id. at *13 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(G) (2006)).
701 Id. at 13* (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12181(10)).
702 Id. at *15-16.
Therefore, a clear distinction must be drawn between aircraft,
which is covered by the ACAA, and the terminal, which is covered
by the ADA. A precise line defining the scope of ADA coverage
within the terminal and the ACAA coverage attendant to aircraft
can only be drawn after the parties are afforded discovery in the
case.
Id.
703 Id. at *15.
704 Id. at *17 (citing United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of
Am., 477 U.S. 597, 605-06 (1986)).
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cient control over the federally funded airport so as to qualify
the airline as a recipient of federal funds and thus subject it to
the Rehabilitation Act.70 7
B. FAA AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1994
In Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transportation Ass'n, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Aviation Administration
Authorization Act of 1994 preempted two provisions of a Maine
statute which regulated and restricted the sale and delivery of
tobacco products purchased via the internet or other electronic
means.70 8 The Court ruled the statute was preempted because it
was connected with or referenced carrier rates, routes, or ser-
vices, and state laws are preempted if they do S. 709 Although
the statute was specifically directed at shippers, its effect was on
the carriers' provision of delivery services. 710 The Court also ad-
dressed the issue whether there was a public health exception to
the preemption, as the state of Maine argued that the statute
was designed to prevent underage smoking.711 The Court ruled
there was no public health exception among the enumerated
exceptions to preemption.712 The Court ruled the states still
have alternative means to prevent underage smoking.713
VII. FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
Generally, in the absence of a waiver of sovereign immunity,
federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear claims against the United
States. The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), however, waives
the government's sovereign immunity for:
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act
or omission of any employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, under circum-
stances where the United States, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred.1
707 Id. at *19.
708 128 S. Ct. 989, 993 (2008).
709 Id. at 995.
710 Id. at 996.
711 Id.
712 Id. at 996-97.
713 Id. at 998.
714 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1) (2000).
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The act excludes independent contractors from its definition of
"employee." '715 Thus, under the FTCA, a determination of
whether an individual may be considered a federal employee is
the amount of control the federal government has over the indi-
vidual's physical performance. In addition, the government
may be shielded under the discretionary function exception of
the FTCA.7 16 This exception insulates the government from lia-
bility for claims based upon a government employee's acts or
omissions in performing a discretionary function or duty that
involves an element of judgment or choice as long as the judg-
ment is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was
designed to shield. If the FTCA does not apply to an action so
as to waive the government's sovereign immunity, the claims
against the government must be dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
Supinski v. United States is illustrative of both the determina-
tion of whether an individual may properly be considered an
employee of the government for purposes of the FTCA and
whether the discretionary function exception applies.717 There,
the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs complaint against the
U.S. government for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding
that the FTCA did not waive the government's sovereign immu-
nity.7 18 The plaintiff brought the action as the personal repre-
sentative of the estates of two passengers who were killed in the
crash of a small airplane.719 The complaint alleged that the
flight instructor and the designated pilot examiner who had cer-
tified the plane's pilot were federal employees and were negli-
gent in certifying the pilot.7 2° As such, the complaint alleged
721that the government was responsible for plaintiffs injuries.
Further, the plaintiff argued that the government was liable for
the FAA's negligent issuance of a certificate to the flight school
that trained the airplane's pilot and in failing to suspend or re-
voke the certification.722 Finally, the plaintiff alleged that the
government was liable because the FAA had negligently hired,
715 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2000).
716 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006).
717 See No. 4:07-CV-963(CEJ), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4478 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 22,
2008).
718 Id. at *11, *18.
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trained, and supervised the FAA employee who had ultimately
approved the pilot's certification.123
First, the court found that neither the flight instructor nor the
designated pilot examiner were federal employees because the
government did not exercise sufficient control over their per-
formance.124 The evidence presented showed that a private firm
employed the instructor, set her training schedule, assigned her
students, set the fees charged for her services, and directly su-
pervised her in the performance of her duties.7 25 The evidence
also showed that the designated pilot examiner was self-em-
ployed, did not have a contract with the FAA to work as a desig-
nated pilot examiner, and did not pay any percentage of his fees
to the FAA.726 The mere fact that both had applied standards
prescribed by federal regulations in assessing the pilot's fitness
for certification did not render either an employee of the
government. 727
Second, the court found that, as to allegations that the em-
ployer of the flight instructor "'failed to meet the curriculum,
qualification and/or operation. requirements of 14 C.F.R. Part
141' ''721 and that the FAA therefore was "negligent in issuing
[the employer's] certificate and in failing to suspend or revoke
it," 729 the government was shielded from liability by the discre-
tionary function exception of the FTCA.730 The court was not
persuaded by plaintiffs argument that the FAA's negligence in
certifying the flight school and failing to decertify the flight
school rendered the government liable.731 The court found that
"[a] 11 of the applicable regulations [regarding flight school cer-
tification] speak in the permissive and they do not set forth a
fixed or readily ascertainable standard which the FAA must ap-
ply in certifying a flight school. '732 Therefore, the court agreed
with the government that the certification of a flight school was
a discretionary activity. 7 3 3 Moreover, the plaintiff failed to point
to any regulation that required the FAA to decertify a flight
723 Id.
724 Id. at *11.
725 Id. at *9.
726 Id.
727 Id. at *10.
728 Id. at *11.
729 Id.
7- Id. at *16-17.
731 Id.
732 Id. at *14.
733 Id.
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school.13 ' The court also rejected plaintiffs argument that the
applicable state law established an analogous duty, finding that
Missouri law did not "recognize a duty in tort to properly inter-
pret and apply regulations," or any other alternative duty. 735
Third, the court explained that the FTCA did not apply to
waive the government's sovereign immunity for the alleged neg-
ligent hiring, training, and supervision of the FAA employee
that approved the pilot's certification because "[d]ecisions con-
cerning the hiring, training, and supervising of federal employ-
ees and independent contractors fall within the discretionary
function exception.7 36
In U.S. Aviation Undenriters Inc. v. United States, the court
granted the government's motion for summary judgment, find-
ing that the action, which alleged that government weather fore-
casters had negligently failed to warn an aircraft crew of clear air
turbulence, was barred under the discretionary function excep-
tion of the FTCA. 7  The plaintiffs alleged that this negligence
resulted in the fatal crash of an aircraft following its encounter
with clear air turbulence conditions. 73 8 The plaintiffs attempted
to argue that the discretionary function exception did not apply
in this case because the actual occurrence of clear air turbu-
lence sufficient to warrant the issuance of warnings had de-
prived the forecasters of their discretion to fail to issue
warnings. 739 The National Weather Service Instructions state
734 Id. at *16.
735 Id. at *17 (citing Cent. Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 169 F.3d 1174 (8th
Cir. 1999)) (claim against the FAA for misinterpreting regulations dismissed be-
cause Missouri does not have comparable duty).
736 Id. at *18. However, the court denied the United States' Motion to Dismiss
relating to plaintiffs claim that a specific named FAA employee allowed the pilot
to take the practical flight test and issued a pilot certificate to him when he did
not meet the regulatory requirements for the practical flight test, holding that
the issue of whether the FAA employee was actually involved in the training or
testing of the pilot was "a factual determination that does not implicate the juris-
dictional matters presently under consideration and [would] not be addressed at
that time." Id. at *20, *22. The court had previously granted the specifically
named employee's motion to dismiss claims against him in his individual capacity
on the grounds that the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensa-
tion Act of 1988, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (1), based upon the Attorney General's cer-
tification that he was "acting within the scope of his office or employment at the
time of the incident out of which the claim arose." Supinski v. United States, No.
4:07-CV-963 (CEJ), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87757 at *2 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 29, 2007)
(quoting § 2679(d)(1), (2)).
737 567 F. Supp. 2d 1407, 1408 (M.D. Ga. 2008).
738 Id. at 1409.
739 Id.
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that such warning "will be issued" when moderate to severe clear
air turbulence is occurring. 40 The court explained that the de-
termination of whether moderate to severe clear air turbulence
is occurring required discretion, and the mandatory language of
the instructions only mandated a response after the discretion-
ary decision already had been made. 41 Therefore, because the
government never decided that significant clear air turbulence
was occurring, the instruction never required a response.742
In In re Air Crash at Lexington, Kentucky, August 27, 2006, the
district court dismissed most of the claims against the U.S. gov-
ernment, brought pursuant to the FTCA, finding instead that
the FTCA did not waive the government's sovereign immunity
because state law did not provide for private liability under simi-
lar circumstances.745 The plaintiff, Comair, alleged (1) that the
government breached a duty to correct, repair, replace, inspect,
and/or approve the configuration, design, lighting, marking
and signage at the airport and a breached its duty to oversee
construction and to inspect for conformance with federal rules;
(2) that the government breached its duty to provide accurate
information regarding this configuration, signage, marking, and
lighting of the airport and to provide instructions or warnings to
the crew that such items were not accurately reflected on a chart
produced byjeppesen, an independent firm; (3) that the gov-
ernment breached a duty to inform the crew regarding con-
struction activities at the airport; and (4) that the allegedly
unreasonable schedule of the air traffic controller on duty at the
time of the crash contributed to the accident.7 4 4 The court ex-
plained that the government, and specifically the FAA, did not
have any duty to insure compliance with its discretionary regula-
tory authority to prescribe minimum safety standards for air-
ports. 745 Rather, the responsibility for compliance with FAA
regulations and for reporting airport conditions rests squarely
with the airport.746 In addition, the court found that the FAA
had not violated the Kentucky "Good Samaritan" doctrine.747
740 Id.
741 Id.
742 Id. at 1410.
743 No. 5:06-CV-316-KSF, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46001, *48-49 (E.D. Ky. June
11, 2008).
7- Id. at *31-32.
745 Id. at *32.
746 Id.
747 Id. at *48.
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The court found that the FAA had assumed no duty with respect
to Comair because the FAA never undertook to render any "ser-
vices" to Comair.748 Additionally, Comair had failed to show
that the government's alleged failure to use care in certifying
Blue Grass Airport's Airport Certification Manual increased the
risk of harm to Comair or turned a nonhazardous condition
into a hazardous one, as required by the Good Samaritan Doc-
trine.749 With regard to the air traffic controller's schedule, the
court stated that it "may fall within the discretionary function
exception" to the FTCA, but because the issue of scheduling ap-
peared to be "intertwined" with Comair's allegations regarding
the air traffic controller's negligence it would be premature to
dismiss Comair's claims regarding the scheduling. 7 0 The court
"reserve[d] consideration of the discretionary function excep-
tion pending presentation of the evidence at trial."
75
'
In Fina Air, Inc. v. United States, the District of Puerto Rico
dismissed an air carrier's claim against the U.S. government al-
leging that the FAA was negligent in certifying the flight school
to which the carrier had sent its pilots for training, finding that
the claim was barred by the FTCA.752 Fina Air (Fina) filed a
petition with the FAA requesting a Part 135 Certificate to con-
duct commercial aviation operations. 753 The FAA "informed
Fina that [its pilots] had to be certified by a qualified flight acad-
emy in order to receive the Part 135 Certificate. '754 Fina then
sought the FAA's permission to use the Pan Am International
Flight Academy to train its personnel.755 Fina alleges that an
FAA employee investigated Pan Am, and Pan Am was ultimately
approved and certified as a qualified academy. 75 6 Fina then in-
vested approximately $350,000 in training its personnel at Pan
Am. 7 The FAA then approved and issued Fina's Part 135 Cer-
tificate.758 Sometime later, the FAA informed Fina "that its pi-
lots had been flying illegally because Pan Am was not a qualified
748 Id. at *45-46.
749 Id. at *46.
750 Id. at *50-51.
751 Id. at *51.
752 555 F. Supp. 2d 321, 322 (D.P.R. 2008).
753 Id.
754 Id. at 322-23.
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academy and therefore could not have certified Fina's pilots. 759
The FAA required Fina to ground its aircraft. 6 °
The court found that the claim was barred by the FTCA's
"negligent misrepresentation" exception to the waiver of sover-
eign immunity.761 Although the carrier had argued that the
FAA was liable because it had been negligent in performing an
operational task, that is the certification of the flight school, the
court determined that the underlying basis of the claim was the
carrier's detrimental reliance on an FAA representation that the
school had been qualified to train and certify the plane's pi-
lots. 76 2 The court also found that the claim failed to satisfy the
FTCA's "private analogous conduct" requirement because the
carrier had presented no evidence that a private person would
be liable under the applicable territorial law for providing inac-
curate information to another who needed the information to
achieve certification.763
In Cahill v. United States, the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Florida found that it did have jurisdiction over the
claims of the survivors and estates of the victims of an aircraft
accident against the United States under the FTCA.6 The
court, however, entered judgment in favor of the government,
finding that the government was not liable for damages stem-
ming from the crash of a twin engine Beech 58P Baron during a
landing attempt at a controlled airport.765 On July 2, 2003, the
Beech 58P Baron crashed on approach at the Memphis Interna-
tional Airport in Memphis, Tennessee. 76 6 The survivors and the
estates of the victims of the crash each sued the United States
under the FTCA767 The court consolidated the four cases.76 8
The plaintiffs alleged that the air traffic controllers at the air-
port failed to maintain appropriate separation between the vic-
tims' plane and a larger plane that had landed on a nearby
runway minutes earlier.769 This loss of separation, according to
759 Id.
760 Id.
761 Id. at 325-28 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2006)).
762 Id. at 327.
763 Id. at 326.
764 No. 8:05-CV-2379-T-24 MSS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35511, *23-24 (M.D.
Fla. Apr. 10, 2008).
765 Id. at *33.
766 Id. at *4-5.
767 Id. at *3 (under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 et seq. (2006)).
768 Id.
769 Id. at *4.
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the plaintiffs, caused the victims' plane to encounter strong
wake turbulence on approach, which, in turn, caused the plane
to crash. 7 0 The FAA has created separation standards to avoid
just such hazards.7 7 1 The evidence presented to the court was
clear that the victims' aircraft was less than four nautical miles,
the amount of separation required by the FAA standards for the
two aircraft, behind the larger aircraft at the relevant time.772
The court determined that the air traffic controllers had a duty
to maintain the minimum separation standard between the two
aircraft and that the controllers breached this duty.773 An ex-
pert for the government testified, however, that atmospheric
conditions near the ground at the time of the accident would
have caused the wake turbulence to deteriorate rapidly.774
Therefore, according to the government, wake turbulence
could not have caused the accident. 775 Other eyewitness testi-
mony supported the conclusion that wake turbulence did not
cause the accident.776 The court ultimately determined that
"[t]he overwhelming weight of the evidence showed that the
Baron did not encounter the wake turbulence created by the
Embraer. 777
In Farag v. United States, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York denied the U.S. government's
motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' claims under the
FTCA.7 7 s The plaintiffs, two friends of Arabic ethnicity, boarded
a domestic commercial flight in San Diego, California, bound
for New York City. 779 Also on the flight were two undercover
federal counterterrorism agents.78 ° The two U.S. agents stated
that the plaintiffs acted "suspiciously" during the flight primarily
because they changed seats to sit near one another, spoke loudly
to one another in English and Arabic, and one suspect repeat-
edly looked at his watch during the flight as if he were timing
770 Id. at *4-5.
771 Id. at *7 (citing Fed. Aviation Admin., Order 7110.65N, Air Traffic
Control).
772 Id. at *8, *13-14.
773 Id. at *27, *33.
774 Id. at *11.
775 Id.
776 Id. at *16-*17.
777 Id. at *30.
778 587 F. Supp. 2d 436, 443 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
779 Id.
780 Id. at 442-43.
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certain intervals."' Upon arrival in New York City, the plaintiffs
were met by a significant law enforcement presence, detained,
transported to a police station, and placed in jail cells, interro-
gated, and finally released some hours later.7 82 The plaintiffs
brought suit against the United States under the FTCA, as well
as against the two undercover U.S. agents.7 83
With regard to the FTCA claims against the United States, the
court first observed that the plaintiffs had complied with the ad-
ministrative prerequisites for suing the United States by filing
written notices of their claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (b).784
The court also determined that, unlike the individual agents,
qualified immunity is a defense unavailable to the United States
in actions brought under the FTCA.7 8 5
The court then analyzed the substantive merits of plaintiffs'
claims under the FTCA.786 Plaintiffs' FICA claims were pre-
mised upon their contentions that the two undercover agents
committed the common law torts of false arrest and false impris-
onment.7 8 7 In cases filed under the FTCA, the court observed
that it must apply the "substantive law of the place where the
events occurred[,]" in this case, New York.788 Under New York
law, the court found that a plaintiff could prevail on a claim for
false arrest if the plaintiff showed that his arrest was not based
on probable cause. 789 The court determined that the plaintiffs
were, in fact, "arrested" based on: (1) the officers' show of force
and restraint of the plaintiffs' movement at the airport terminal;
(2) the transportation of the plaintiffs to the police station, their
confinement in jail cells, and the custodial interrogation; and
(3) the duration of plaintiffs' confinement and interrogation.79 °
The court then explained that the government lacked probable
cause to arrest the plaintiffs. 7 9 ' First, the court opined that all of
the non-ethnic factors, including the alleged conduct of the
plaintiffs during the flight, cited by the government in support
of its argument were, in fact, "benign" and did not tend to sup-
781 Id. at 443-44
782 Id. at 442.
783 Id.
784 Id. at 448.
785 Id. at 452.
786 Id. at 452-470.
787 Id. at 451.
788 Id. (quoting Castro v. United States, 34 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1994)).
789 Id. at 452; Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 84 (2d Cir. 2007).
790 Id. at 452-53.
791 Id. at 460.
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port a finding of probable cause.79 2 In fact, the court stated that
"it cannot rationally be held that if, hypothetically, the plaintiffs
were two Caucasian traveling companions speaking French, or
another non-Arabic language which the agents did not under-
stand, 'a person of reasonable caution' would have believed that
they were engaged in terrorist surveillance."79 Second, the
court held that the plaintiffs' ethnicity could not be used as a
factor to establish probable cause. 9  Therefore, plaintiffs'
claims under the FTCA survived the government's motion for
summary judgment. 9 5
VIII. GENERAL AVIATION REVITALIZATION ACT
In Karim Slate v. United Technologies Corp.,79 6 the California
Court of Appeals considered the application to the General Avi-
ation Revitalization Act (GARA) to a case involving a July 2003
crash of a Sikorsky helicopter manufactured in the 1950's. 797
Plaintiff alleged that the crash was caused by a failure of the
input bevel pinion (IBP) gear in the helicopter's intermediate
gear box.7 98 The intermediate gear box had been removed and
replaced in 1991 by a third party.799 The replacement IBP gear
was manufactured by Fenn Manufacturing. 0 It had been "shot
peened" in 1991 or 1992 in accordance with directions Sikorsky
issued in 1984.8"1
792 Id. at 458-59.
793 Id. at 458 (quoting United States v. Delossantos, 536 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir.
2008)).
794 Id. at 466-68. The court stated as follows:
Even granting that all of the participants in the 9/11 attacks were
Arabs, and even assuming arguendo that a large proportion of
would-be anti-American terrorists are Arabs, the likelihood that any
given airline passenger of Arab ethnicity is a terrorist is so negligible
that Arab ethnicity has no probative value in a particularized rea-
sonable-suspicion or probable-cause determination.
Id. at 464.
795 Id. at 471.
796 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5777 (Cal. App. 2008), cert. denied 2008 Cal.
LEXIS 12434 (Cal. 2008).
7 Id. at *1-2. The helicopter was originally manufactured and sold for the
U.S. Navy, and Sikorsky also alleged a government contractor defense, but be-
cause the trial court had granted summary judgment to Sikorsky on the General
Aviation Revitalization Act, the government contractor defense was not an issue
on appeal. Id. at *2-3.
798 Id. at *2-3.
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The California Court of Appeals first analyzed Sikorsky's de-
fense that it could not be liable in strict liability and tort because
it was not a manufacturer of the IBP gear, however, the court
rejected that argument finding that "the doctrine of strict liabil-
ity in tort may be applied where injury occurs as the proximate
result of a defect in the design of the product," even though the
defendant was not the manufacturer of the part.80 2
The California Court of Appeals next considered the applica-
tion of GARA to the IBP gear installed in 1991 or 1992 (the
accident was in 2003).s83 The court concluded that "a new part
may be the redesigned element of a used part," and that the
rolling statute of repose would apply "to the element of the part
that had been redesigned. '"804 The court considered the effect
of Sikorsky's recommendation that the gear be "shot peened"
and concluded that a "shot peened" part would be significantly
stronger than the non-"shot peened" part and, therefore, "shot
peening" created a new part that triggered a new 18-year period
of repose, as to the design, "beginning on the date of comple-
tion of the replacement. 8 0 5 The court concluded that the com-
pletion of the replacement occurred when the "shot peened"
(that is, in the court's language "redesigned") IBP part was first
installed in the helicopter in late 1991 or 1992, less than 18 years
before the accident.80 6
In reaching this decision, the court relied upon the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Caldwell v.
Enstrom Helicopter Corp.,"'y and a prior California Court of Ap-
peals decision in Hiser v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.,0 s which in-
volved, respectively, allegations that revisions to the flight
manual within eighteen years prior to the accident restarted the
statute of repose "if that revision is alleged to have caused the
accident," and allegations that a redesigned fuel flow switch in-
stalled fifteen years before the accident pursuant to a "technical
bulletin," failed "because of a defective design." ' 9 Accordingly,
the Ninth Circuit reversed the summary judgment in favor of
802 Id. at *5-6 (citing Hyman v. Gordon, 111 Cal. App. 3d 769, 773 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1973)).
803 Id. at *7-14.
804 Id. at *8.
805 Id. at *11 (quoting General Aviation Revitalization Act, 49 U.S.C. § 40101
(2000)).
806 Id.
807 230 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2000).
808 111 Cal. App. 4th 640 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
809 Id. at *9-13.
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Sikorsky, noting that in order for Sikorsky to prevail on a GARA
defense, it would have to "show through undisputed evidence
that shot peening the IBP gear was not a cause of the accident
or that [plaintiff] did not have, and could not acquire, evidence
to show that shot peening the IBP was a cause of the
accident."81 0
In Brewer v. Parker Hannifin Inc., the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals considered the application of GARA81 ' to Parker Han-
nifin parts that had been overhauled by another company
(Aero) since their manufacture in 1984.812 Plaintiff argued that
certain subsequent mailings and manuals issued by Parker Han-
nifin were "parts capable of restarting GARA. ''81' The court dis-
tinguished its prior decision in Caldwell v. Enstrom Helicopter
Corp."14 by stating that the substantial changes to the pump in-
volved in this case (which it referred to as "cannibalized subparts
of Aero-overhauled products"), precluded a finding that any of
the Parker Hannifin manuals which replaced "other manuals
pertinent to a particular [Parker Hannifin] pump," were related
to the "'. . . part of the general aviation aircraft product' that is
'alleged to have caused the death, injury or damage"' in this
case.815 Accordingly, these mailings and manuals failed to "trig-
ger GARA's rolling statute of repose. "816
In Blazevska v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals considered the application of GARA to claims asserted
in the United States arising from an accident outside the United
States.8 17 The case involved the 2004 crash in Bosnia of a Beech-
craft King Air 200 manufactured in 1980.818 The aircraft had
been sold to the Republic of Macedonia in 1980 and was trans-
porting the President of Macedonia and other government offi-
cials to Bosnia when it crashed in rain and fog while attempting
to land.1 9 Plaintiffs filed a product liability action in federal dis-
trict court based upon diversity jurisdiction and alleging prod-
uct liability claims for defects and lack of crashworthiness under
810 Id. at *14.
811 No. 07-35326, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 22588, *2-3 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 2008).
812 Id. at **2-3.
813 See id.
814 Id. (citing Caldwell v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp., 230 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir.
2000)).
815 Id.
816 Id. at *3.
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Macedonian law.8 2° The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed summary judgment for the manufacturer on the grounds
that the application of GARA did not implicate the presumption
against the extraterritorial application of U.S. law.8 2 ' The court
relied upon prior decisions holding that GARA "acts not just as
an affirmative defense, but instead 'creates an explicit statutory
right not to stand trial' [in federal and state courts in the United
States]"8 22 for claims arising from products first sold more than
eighteen years before the filing of the lawsuit.8 2' The court ex-
amined cases involving the extraterritorial effect of statutes reg-
ulating conduct within the United States and concluded that if
the conduct to be regulated occurred in the United States, then
the presumption against the extraterritorial effect of U.S. law
was not implicated. 24 In this case, the court concluded that the
conduct regulated by the statute at issue, namely the trial of a
product liability case in U.S. courts, was purely domestic, and
therefore the application of the statute was not precluded by the
presumption against extraterritoriality.8 25
In Johnson v. Precision Airmotive, LLC, the district court denied
without prejudice the motions for summary judgment of de-
fendants AlliedSignal, Inc., Avco Corporation, Bendix Corpora-
tion, Honeywell, Inc., Honeywell International, Inc., and
Textron, Inc. (which it referred to as "the manufacturing de-
fendants") based upon GARA and the Indiana Statute of Re-
pose.82 6 The case involved the crash of what is only referred to
in the decision as an "airplane" in Indiana, resulting in the
deaths of four passengers. 27 The opinion does not recite any
other facts regarding the aircraft (other than that it was 29 years
old at the time of the accident), the cause or circumstances sur-
rounding the accident, the owner, operator or occupants of the
aircraft, and only refers generally to the fact that the "manufac-
turing defendants" (who were alleged to have "manufactured
original or replacement parts for the airplane or airplane en-
820 Id.
821 Id.
822 Id. at 951 (quoting Estate of Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 283
F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 2002)).
823 Id.
824 Id. at 952-54.
825 Id. at 953.
826 No. 4:07CV1695-CPP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48778, *4 (E.D. Mo. June 26,
2008).
827 Id. at *3.
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gine) were only a "handful" of the defendants. 8 28 However,
plaintiff s counsel submitted an extensive affidavit under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) stating that the engine and
engine parts had been "overhauled, converted, and replaced on
various occasions. '829 The court concluded that, while original
parts on the aircraft may have been more than eighteen years
old, it was not possible without further discovery to determine
the age of any replacement parts.83 0 The court rejected the ar-
gument that GARA establishes an "absolute right not to stand
trial," as stated by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Estate of
Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.,8"1 and refused to limit dis-
covery to the GARA issues on the grounds that it would be diffi-
cult to separate those issues from other issues, particularly in
view of plaintiffs claims that GARA did not apply based upon
the misrepresentation exception, and the parties had shown no
ability to resolve issues without court intervention.83 2 The court
concluded that it would be best to allow discovery as to the cause
of the accident, the parts involved in the accident, and then ad-
dress the issue of whether any of those specific parts were more
than eighteen years of age and whether GARA applied to bar
any action based on those parts.8"3 The court denied the mo-
tions for summary judgment without prejudice and granted the
Rule 56(f) motion filed by plaintiffs to permit discovery before
requiring a response to the motion for summary judgment.83 4
The court concluded by noting that discovery was scheduled to
last for almost a year and a half and there "may well come a
point later in the litigation prior to the close of discovery when
consideration of defendants' GARA motion is appropriate."8 35
Finally, as to the Indiana statute of repose, the court declined to
rule on any choice of laws issues on the grounds that it would be
premature, and that the law of one state might apply to one set
of defendants or a particular issue, and the court did not want to
make a ruling at that time on motions involving only a "handful"
of defendants, that might affect other defendants.836
828 Id. at *1-11.
829 Id. at *9.
830 Id. at *9-10.
831 Id. at *6 (quoting Estate of Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 283
F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2002)).
832 Id. at *6-9.
833 Id. at *8-9.
834 Id. at *9-10.
835 Id. at *10.
836 Id. at *10-11.
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In Moyer v. Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc. the appellate court
initially affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendant
Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc. (TCM), the engine manufac-
turer, and defendants Piedmont Hawthorne Aviation, Inc, and
Divco, Inc., both of which were involved in overhaul and repair
of a TCM engine.837 The Pennsylvania Superior Court of Ap-
peals has granted reargument of this appeal by order entered
October 23, 2008, and has withdrawn the opinion in this case
discussed below.8 38 For this reason, the following discussion is
included only for purposes of comparison with any later opinion
that may be rendered upon reargument and is not precedential.
The lawsuit arose from a 2003 accident involving a single-en-
gine Beech V35B aircraft first delivered to the original pur-
chaser in April 1982.39 The accident occurred when the
aircraft collided with trees during an emergency landing at-
tempt following an engine failure. 4 Plaintiff claimed that the
engine failure was the result of the failure of a repair weld in the
engine crankcase.8 41 The repair weld had been performed by
Divco during the course of an engine overhaul by Piedmont
Hawthorne. 42 Plaintiff further claimed that TCM had issued a
service bulletin approving the use of welding to repair crank-
cases, when it knew that the practice of welding crankcases was
not a safe method of repair, particularly in high stress areas.8 43
Defendant TCM contended that the claim was barred by
GARA because the lawsuit was commenced more than eighteen
years after the product was first sold to a customer.844 Plaintiff
argued that GARA was not applicable and also argued that if it
was applicable, the case fell within two of the statutory excep-
tions to the eighteen-year statute of repose.845 Initially, the
court considered plaintiffs argument that the service letter, is-
sued in 1990, was a new "part" based upon the decision in Cald-
837 2008 Pa. Super 194, 32 Avi. Cases (CCH) 16,691 (all references are to the
previously published CCH Aviation Reporter decision, since withdrawn by the
court).
838 Moyer, 2008 Pa. Super., 194, 194.
839 32 Avi. Cases (CCH) at 16,692.
840 Id.
841 Id.
842 Id. at 16,693.
843 Id. at 16,694.
844 Id. at 16,693.
845 Id. at 16,693-94.
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well v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp.8 46 In Caldwell, the court held that
the FAA-approved flight manual constituted sale of a "part" for
purposes of the statutory exception that triggers the eighteen-
year time period because it contained the instructions necessary
for the safe operation of the aircraft and therefore was insepara-
ble from the aircraft.847 The Moyer court distinguished Caldwell
on the grounds that the service letter was not the equivalent of a
manual, and "that given the continual issuance of service bulle-
tins on a variety of topics, if the statute of repose were triggered
every time a service bulletin was issued, the intent of GARA, that
is, 'to ameliorate the impact of long-tail liability on a declining
American aviation industry,' would be eviscerated."84 Further-
more, the court concluded that the service bulletin was not de-
fective, stating that "it was not the service bulletin that failed but
the crankcase."849 Plaintiff also argued that TCM had knowingly
misrepresented or concealed the hazards associated with weld
repairs of the crankcase. 50 The court concluded, however, that
plaintiff had not met the burden of proving "scienter, or active
obstruction, or even of proving that the weld in this instance was
done pursuant to the specific service bulletin at issue. '8 51 Fi-
nally, plaintiff argued that issuance of the service bulletin was
not an act of manufacturing and therefore TCM was being sued,
not as the manufacturer (which would be barred by GARA), but
as an "engine rebuilder/overhauler. '8 52 The court declined to
rule on that argument because it was not properly presented by
the issues on appeal.8 53 A dissenting opinion would have re-
versed summary judgment at that stage of the case on the
grounds that the service bulletin, which replaced a prior warn-
ing against repair welds of the crankcase, with approval of such
repairs, "fit[ ] comfortably within the terminology and scope of
GARA's rolling provision "as any other part of such aircraft. 8 54
Defendant Piedmont Hawthorne had sought summary judg-
ment on the grounds that there was no evidence of negligence
846 Id. at 16,693 (citing Caldwell v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp., 230 F.3d 1155
(9th Cir. 2000)).
847 Id. (citing Caldwell, 230 F.3d at 1157).
848 Id. (citing Prigden v. Parker Hannifen Corp., 916 A.2d 619, 622 (Pa.
2007)).
849 Id.




854 Id. at 16,697.
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in the performance of the overhaul. 55 Piedmont relied upon
the Federal Aviation Regulations related to repairs to show that
it was required to follow the manufacturer's instructions in per-
forming the overhaul, and that it had done so.8 5 6 Plaintiff's ex-
pert had been critical of Piedmont Hawthorne for relying on
the TCM recommendations in overhauling the engine with a
repair weld in the crankcase. 57 The court held that Piedmont
was not charged with being negligent, but in simply performing
the overhaul, as it was required to do, in reliance upon the en-
gine manufacturer TCM's recommendations.8 58 Accordingly,
the court affirmed summary judgment for Piedmont Haw-
thorne . 59 The dissent, again, would have reversed the summary
judgment on the grounds that a genuine issue of fact existed as
whether the repairs were performed "in a manner which would
satisfy FAA airworthiness standards.
8 60
As will be discussed below, Defendant Divco, Inc., a Tulsa,
Oklahoma company was dismissed for lack of personal
jurisdiction.
IX. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
A. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
In Vibratech, Inc. v. Frost, the Georgia Court of Appeals af-
firmed the trial court's denial of defendant Vibratech's motion
to dismiss, finding that the assertion of personal jurisdiction
over the defendant was proper under both the Georgia Long
Arm Statute and the United States Constitution's Due Process
Clause.8 61 The plaintiffs, the airplane owner and the estates of
five decedents, brought actions against Vibratech, the manufac-
turer of a necessary component part of the engines onboard a
twin-engine aircraft that crashed in Tennessee, following take
off on one leg of a flight originating in Georgia with two
planned stops in Tennessee.862 Plaintiffs alleged that Vibratech,
a defunct Delaware corporation with no offices or agents in
Georgia, had negligently manufactured the component part
855 Id. at 16,694.




8- Id. at 16,697.
86, 661 S.E.2d 185, 198, 191 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008), cert. denied 2008 Ga. LEXIS
692.
862 Id. at 187.
247
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
and that the malfunction of that part, in whole or in part,
caused the deadly crash. 63 Vibratech was the sole supplier of
that part to Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc. (TCM), the en-
gine manufacturer, and had shipped that part to TCM in Ala-
bama for installation in the TCM engine at issue."64 The court
noted that an earlier Georgia decision involving TCM had estab-
lished that shipment of an engine by TCM to a Georgia mainte-
nance facility for installation in an aircraft owned by a Georgia
resident satisfied the "stream of commerce" requirements as to
TCM.s65
The trial court concluded that jurisdiction was proper under
subsection (1) of Georgia's long arm statute, which provides for
jurisdiction over any defendant "transacting any business"
within Georgia. 66 The appellate court agreed. 67 The court ex-
plained that a defendant's contacts with Georgia need not be
direct to satisfy the long arm statute.868 Rather,
[i] n considering whether a Georgia court may exercise jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident based on the transaction of business,
[the court applied] a three-part test:[ j]urisdiction exists on the
basis of transacting business in [Georgia] if (1) the nonresident
defendant has purposefully done some act or consummated
some transaction in [Georgia], (2) if the cause of action arises
from or is connected with such act or transaction, and (3) if the
exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of [Georgia] does not of-
fend traditional fairness and substantial justice. 69
A court uses the first two prongs of this test to determine
whether a defendant establishes the minimum contacts neces-
sary for exercising jurisdiction. 70 If the court determines that
sufficient minimum contacts exist, then it must evaluate other
factors to determine the reasonableness of exercising jurisdic-
tion in Georgia, including: the burden on the defendant, the
forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiffs
interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the inter-
state judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient res-
olution to controversies, and the shared interest of the states in
863 Id.
864 Id.
865 Id. at 189.
866 Id. at 188, 191.
867 Id. at 191.
868 Id. at 190.
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furthering substantive social policies.871 The court found that
Vibratech's commercial activity satisfied all of these require-
ments.8 7 2 Vibratech had placed its component part, which was
alleged to have caused the fatal accident, into the stream of
commerce by supplying it to TCM with the expectation that its
part would be purchased by consumers throughout the United
States, including consumers in Georgia. 73
In Djamoos v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania considered a case in which
the manufacturer of the Pilatus PC-12 aircraft, a Swiss corpora-
tion, moved for dismissal due to lack of personal jurisdiction. 74
The case arose from an accident in Pennsylvania on landing at
State College, Pennsylvania.875 The aircraft had been manufac-
tured in Switzerland, sold to a French company, then a Swiss
company, and then a Massachusetts company, which then sold it
to a Rhode Island LLC, which owned it at the time of the
crash.87 6 Pilatus has no office or employees in the United States,
but has a U.S. subsidiary in Colorado that is responsible for mar-
keting and selling the PC-12 aircraft "throughout the Western
hemisphere. '8 77 The subsidiary's dealer that services the mid-
Atlantic region is based in Baltimore, Maryland. 78 Pilatus
purchases approximately $120,000 to $330,000 per year from
Pennsylvania companies, which is less than one per cent of its
871 Id.
872 Id.
873 Id at 190. The court stated that
[t]he shipment of the damper in this case was not an isolated trans-
action. Evidence in the file indicates that Vibratech and TCM had
a longstanding business arrangement. The two parties apparently
entered into a supply contract, under which Vibratech sold as many
as several hundred dampers per year to TCM for incorporation
into its airplane engines. [footnote omitted, but references fact that
'an aircraft engine by its very nature is 'inherently appropriate' for
interstate travel."] In addition, the two parties entered into a side
agreement in which TCM agreed to indemnify Vibratech to carry
the company as an additional insured on an aviation liability policy.
The certification of insurance to Vibratech under this agreement
indicates that the geographical limit of the coverage is
"Worldwide."
Id.
874 No. 07-1133, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35181, *2-3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 2008).
875 Id. at *3-4.
876 Id. at *4.
877 Id. at *4-5.
878 Id. at *5.
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purchases.879 Pilatus sent its employees into Pennsylvania on
only one occasion in the early 2000's.80 Plaintiffs contended
that the court had both specific and general jurisdiction over
Pilatus for claims arising from the Pennsylvania accident.83
The court first considered specific jurisdiction noting that
Pennsylvania law recognized "tort out/harm in" jurisdiction
over entities causing harm in Pennsylvania from acts outside
Pennsylvania. 82 Nevertheless, the exercise of such jurisdiction
must comport with procedural due process notions of "fair play
and substantial justice. '"883 Plaintiff argued that jurisdiction was
proper under the stream of commerce theory because it was
foreseeable that a defect in the aircraft might result in harm in
Pennsylvania. 884 The court considered Pennzoil Products Co. v.
Colelli & Asociates, Inc.,885 which involved the sale of crude oil by
an out of state producer to an oil refiner which then distributed
its products in Pennsylvania. 8 6 Like the crude oil producer,
plaintiffs argued that Pilatus had "placed its aircraft into the
stream of commerce with the intent to exploit the United States
market. ' 887 However, the court concluded that the aircraft had
not been sold in Pennsylvania,888 and that none of the subse-
quent sales of the accident aircraft had taken place in Penn-
sylvania or involved Pennsylvania residents, the aircraft did not
reach Pennsylvania through any distribution network, and Pi-
latus had no physical presence in Pennsylvania.889 The court es-
sentially concluded that the presence of the aircraft in
Pennsylvania was fortuitous, and that the actions of Pilatus were
more like those of the NewJersey auto dealer in World-Wide Volk-
swagen Corp. v. Woodson8 90 and that "[t]his single, isolated inci-
dent involving a product that Pilatus sold in Europe is not
enough to support jurisdiction in Pennsylvania."891 The court
879 Id.
880 Id.
881 Id. at *10.
882 Id.
883 Id. at *11.
884 See id.
885 Id. at *9-11 (citing Pennzoil Prods. Co. v. Colelli & Assocs., Inc., 149 F.3d
197 (3rd Cir. 1998) (applying Pennsylvania law)).
886 Id. at *13-14.
887 Id. at *14.
888 Id. at *18 n.5. The court noted that there were six PC-12 aircraft registered
to owners having addresses in Pennsylvania.
889 Id. at *4, *18.
890 World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
891 Id. at *15 (citing World-Wide Volkswagon, 444 U.S. at 297).
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stated that under either the test set forth by Justice O'Connor or
the less stringent test set forth by Justice Brennan in Asahi Metal
Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County,8 92
neither Pilatus nor its U.S. subsidiary are directly involved in
marketing the aircraft in the United States once they are sold to
dealers.8 93 Furthermore, the court concluded that the stream of
commerce theory was "not entirely apposite in this case, because
the subject aircraft did not enter Pennsylvania through any
stream of commerce, 89 4 but that " [t] he plane's only connection
to Pennsylvania was that it was flying over Pennsylvania and at-
tempting to land at a Pennsylvania airport when it crashed. 895
Finally, the court concluded that "[s] pecific jurisdiction exists
where a defendant purposefully directs his activities at a forum
and the harm arises out of or is related to those activities. 89
6
The court also rejected the argument that general jurisdiction
existed because neither Pilatus nor its U.S. subsidiary have a
physical presence, mailing address, phone number, employee,
shareholder or bank account in Pennsylvania.8 97 Neither com-
pany advertises locally in Pennsylvania, and only through publi-
cations with nationwide circulation.898 Neither company had
made any direct sales in Pennsylvania for five years, and sales by
an independent distributor normally do not constitute the type
of contacts required for general jurisdiction. 899 The court also
rejected arguments relating to the volume of sales in the United
States generally, limiting its consideration to the contacts with
the State of Pennsylvania for purposes of a general jurisdiction
analysis.900 Moreover, the court rejected plaintiff's arguments
that mere evidence of past sales to Pennsylvania residents was
sufficient to support general jurisdiction, because to do other-
wise, the court noted, would be to "inject the stream of com-
merce theory "in this instance relating only to the distribution of
other products not involved in causing plaintiffs' harm" into the
general jurisdiction context,"0 1 and that the "stream of com-
892 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County, 480
U.S. 102 (1987).
893 Djamoos, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35181, at *16-18.
894 Id. at *19.
895 Id.
896 Id. at *20.
897 Id. at *22-23.
898 Id. at *23.
899 Id. at *24.
900 Id. at *25-26.
90, Id. at *26.
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merce theory, ... provides no basis for exercising generaljuris-
diction over a nonresident defendant. 90 2 Finally, in rejecting
arguments that Pilatus had purchased products from Penn-
sylvania suppliers, the court echoed the same analysis described
below in Pease v. Kelly Aerospace, Inc.,9 °3 by referring to Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall' 4 and the Supreme Court's
rejection of evidence of substantial unrelated purchases by the
defendant from the forum state for purposes of attempting to
establish general jurisdiction over a defendant.0 5
Having determined that the Pennsylvania courts did not have
specific or general jurisdiction over Pilatus, the court next
turned to plaintiffs' motion to transfer the case to Colorado, the
principal place of business of Pilatus's U.S. subsidiary. 90 6 The
court noted that transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1631 requires that
the transferee court be one "'in which the action ... could have
been brought at the time it was filed."' 907 The court considered
the relationship between Pilatus and its wholly-owned U.S. sub-
sidiary and concluded that the mere presence of a wholly-owned
subsidiary does not subject the parent corporation to jurisdic-
tion in the state in which the subsidiary is subject to jurisdic-
tion.0 ' Instead, it must be established that the subsidiary is the
"mere instrumentality" or "alter ego" of the parent in order to
attribute the subsidiary's contacts to the parent.09 The court
concluded that the mere fact of overlapping directors, that the
president of the subsidiary later became the president of Pilatus
and that the companies have the same logo, is insufficient to
establish that it is the "mere instrumentality" or "alter ego" of
Pilatus in the absence of evidence that the subsidiary is under-
capitalized, that most of its business is with the parent, that the
parent finances the subsidiary and pays its expenses, or that its
902 Id. at *27.
903 See Pease v. Kelly Aerospace, Inc., No. 2:07 cv 340-ID, 2008 LEXIS 48187
(N.D. Ala. June 20, 2008).
904 Djamoos, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35181, at *27-28 (citing Helicopteros Na-
cionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984)).
9005 Id. at *27-28 (noting that in Helicopteros, defendant's major purchases
(almost 80% of its total purchases) and regular employee visits to the forum were
insufficient to establish general jurisdiction). Pilatus's contacts with Pennsylvania
are minimal compared to those in Helicopteros.
906 Id. at *29.
907 Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2006)).
908 Id. at *34.
909 Id.
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directors act on direction from Pilatus.91 ° Thus, because "Pi-
latus, on its own, does not have the systematic and continuous
contacts with Colorado that would subject it to general jurisdic-
tion there,"9 1' and "plaintiffs have not provided clear evidence
that [the subsidiary] is Pilatus's alter ego, '9 12 the court con-
cluded that transfer to Colorado would not be proper under
§ 1631 and denied the motion to transfer.913
In Moyer v. Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc., the Pennsylvania
Superior Court of Appeals considered personal jurisdiction over
Divco, Inc., which had been involved in overhaul and repair of a
TCM engine. 914 As discussed above, the court of appeals has
granted a request for reargument in that case, and has with-
drawn the opinion discussed below.9 5 It is included in this arti-
cle for purposes of comparison with any later opinion and not as
precedent.
Divco, a Tulsa, Oklahoma company, objected to personal ju-
risdiction in Pennsylvania. 1 6 The lawsuit arose from a 2003 ac-
cident involving a single-engine Beech V35B aircraft first
delivered to the original purchaser in April 1982."' 7 The acci-
dent occurred when the aircraft collided with trees during an
emergency landing attempt following an engine failure. 918
Plaintiff claimed that the engine failure was the result of the
failure of a repair weld in the engine crankcase. 919 The repair
weld had been performed by Divco during the course of an en-
gine overhaul by Piedmont Hawthorne.92 ° Plaintiff further
claimed that TCM had issued a service bulletin approving the
use of welding to repair crankcases, when it knew that the prac-
tice of welding crankcases was not a safe method of repair, par-
ticularly in high stress areas.921
The court affirmed Divco's dismissal on the grounds that it
had insufficient contacts with Pennsylvania to support personal
910 Id. at *36.
911 Id. at *37.
912 Id.
913 Id.
914 No. 1402-EDA-2007, 2008 Pa. Super 194 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2008).
915 Moyer v. Teledyne Cont'l Motors, Inc., 2008 Pa. Super. LEXIS 3721 (Pa.
Super. Ct. Oct. 23, 2008).
916 Moyer, 2008 Pa. Super 194, at 3.
917 Id. at 2.
918 Id.
919 Id. at 2-3.
920 Id. at 3.
921 Id. at 8.
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jurisdiction.9 22 Divco, Inc. had minimal sales to Pennsylvania re-
sidents (less than 1.5%) each year.923 While Divco maintained a
web site, it did not sell parts directly over the internet using an
interactive web site.924 The only use of the web site was to en-
able prospective customers to request information, or to enable
existing customers to check on the status of an order, and no
orders were taken through the internet unless the person was an
existing customer and then the billing was not done electroni-
cally.925 Under Pennsylvania case law, even in cases involving
specific jurisdiction, there must be sufficient continuous con-
tacts with the State of Pennsylvania that it would be reasonable
for the defendant to expect that it might be haled into court in
Pennsylvania.926 Based upon the limited contacts with Penn-
sylvania in this case, the court held that there were insufficient
contacts to support personal jurisdiction over Divco, Inc.9 27
In Pease v. Kelly Aerospace, Inc.9 28 the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Alabama considered a case in which defen-
dant Main Turbo, a California corporation, overhauled a turbo-
charger manufactured by Kelly Aerospace, an Alabama
corporation.9 29 The turbocharger had been manufactured in
Alabama and installed on an aircraft engine manufactured by
Lycoming, a Pennsylvania corporation, and installed on a Piper
aircraft thereafter sold to an Ohio resident.93 ° The Ohio resi-
dent contracted with an Ohio corporation to overhaul the tur-
bocharger, and the Ohio corporation sent the turbocharger to
Main Turbo in California for the overhaul. 1 Main Turbo over-
hauled the turbocharger in California and returned it to Ohio,
where the Ohio corporation reinstalled it on plaintiff's aircraft




926 Id. at 11.
927 Id.
928 No. 2:07cv340-ID, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48187 (M.D. Ala. June 20, 2008),
recon. denied 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84788 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 4, 2008). Notably, on
motion for reconsideration, plaintiff requested that instead of dismissal, the case
should be transferred to the U.S. District Court the Central District of California.
The district court rejected that request as untimely stating that it was not raised
prior to the request for reconsideration and that such a request was not an appro-
priate grounds for requesting reconsideration under F.R.Civ.P. 59(e).
9- Pease, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48187, at *1-2.
930 Id. at *5-6.
931 Id.
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engine.93 2 Thereafter, the aircraft on which the turbocharger
was installed suffered an engine failure and crashed in Tennes-
see. 933 Plaintiff brought suit in Alabama against Kelly Aero-
space, Lycoming and Main Turbo.93 4
Main Turbo filed its motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction.935 Plaintiff contended that either specific or gen-
eral jurisdiction existed.9 36 The court applied the Alabama long
arm statute, which has been interpreted as extending personal
jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted under the U.S. Con-
stitution.937 The court described Main Turbo as having its prin-
cipal place of business in California, owning no property in
Alabama and having no place of business in Alabama.9 3 8 Main
Turbo purchased parts from Kelly Aerospace on other occasions
(although the parts used to overhaul the engine at issue had
been purchased from a Texas company) .9 39 The court noted
that Main Turbo maintained an informational web site that did
not allow customers to post messages or place orders. 940 The
court also noted that Main Turbo did not advertise locally in
Alabama and only occasionally advertised nationally in Trade-A-
Plane Magazine. 941 Less than one-half of one percent of its na-
tional business, both in number of units overhauled and reve-
nue, had been with Alabama residents during the four years
prior to the accident.94 2
The court first reviewed the issue of specific jurisdiction and
concluded that the mere fact that the part overhauled had been
manufactured in Alabama was not a sufficient contact with the
State of Alabama to conclude that the claims arose out of any
contacts between Main Turbo and the State of Alabama or any
of its residents.943 The court distinguished this case from one in
which a resident of Alabama may have sustained injuries in Ala-
bama as a result of the conduct of the defendant.944 The court
932 Id.
933 Id. at *6.
934 Id.
935 Id. at *2.
936 Id. at *9.
937 Id. at *10.
938 Id. at *5-7.
939 Id. at *14-15.
940 Id. at *8.
941 Id.
942 Id. at *8-*9.
943 Id. at *13.
94 Id. at *14.
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noted that in such cases "a state's 'direct interest in the cause of
action' is heightened if the harm occurs in the forum and if the
plaintiff resides in the forum."'945 The court concluded that in
this case, involving a non-resident plaintiff, who was not injured
in Alabama, there was simply "no evidence of any activity by
Main Turbo 'in the forum state' which is related to the causes of
action . "..."946 Furthermore, the unilateral activity of the plain-
tiff in purchasing a product manufactured in Alabama did not
establish such a contact.947 Finally, the court concluded that
"the contacts were not 'such that [the defendant] should rea-
sonably anticipate being haled into court [in Alabama]" in this
case. 
9 48
The court next considered the issue of general personal juris-
diction and determined Main Turbo had none of the contacts
with Alabama normally associated with doing business in the
state, such as agents for service of process, business operations,
solicitation of business, contracts, employees or ownership of
real or personal property in the state.9 49 Furthermore, the lim-
ited revenues (approximately $16,000 over four years) from Ala-
bama customers, which constituted less than one half of one
percent of total revenues, outweighed the fact that those reve-
nues were derived from Alabama customers with repeat busi-
ness.950 The court could not "overlook the fact" that those
revenues were small in comparison with Main Turbo's overall
business.95 ' Comparing that percentage of revenues to those of
defendants in other reported cases involving general jurisdic-
tion, the court concluded that those revenues were not signifi-
cant.9 52 Finally, the court rejected the argument that Main
Turbo had purchased a substantial volume of parts from Kelly
Aerospace in Alabama, comparing that argument to the argu-
ment rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Helicopteros Nacion-
ales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,9 53 in which plaintiff argued
unsuccessfully for personal jurisdiction because the defendant
945 Id. (citing Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 1987).
946 Id. at *15 (citing Sloss Indus. Corp. v. Eurisol, 488 F.3d 922, 925 (11th Cir.
2000)).
947 Id. at *16.
948 Id. at *17 (citing Vermeulen v. Renault U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1546
(11th Cir. 1993)).
949 Id. at *18-19.
950 Id. at *20-21.
951 Id. at *21.
952 Id. at *24.
953 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
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purchased 80 percent of its helicopter fleet, as well as $4,000,000
in spare parts, from the forum state.9 54 The court stated that
these purchases, as in Helicopteros, were unrelated to the instant
lawsuit and insufficient to support the court's exercise of gen-
eral personal jurisdiction.955
B. FEDERAL JURISDICTION-REMOVAL-FEDERAL PREEMPTION
In Gonzalez v. Ever-Ready Oil, Inc., the U.S. District Court for
the District of New Mexico remanded a personal injury action
against US Airways alleging violations of the New Mexico dram
shop act and state liquor laws.956 US Airways had removed the
case on the grounds that the FAA of 1958 and the applicable
Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) preempted state law and
raised substantial, disputed issues of federal law creating subject
matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331."' 7
The district court reviewed the interface between federal and
state law and concluded that an issue existed as to whether the
applicable standard to be applied in determining liability was a
federal or state standard. 958 Nevertheless, if federal law pro-
vided the standard of care, the court concluded that the applica-
tion of federal law to the specific facts of each case involved only
the application of well-established federal law, and did not in-
volve "substantial and disputed" federal issues.959 In such fact
specific cases, the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in find-
ing federal subject matter jurisdiction in Grable & Sons Metal
Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing.960 was not
applicable because that case involved primarily the interpreta-
tion of federal law, and it was not dependent upon the resolu-
tion of any disputed fact relating to the dispositive question of
federal law.96 Instead, the court concluded that the present
case was similar to Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. Mc-
954 Id. at *25.
955 Id. at *24.
956 No. 07-1181 JP/DJS, slip op., 12 (D.N.M. May 2, 2008).
957 Id.
958 Id. at 8 (the court declines to resolve the question of whether federal avia-
tion law preempts state law standards of care in tort claims involving sale of alco-
holic beverages on board commercial flights.).
959 Id.
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Veigh,962 which the Supreme Court stated was "poles apart" from
Grable because it was "fact-bound and situation-specific" in its
resolution, rather than "presenting a nearly 'pure issue of
law."963 Thus, the court concluded that the rule in Grable pro-
viding federal subject matter jurisdiction in cases turning prima-
rily on the interpretation of a federal law to otherwise
undisputed facts, was narrowly limited to such cases.964
The court also considered the effect of federal preemption of
aviation safety regulations and concluded that any such federal
preemption was not intended to create federal subject matter
jurisdiction in the broad class of aviation cases because Congress
had not created a federal cause of action for cases involving air
safety, federal subject matter jurisdiction was not necessary for
uniform application of federal law in cases involving air safety,
and perhaps most importantly, the adoption of federal subject
matter jurisdiction in all cases involving aviation safety would
"extend Grable and the arising-under jurisdiction well beyond
the scope the Justices are willing to tolerate," and would "move a
whole category of suits to federal court. "965 Indeed, the court
observed that the effect of such a finding of federal court re-
moval subject matter jurisdiction in every case in which federal
law provides the applicable standard would be to substantially
expand the scope of federal jurisdiction and "move a whole cate-
gory of suits to federal court," thereby changing the balance be-
tween federal and state court jurisdiction.9 66  The court
concluded that in this case "[t]o allow any state tort claim with
an element of federal aviation law into federal court, particu-
larly when Congress has not created a federal cause of action,
appears to be inconsistent with congressional judgment about
the scope of federal courts' jurisdiction over state law tort claims
involving aviation." '967
In Collins v. America West Airlines, Inc., the court remanded an
action against an air carrier by representatives of individuals
who had been killed in an automobile accident caused by an
intoxicated motorist who allegedly had been served alcoholic
962 Id. at (citing Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S.
677, 699 (2006)).
963 Id. at 4 (citing Empire Healthchoice, 547 U.S. at 700-01).
964 Id.
965 Id. at 11 (quoting Bennett v. Southwest Airlines Co., 484 F.3d 907 (7th Cir.
2007)).
966 Id. at 16,349 (quoting Bennett, 484 F.3d at 911).
967 Id.
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beverages aboard one of the carrier's flights in violation of state
liquor control and dram shop statutes because the court found
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.96 The carrier argued
that the court had jurisdiction to hear the claims because they
raised substantial, disputed issues of federal law relating to the
regulation of the national airline industry, which required reso-
lution as a predicate for the plaintiffs to obtain the relief they
sought.96 9 The court was not persuaded, choosing instead to fol-
low the "thorough and thoughtful opinion" in Gonzales, which
held that personal injury or wrongful death claims arising from
the service of alcoholic beverages on commercial airline flights
(including the issue of whether federal preemption required
the application of a federal standard of care rather than the
state law standard alleged by plaintiffs) were not "legally suffi-
cient to invoke federal jurisdiction."97
In Goonewardena v. AMR Corp., the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York held that it lacked original jurisdic-
tion and supplemental jurisdiction over a suit filed by plaintiff
Prasanna W. Goonewardena (Goonewardena) alleging that
AMR Corp. had discriminated against him based upon his race,
creed, color, and national origin by refusing his request for
overnight accommodation when his flight was cancelled and for
removing him from his flight the next day on the basis that he
was ill.97 1 Goonewardena originally filed the suit in New York
state court, and defendants removed the action to federal
court.972 Goonewardena, proceeding pro se, amended the com-
plaint to limit his damages to less than $75,000, withdrew his
claim under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and moved the district
court to remand the case to state court based on lack of
jurisdiction.973
The first issue before the court was whether, because of the
doctrine of complete preemption, the court had original juris-
diction over Goonewardena's remaining state claims.974 Citing
968 No. Civ 08-78 MCA/WDS, slip op., 1 (D.N.M. May 12, 2008).
969 Id. at 2.
970 Id. at 3.
971 No. 08-cv-4141, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96013, *9-10 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 25,
2008).
972 Id. at *2.
973 Id. at *1-3.
974 Id. at *4. The court noted that by amending the complaint to attempt to
eliminate a basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction, the propriety of removal
was not affected as that it determined as of the time of the removal. The court
concluded that both diversity and the federal civil rights claims provided a basis
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Sullivan v. American Airlines, Inc.,9 75 the court stated that
"[u]nder the complete-preemption doctrine, certain federal
statutes are construed to have such 'extraordinary' preemptive
force that state-law claims coming with the scope of the federal
statute are transformed, for jurisdictional purposes, into federal
claims-i.e., completely preempted."976 While defendants at-
tempted to argue that the suit arose under federal law simply
because defendants may have been able to raise ordinary pre-
emption under the FAA of 1958 or ADA as a defense, the court
disagreed.977 Rather, the court held that in order for Defend-
ants to have shown that the FAA of 1958 and ADA completely
preempted state law, they would have to establish that
Goonewardena's claims were "in actuality nothing more than
claims brought under the FAA of 1958 and the ADA, clothed as
claims under the New York Human Rights Law. '978 Because
neither the FAA of 1958 nor the ADA provides a private right of
action, the court found that this would be impossible for de-
fendants to establish-Goonewardena could not have brought
his claims under either of those federal statutes.979 For these
reasons, the court held that it lacked original jurisdiction over
Goonewardena's state law claims.98 °
Because Goonewardena had withdrawn all claims over which
the court had original jurisdiction, the second issue before the
court was whether the court should assert supplemental jurisdic-
tion over the remaining state law claims9 81  In light of
Goonewardena having withdrawn his single federal claim very
early in the litigation, the court declined to exercise supplemen-
tal jurisdiction over the remaining claims and remanded the
case to state court.
98 2
for removal and that the removal had been proper. Nevertheless, upon amend-
ment that eliminates the claims providing federal subject matter jurisdiction, the
court may in its discretion continue to hear the case based on supplemental juris-
diction or it can remand the case. In this instance, in order to determine
whether the court could decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and re-
mand the case, it was necessary to first determine whether, as a result of the
amendment, any other basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction existed. Id. at
*2-4.
975 Id. at *4 (quoting Sullivan, 424 F.3d 267, 271-72 (2d Cir. 2005)).
976 Id. at *4-5.
977 Id. at *5-6
978 Id. at *6.
979 Id. at *6-7.
980 Id. at *8.
98, Id.
982 Id. at *9.
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In Ray v. American Airlines, Inc., the Arkansas district court de-
nied the plaintiffs motion to remand and found that an airline
passenger's state law claims against an air carrier arising out of
the diversion, extended ground stop, and delay of her flight
were properly removed to federal district court*83 The court
determined that it had jurisdiction under diversity of citizen-
ship, and explained that the complaint contained sufficient alle-
gations to support a potential recovery exceeding the court's
jurisdictional amount of $75,000 in an individual case or
$5,000,000 in the aggregate in a class action.984 Although the
complaint contained no specific amount of damages sought, the
court found that the carrier proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that the amount in controversy exceeded the jurisdic-
tional amount.98 5 The court based its findings at least in part on
a settlement letter sent by plaintiffs counsel to the defendant,
demanding a $50,000 payment to plaintiff for her individual
claim, and a $5,000,000 payment for the class action claim, as
well as $74,900 for another passenger who had filed an identical
claim in California and a $5,000,000 payment to settle the class
action claim in the California case. 9 6 The court determined,
over plaintiffs objections, that Federal Rule of Evidence 408 did
not prohibit the use of the purportedly-confidential settlement
letter for the limited purpose of establishing the amount in con-
troversy, even though the letter would be inadmissible to estab-
lish liability or the invalidity of the claim or its amount.987
C. JURISDICTION-REMOVAL-MONTREAL
AND WARSAW CONVENTIONS
The cases involving preemption by the Montreal and Warsaw
Conventions are discussed above in Section I.
D. PROCEDURE: FEDERAL JURISDICTION-REMOVAL-
FEDERAL OFFICER REMOVAL
In Swanstrom v. Teledyne Continental Motors, the federal district
court granted plaintiffs motion to remand the case to the Cir-
cuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama.988 Defendant Cirrus
Corporation removed the case to federal court on the grounds
983 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42998, No. 08-5025, *3 (W.D. Ark. June 2, 2008).
984 Id. at *13.
985 Id.
986 Id. at *10-11.
987 Id. at *11-12.
988 531 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1333 (S.D. Ala. 2008).
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that the defendant's actions implicated by plaintiff's claims that
the design of the firewall of the Cirrus aircraft involved in the
accident did not meet FAA regulations, resulting in a right to
federal officer removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a). ° 9 The court
recognized that the claims specifically related to the certification
of the design of the firewall as meeting FAA regulations by FAA
Designated Engineering Representatives (DERs), who were act-
ing on behalf of the FAA, even though they were also employees
of the aircraft manufacturer.990 However, the district court
noted that neither of these DERs were named as defendants,
and the allegations did not identify a specific FAA representative
whose conduct resulted in the alleged claims.99 ' The court
noted that federal officer removal was not available where the
conduct alleged was "mere [ly] participation in a regulated in-
dustry... unless the challenged conduct is closely linked to de-
tailed and specific regulations. "992 And while the
"manufacturing [of] an airplane and its parts is highly regulated
by the FAA,... expanding participat[ion] in a regulated indus-
try to allow removal under the federal officer removal statute is
not the purpose or intent of the statute."9 The court con-
cluded that "removal is appropriate only where the FAA repre-
sentative has been specifically named and the allegations relate
to conduct of the FAA representative while acting in the capacity
of an FAA representative." '94
E. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
In In re Air Crash Near Peixoto de Azeveda, Brazil, on September 29,
2006, the trial court granted a motion by defendants for dismis-
sal on the grounds of forum non conveniens.995 Plaintiffs had
brought numerous actions in the United States on behalf of pas-
sengers who were killed in the crash of a foreign airliner during
a domestic flight within Brazil.996 Those actions were referred to
a multi-district panel.997 All of the plaintiffs were "Brazilian citi-
zens and residents, and the decedents they represent[ed] were
989 Id. at 1329.
990 Id. at 1332.
991 Id.
992 Id. at 1331-33 (quoting King v. Provident Bank, 428 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1231
(M.D. Ala. 2006)).
993 Id. at 1332.
994 Id. at 1333.
995 574 F. Supp. 2d 272, 275 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
996 Id. at 275-76.
-7 Id. at 275.
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all Brazilian citizens and residents at the time of their deaths."99 8
The defendants included both residents of the United States
and Brazilian entities."' At the time of the crash, it was the
deadliest air disaster in Brazilian history."" 0 Brazilian authori-
ties had undertaken an investigation of the accident, numerous
court proceedings had been commenced in Brazil, a criminal
action was proceeding in Brazilian federal court, and numerous
civil actions had been brought against the Brazilian airline in
Brazilian courts.100" Most of the defendants agreed, as a condi-
tion of dismissal of the Multi-district litigation (MDL) proceed-
ing, to consent to the jurisdiction of the Brazilian courts, to toll
the applicable statute of limitations for a period of 120 days after
dismissal, to make available to the Brazilian courts any witnesses
or documents in their possession, custody, or control that the
Brazilian court may deem relevant, and to pay any post-appeal
judgment awarded against them by a Brazilian court.100 2
The court explained that a determination of whether an ac-
tion should be dismissed for forum non conveniens requires a
three-step process. 100 3 First, the court must determine the de-
gree of deference properly accorded the plaintiffs choice of fo-
rum. 1004  Second, the court must determine whether the
defendant's proposed alternative forum, in this case Brazil, was
available and adequate to adjudicate the dispute. 0 0 5 Third, the
Court must balance certain public and private interests impli-
cated in the choice of forum. 10 0 6
Generally, a plaintiff who chooses their home forum is due
great deference because that forum is presumed to be conve-
nient.1l°° On the other hand, "when a foreign plaintiff chooses
a U.S. forum it 'is much less reasonable' to presume that the
choice was made for convenience. '"1008 To determine whether
the plaintiff's choice was truly motivated by convenience in such
998 Id. at 275-76.
9- Id. at 276-77.
1000 Id. at 277.
1001 Id.
1002 Id. at 277-78.
1003 Id. at 278-79.
1004 Id. at 278 (quoting Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 416 F.3d
146, 153 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted)).
1005 Id. (quoting Norex, 416 F.3d at 153 (internal quotations omitted)).
1006 Id. (quoting Norex, 416 F.3d at 153 (internal quotations omitted)).
1007 Id. at 279.
1008 Id. (quoting Iragorri v. United Tech. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 2001)
(internal quotations omitted)).
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a case, the court applies a sliding scale and examines: "(1) the
convenience of the plaintiffs residence in relation to the cho-
sen forum; (2) the availability of witnesses or evidence to the
forum district; (3) the defendant's amenability to suit in the fo-
rum district; (4) the availability of appropriate legal assistance;
and (5) other reasons related to convenience or expense."1009
The court is not required to examine every factor because the
analysis tends to be highly factual.1010 The plaintiffs argued that
they should be accorded the full deference a resident plaintiff
would receive because the United States and Brazil had entered
into a treaty guaranteeing Brazilian citizens equal access to U.S.
courts."1 1 The court disagreed with plaintiffs, noting that the
treaty language cited by the plaintiffs, "by its express terms, re-
quire[d] that the signatories' courts be open to foreign nation-
als who happen to be located within the territory of the
other.'10 12 There was no indication that the plaintiffs were phys-
ically located within the United States or had ever even visited
the U.S.10 13 The court also pointed out that the defendants
would be subject to jurisdiction in Brazil, that the plane was
owned and operated by a Brazilian airline while within the juris-
diction of Brazilian air traffic control, and that significant evi-
dence from certain Brazilian entities would not be available in
the U.S. but likely would be available in Brazil.' 10 4 On the other
hand, the only evidence that might not have been available in
Brazil was the live testimony of the pilots, both U.S. citizens.0 15
Although the court recognized the importance of the pilots' tes-
timony, the court also pointed out that they could be required
to provide testimony via letters rogatory.' °16 If the case were to
proceed in the United States, however, the parties may not have
access to the testimony of the Brazilian air traffic controllers be-
cause they could refuse to testify in the U.S. on sovereign immu-
nity grounds. 0 17 Thus, because the plaintiffs' choice of forum
was granted a lesser degree of deference, the court found that
"the action should be dismissed only if the chosen forum is
1009 Id. at 279-80 (quoting Iragorri, 274 F.3d at 72 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quo-
tations omitted)).
1010 Id. at 280.
loll Id.




1016 Id. at 281-82.
1017 Id.
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shown to be genuinely inconvenient and the alternate forum
significantly preferable.' 10 18
The court found that Brazil was an available alternate fo-
rum. 1019 Most of the defendants had expressly agreed to submit
to the jurisdiction of the Brazilian courts for purposes of these
actions. 10 20 Experts for both parties also agreed that Brazil had
grounds under its Code of Civil Procedure to assert personal
jurisdiction over all of the defendants, including those who had
not expressly agreed to submit to jurisdiction.0 2' The court also
found that Brazil was an adequate alternate forum. 10 22 The
court found that any potential delay occasioned by the Brazilian
judicial system would be "sufficiently minimal" relative to any
delay in the United States and that whether the cases could be
consolidated in Brazil was not determinative of the adequacy
factor.1023
Finally, the court engaged in a balancing of the private and
public interest factors. The court identified the private interest
factors as follows:
(1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the availa-
bility of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling wit-
nesses; (3) the cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses;
(4) issues concerning the enforceability of a judgment; and (5)
all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expedi-
tious, and inexpensive-or the opposite. 10
24
The court noted that many of the entities "centrally involved in
the accident" would not be subject to personal jurisdiction in
the United States, but all of the current defendants and the
other important entities would be subject to personal jurisdic-
tion in Brazil. 10 25 The court further found that the parties may
be unable to compel testimony and evidence in the United
1018 Id. (quoting Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 448 F.3d 176,179 (2d Cir. 2006)).
1019 Id. at 284-85.
1020 Id at 282-83.
1021 Id. at 283. The two U.S. pilots of the business jet involved in the collision
with the airliner that resulted in the litigation by the representatives of the pas-
sengers of the airliner did not sign declarations consenting to jurisdiction in Bra-
zil-leading that court to evaluate Brazilian jurisdiction over the pilots and to
conclude that it was a "near certainty that Brazil [would] exercise jurisdiction
over the legacy pilots .... In any event, the Court [made] the dismissal condi-
tioned on jurisdiction being exercised by Brazil." Id.
1022 Id. at 284.
1023 Id. at 284-85.
1024 Id. at 285.
1025 Id.
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States from the Brazilian entities, but if the cases went forward
in Brazil, the parties would likely have access to all of the Brazil-
ian entities, and the witnesses and evidence under their con-
trol. 1126 The court also determined that much of the evidence
was located in Brazil, including most importantly the wreckage,
the accident site, the flight data recorder, and cockpit voice re-
corder.1 0 27 The defendants had also agreed to pay any final
post-appeal judgment awarded against them by a Brazilian
court, so the fourth factor weighed in favor of dismissal. 10 2 In
sum, the court appeared to conclude that the private interest
factors weighed in favor of proceeding in Brazil, where litigation
was already pending and where plaintiffs' private interest con-
cerns could be accommodated, thus resulting in dismissal of the
present U.S. case.
The court identified the public interest factors as follows:
(1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion;
(2) the local interest in having controversies decided at home;
(3) the interest in having a trial in a forum that is familiar with
the law governing the action; (4) the avoidance of unnecessary
problems in conflict of laws or in application of foreign law; and
(5) the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum
with jury duty. 10 29
The court determined that the first factor did not tend to favor
or disfavor dismissal because the court could accommodate the
cases on its calendar and there was no indication of significant
court congestion in either U.S. courts or in the Brazilian
courts. 10 3 With regard to the second factor, the court stated
that Brazil's interest in resolving the controversy was "obvious,"
and that it outweighed the United States' interest, even though
some of the defendants were U.S. residents who carried on man-
ufacturing activities within the United States.' 03 ' The court then
found that, even though the United States' interest paled in
comparison to Brazil's, it would not be unfair to burden U.S.
citizens with jury duty on this matter because the cases involved
companies headquartered in the United States, two pilots who
lived in the United States, and avionics equipment was created
in the United States and regularly used by aircraft flying
1026 Id. at 286.
1027 Id. at 287.
1028 Id.
1029 Id. at 287-88.
1030 Id. at 288.
1031 Id.
[74266
2009] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION LAW 267
throughout the United States. 11 2 Thus, the fifth factor did not
support dismissal.1 113 The court explained that the third and
fourth factors did favor dismissal because there was at least some
likelihood that if the court retained jurisdiction, it would be ob-
ligated to apply Brazilian law to part of or the entire case and
that it may have to apply the substantive state law of transferor
because this was a multi-district case.10 3 4
In sum, the court found that, while the private and public in-
terest factors "fall on both sides of the aisle, and down the mid-
dle," because of the "lack of jurisdiction . .. over potentially
liable parties and the lack of compulsory process over witnesses
and evidence in Brazil, together with other considerations," the
United States was a "genuinely inconvenient" forum and Brazil
was "significantly preferable," and therefore granted the motion
to dismiss based on forum non conveniens.03 5
In Van Schijndel v. Boeing Co., the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
trial court's dismissal of product liability claims against U.S. air-
craft manufacturer Boeing Company on the grounds of forum
non conveniens.1°36 The court explained that a district court
faced with a motion to dismiss on the grounds of forum non con-
veniens must examine: "(1) whether an adequate alternative fo-
rum exists, and (2) whether the balance of private and public
interest factors favors dismissal.' 10 3 7 In weighing the private in-
terest factors, the court determined that the trial court had
properly considered that many important witnesses and much of
the evidence relative to contributory causes of the plaintiffs' al-
leged injuries was located in Singapore."3 8 The court recog-
nized that it is appropriate to give the location of evidence
regarding an air carrier's contributory fault substantial weight in
conducting a forum non conveniens analysis in a product liability
case. 10 19 Furthermore, some of the evidence in the foreign fo-
rum had a nexus with the product liability claim because the air
carrier, Singapore Airlines, was in possession of the aircraft's
maintenance records.' 40 As to the public interest factors, the
1032 Id.
1033 Id.
1034 Id. at 288-89.
1035 Id. at 289-90.
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court determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
because it had considered and acknowledged the interest of the
United States as a whole, and not merely California, in the law-
suit before concluding that the interest of the foreign state was
greater. 1041
In Clerides v. Boeing Co., the Seventh Circuit held that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing, on the grounds
of forum non conveniens, an action against an aircraft manufac-
turer with its manufacturing facilities headquartered in Wash-
ington state by citizens and residents of Cyprus who were the
personal representatives of an individual (also a Cypriot citizen)
who died when an airplane operated by an air carrier incorpo-
rated and based in Cyprus crashed in Greece.1 °42 The parties
conceded on appeal that Greece and Cyprus were both ade-
quate and available fora. 1°43 Thus, the court considered only
the private and public interest factors. 104 4 The court found that
the private interest factors favored dismissal because the vast ma-
jority of the relevant evidence was in Greece and Cyprus.1 1 45
The only evidence in the United States was evidence relevant to
the product liability claim against Boeing, which Boeing agreed
to make available in Greece or Cyprus. 10 46 In addition, compul-
sory process was available in Cyprus and Greece for witnesses
who would not be subject to compulsory process in the United
States. 1'47 The court also found that the public interest factors
favored dismissal.0 48 Although "the court did not have suffi-
cient evidence to enable it to assess the congestion of the courts
in Greece or Cyprus," the appellate court held that the trial
court reasonably found this factor would be neutral because the
median time to trial in the Northern District of Illinois was
twenty-four months. 049 In addition, "Greece and Cyprus had an
interest in protecting the health and safety of its residents,"
which included 111 of the 115 decedents. 10 50 Not one decedent
was a United States resident, on the other hand. 1 15 Greece and
1041 Id.
1042 534 F.3d 623, 625-26 (7th Cir. 2008).
1043 Id. at 629.
1044 Id.
1045 Id. at 629-30.
1046 Id. at 629.
1047 Id.
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Cyprus had both demonstrated an interest in the case through
their investigations into the crash. 10 5 2 Finally, the court deter-
mined that jurors in the Northern District of Illinois had no lo-
cal connection to the case, including "the development and
manufacture of the Boeing systems likely involved in the
crash.' 01 53 The Court of Appeals found that the trial court's
consideration of the public factors was also reasonable.
0 54
Based upon review of the trial court's analysis of the private and
public factors, the appellate court found that the district court
did not abuse its discretion and affirmed the forum non con-
veniens dismissal.1 0 5 5
F. PROCEDURE-JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULINGS
Courts strictly construe their authority to review administra-
tive rulings. Practitioners should take care to bring such actions
before the appropriate court. In many cases, the federal court
of appeals is the appropriate venue, while in other cases the fed-
eral district court or even the Court of Federal Claims may have
jurisdiction. Practitioners should also be mindful of any proce-
dural prerequisites to filing a claim against an administrative
body in federal court. A failure to bring the action in the appro-
priate forum or to satisfy all prerequisites can be fatal to a claim.
1. Jurisdiction
In Diaz Aviation Corp. v. Alvarez, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Puerto Rico explained the exclusive jurisdiction pro-
vision of 49 U.S.C. § 46110, which grants exclusive jurisdiction
to the federal courts of appeals to hear certain challenges to
federal agency actions.0 56 The court dismissed an air carrier's
claims against the FAA and some of its employees arising out of
the suspension of the carrier's operating certificate because the
claims were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal ap-
peals court.10 57 Section 46110(c) provides that the courts of ap-
peals have "exclusive jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or set aside"
orders of the NTSB or the FAA.11 5' The court explained that





1056 556 F. Supp. 2d 94, 99 (D. P.R. 2008).
1057 Id. at 98-99.
1058 Id. at 97.
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to the suspension of its certificate and the alleged motivations
and actions of certain FAA employees, which were inescapably
intertwined with a review of the FAA's suspension order. 1059 A
claim is "inescapably intertwined with a review of administrative
orders when the plaintiff challenges the procedures and merits
of the order."10 60 Although the carrier had framed its complaint
as deprivation of property without due process of law-a consti-
tutional claim that the carrier argued would be within the pur-
view of the federal district court-the court decided that the
claims went directly to the merits of a previous agency
adjudication. 61
In MacLean v. Department of Homeland Security, the Ninth Cir-
cuit found that it had jurisdiction to review a TSA order that an
air marshal's text message to the media regarding the alleged
cancellation of certain missions on overnight flights contained
"sensitive security information." 1062 The court observed that the
order was supported by a reviewable record (even though there
was no notice and comment period or other opportunity for the
marshal to present evidence), and was a definitive statement of
the agency's position regarding the contents of the text mes-
sage, and had an immediate and prospective impact upon the
marshal's challenge of his subsequent termination. 10 63
On the other hand, in Ibrahim v. Department of Homeland Secur-
ity, the Ninth Circuit held that the federal district court retained
original jurisdiction over a Malaysian Muslim passenger's Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA) claim regarding the place-
ment of her name on the federal government's no-fly list.10 64
The district court had ruled that it lacked jurisdiction under 49
U.S.C. § 46110(a) to consider the plaintiffs claims against the
federal government because "the no-fly list is an 'order' [of the
Transportation Security Administration] under the ambit of
46110."'165 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, explaining that putting
the passenger's name on the list was an order of an agency not
named in § 46110, and, therefore, the district court retained ju-
1059 Id. at 98.
10- Id. (citing Green v. TSA, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1127 (W.D. Wash. 2005)).
1061 Id. at 95, 99.
1062 543 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2008).
1063 Id.
1064 538 F.3d 1250, 1255 (9th Cir. 2008).
1065 Id. at 1254.
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risdiction to review that agency's order under the APA. 1066 In
addition, the Ninth Circuit disagreed that the decision to place
a person on the watch list was an "order" subject to appellate
review, pointing out that "[t] here was no hearing before an ad-
ministrative law judge; there was no notice-and-comment proce-
dure. For all we know there is not an administrative record of
any sort for us to review. "1067 In such a circumstance, the court
opined that if any court were to review the government's deci-
sion to place the passenger's name on the no-fly list, "it [made]
sense that it be a court with the ability to take evidence."" 68
The Ninth Circuit further held that dismissal of the passen-
ger's claims against certain federal officials acting in their offi-
cial capacities was proper. °69 The court explained that the
officials, like the government itself, cannot be liable for state-law
torts unless Congress has waived the government's sovereign im-
munity.10 70 Plaintiff argued that Congress had done so through
the FTCA.117' The court pointed out that the FTCA "only waives
sovereign immunity if a plaintiff first exhausts her administrative
remedies," which the passenger failed to do before filing her
complaint. 10 72 Moreover, the passenger did not request a stay of
the litigation in district court so that she could attempt to ex-
haust her administrative remedies while the litigation was
pending.1 173
1066 Id. at 1255. The court explained that the district court retained jurisdic-
tion because the terrorist watch list was compiled by the Terrorist Screening
Center, which is "part of the Federal Bureau of Investigation," not one of the
specifically named agencies over which the federal courts of appeal have exclu-
sive jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a) (2000 & Supp. V 2006). Id.
1067 Id. at 1256. The court noted that the lack of notice or a comment period
was not fatal to appellate review in cases in which there was an express statutory
command requiring appellate review, but that, in this case, in which there was no
express statutory command, it was supportive of the court's conclusion that Con-
gress did not intend the courts of appeals to have exclusive jurisdiction of deci-
sions to place persons on the terrorist watch list. Id.
1068 Id.
1069 Id. at 1257.
1070 Id. at 1258 (citing Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. 269, 274-76 (1869)).
1071 Id.
1072 Id.
1073 Id. The court also considered the dismissal of Nevins claims and tort
claims against another federal agent, sued only in his individual capacity. The
court reversed the dismissal of those claims, holding that even though the agent
resided in and apparently acted only in Virginia, his actions resulting in plaintiffs
arrest in California were sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in California
because of their effect on a California resident. The court noted that the agent
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In Jan's Helicopter Service, Inc. v. FAA, the Federal Circuit af-
firmed the district court's transfer to the Court of Federal
Claims of actions by two aircraft operators seeking damages
from the FAA for the issuance of alleged unauthorized orders
that resulted in the grounding of the operators' aircraft. 10 74 The
operators alleged that the orders constituted unlawful takings in
violation of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and
sought compensation in excess of $10,000 each from the U.S.
government. 10 75 The court determined that under the Tucker
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a) (1), only the Court of Federal Claims
has jurisdiction over any claim against the U.S. government
founded upon either the U.S. Constitution or any act of Con-
gress that exceeds $10,000.1076 Therefore, the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the actions, and its trans-
fer to the Court of Federal Claims was proper, as long as the
claims fell within the Act's waiver of sovereign immunity.
10 77
The court then determined whether the operators' claims fell
within the terms of the Tucker Act's waiver of sovereign immu-
nity.1 7 The court explained that for the waiver to apply, "the
claim must be one for money damages against the United States,
and the claimant must demonstrate that the source of the sub-
stantive law he relies upon 'can fairly be interpreted as mandat-
ing compensation by the Federal Government for the damages
sustained.' "1079 In deciding this issue, the court stated that it
was "undisputed that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment is a money-mandating source for purposes of [the] Tucker
Act .... -1080 The court of appeals held that the district court
had correctly decided that the Court of Federal Claims had sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over the operators' claims and that the
had not raised any defenses under the Federal Tort Claims Act and therefore did
not consider that issue. Id. at 1258-59.
1074 525 F.3d 1299, 1301-02 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1075 Id. at 1303.
1076 Id. at 1304.
1077 Id. at 1304-05.
1078 Id. at 1305.
1079 Id. at 1306 (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216-17
(1983)). The court explains that "because the Tucker Act itself does not create a
substantive cause of action, ... a plaintiff must identify a separate source of sub-
stantive law that creates the right to money damages." Id. (citing Fisher v. United
States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc in relevant part)).
1080 Id. at 1309.
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case was properly transferred from the District Court of Guam
to the Court of Federal Claims.' 08
In Adams v. FAA, the petitioners were
commercial airline pilots who reached the age of 60 before De-
cember 13, 2007 . . . [and had] filed requests for an exemption
with the FAA from the regulation barring them from flying com-
mercial aircraft after they turned 60. The FAA denied their re-
quests for exemption and the petitioners filed petitions for
review in the U.S. Court of Appeals [sic] under 49 U.S.C.
§ 46110(a), which permits direct challenges to an order issued by
[the FAA].
10 82
The U.S. court of appeals held that the Fair Treatment for Ex-
perienced Pilots Act (FTEPA), 49 U.S.C. § 44729, which raised
the maximum age limit for pilots flying large commercial air-
craft to sixty-five, expressly repealed the regulation that was the
Age 60 Rule, making the petitions moot.'083 The pilots asserted
that their petitions could not be dismissed as moot, since the
statute itself is a "constitutionally-prohibited bill of attainder and
a violation of their rights to due process and equal protection,"
because "it denies such pilots any seniority or benefits from their
prior (pre-age 60) years of service if they are hired or rehired by
an airline prior to reaching age 65. °1084 The U.S. court of ap-
peals held that it had no jurisdiction to consider constitutional
questions unrelated to the FAA's Rule 65 order, promulgated
under FTEPA. 10 8 5 As long as the pilots could "satisfy the usual
Article III standing requirements, their facial challenges to the
[FTEPA] had to be brought first in the district court," which has
original jurisdiction over federal question claims. 10 8 6
2. Procedural Prerequisites
In Curran v. National Transportation Safety Board, the Ninth Cir-
cuit denied a pilot's request for review of the National Transpor-
tation Safety Board's (NTSB) dismissal of his appeal of the 120-
day suspension of his commercial pilot's certificate. 0 8 7 The
NTSB dismissed the appeal because the pilot failed to file a
1081 Id. at 1310.
1082 550 F.3d 1174, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
1083 Id.
1084 Id. at 1175-76.
1085 Id. at 1176.
1086 Id.
1087 266 Fed. App'x. 645, 645-46 (9th Cir. 2008).
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timely appeal brief or provide good cause for the untimeliness
of his appeal.1 1 8 The court explained that
where the NTSB dismisses an appeal for failure to file a timely
brief, the court's jurisdiction is restricted (1) to deciding if the
NTSB's order dismissing the appeal as untimely was arbitrary or
capricious; and, if not, (2) to addressing a limited number of sub-
stantive issues, such as constitutional claims raised on appeal that
the NTSB could not have addressed. 1 89
The court found that the dismissal was not "arbitrary" or "capri-
cious" because the pilot was warned about the timeliness re-
quirement "numerous times," the brief was weeks late, and the
pilot proffered no cause, much less "good cause" for the late
filing.' ° In addition, the court found that no issue raised on
appeal could not have been litigated before the NTSB. 0 9'
Similarly in Nadal v. FAA, the Tenth Circuit held that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over a petition seeking review of an
order of the NTSB affirming the suspension of a pilot's airman
certificate because the pilot did not file his petition until three
days after the filing deadline.10 92 The court explained that "stat-
utory provisions specifying the timing of review are mandatory
and jurisdictional."' 93 The court therefore dismissed the peti-
tion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.1 94
In Armstrong v. FAA, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
dismissed as moot a pilot's appeal of an FAA order that deter-
mined that an "emergency" existed entitling the FAA to revoke
his private pilot certificate immediately.10 95 The emergency
characterization permitted the Administrator to impose the or-
der and revoke his certificate without first providing the pilot an
opportunity to respond to allegations that the pilot had violated
certain federal aviation regulations. 10 96 The characterization
also "prevented [the pilot] from obtaining a stay of the order
while he appealed it to the National Transportation Safety
Board."1097 The pilot did appeal the order itself to the NTSB,
1088 Id. at 645.
1089 Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1153(b) (4) (2000 & Supp. V 2006); Gilbert v. NTSB,
80 F.3d 364, 367-68 (9th Cir. 1996)).
1090 Id.
1o91 Id.
1092 276 Fed. App'x. 780 (10th Cir. 2008).
1 93 Id. at 781 (citing Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995)).
1094 Id.
1095 515 F.3d 1294, 1295, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
1 96 Id. at 1295 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 44709(c) (2000 & Supp. V 2006)).
1 97 Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 44709 (e)(2)).
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but failed to request review of the underlying emergency deter-
mination within two days of receiving that order. 1098 Because of
this failure, the pilot forfeited his right to an administrative ap-
peal of the emergency determination'099 and instead petitioned
the court of appeals for review of the determination pursuant to
49 U.S.C. § 46110(a)." 00 While the appeal was pending before
the court of appeals, an administrative law judge (ALJ) "af-
firmed all the violations found by the Administrator but reduced
the sanction to a 10-month suspension of the pilot's private pilot
certificate."'1 01 Both the pilot and Administrator cross-appealed
the ALJ's decision to the NTSB. 0 2 Ultimately, the NTSB
granted the Administrator's appeal and reinstated the order re-
voking the pilot's certificate. 10 The court of appeals found
that once the NTSB resolved the pilot's appeal, the emergency
determination ceased to have any effect. 1104 The court was not
persuaded by the pilot's contention that his case fell within the
exception to mootness for cases "capable of repetition, yet evad-
ing review."'" 0 5 The court explained that the pilot failed to show
that he would again be subjected to the alleged illegality, specifi-
cally, that he was likely to obtain a new private pilot certificate
and again be subject to an emergency determination. 11 6 Fur-
ther, the court explained that the issue presented-"whether it
was arbitrary and capricious for the Administrator to make an
emergency determination under the specific factual circum-
stances of this case"-would not arise again. 107 Finally, the pi-
lot's case did not "evade review" because it was the pilot's own
delay that allowed his case to become moot.110 8
3. Standing
In St. John's United Church of Christ v. FAA, the D.C. Circuit
dismissed the petition of a cemetery owner and two municipali-
ties challenging an FAA grant to the city of Chicago for the ex-
pansion of O'Hare International Airport on the grounds that
1098 Id.
1099 Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 44709 (e)(3)).
1100 Id.




1105 Id. (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975)).
1106 Id.
1107 Id.
1108 Id. at 1296-97.
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the petitioners lacked standing.'10 9 Chicago planned to acquire
land in nearby Elk Grove Village and the Village of Bensenville
for the expansion. 1110 Bensenville complained that the acquisi-
tion would destroy its parkland and affordable housing, and Elk
Grove complained that the acquisition would deprive it of tax
revenues.1 1" In addition, the expansion plans required the re-
location of St. Johannes Cemetery, which St. John's complained
would substantially burden religious exercise. 1 1 2 The court de-
termined that all of the petitioners lacked standing because
even a favorable ruling for the petitioners would not redress
their injuries. 13 The court, first focusing on the timing of spe-
cific grants related to various parts of the project, noted that
"[b]ecause FAA's $29.3 million grant reimbursed Chicago for
completed work that did not affect the petitioners, how the grant
causes their injuries is a mystery."" 14 The court then focused on
petitioners' arguments that all of the grants, including those for
portions of the project yet to be completed and totaling $337
million, should be considered.1 15 The court also rejected that
argument, finding that the $337 million pledged by the FAA
played a "'minor role' and Chicago could replace it with other
sources of funding. '"1116 For the foregoing reasons the court
held that petitioners had not demonstrated "that the $29.3 mil-
lion grant has caused their injuries," and dismissed the case for
lack of standing." 1 17
Conversely, in Town of Winthrop v. FAA, the U.S. First Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a municipality located next to an
airport did have standing under Article III of the Constitution to
petition for review of an FAA final order permitting the con-
struction of a new taxiway at the airport. 118 The municipality
alleged that the FAA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in decid-
ing that it did not need to prepare a supplemental environmen-
tal impact statement before issuing a final order permitting the
construction of a new taxiway at Boston's Logan International




1113 Id. at 461-62.
1114 Id. at 462 (emphasis added).
1115 See id.
1116 Id. at 463.
1117 Id.
1118 535 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2008).
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Airport. 9 The municipality claimed that the additional taxi-
way would lead to greater use of Logan and, therefore, to
greater environmental impacts. 120 The court explained that
"Article III standing requires an injury-in-fact to a cognizable in-
terest, a causal link between that injury and the respondent's
action, and a likelihood that the injury could be redressed by
the requested relief. 1 1 21 The court then stated that "[t]o estab-
lish injury-in-fact in a 'procedural injury' case, like the present
one, 'petitioners must show that 'the government act performed
without the procedure in question [here, sufficient NEPA re-
view] will cause a distinct risk to a particularized interest of the
petitioner." 1"1122 The court found that the petitioner had rea-
sonably and adequately alleged that they feared harm-in-fact
should the new taxiway construction go forward as approved by
the FAA.112
3
4. Federal Taking under Fifth Amendment and Federal Law
In Huntleigh USA Corp. v. United States, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of the Court
of Federal Claims in favor of the United States, dismissing Hun-
tleigh USA Corp.'s (Huntleigh) claims under the Fifth Amend-
ment and Section 101 (g) (2) of the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act (ATSA) related to the nationalization of passenger
and baggage screening in commercial aviation.1 24 Huntleigh
provided baggage and passenger screening for seventy-five sepa-
rate air carriers at thirty-five different airports when Congress
enacted the ATSA, assigning all airport screening responsibili-
ties to the TSA rather than commercial airlines, "effectively
eliminat[ing] the market" for Huntleigh's services.1 1 25 The
court, as a threshold matter, concluded that Huntleigh's con-
tracts with commercial air carriers were in fact "cognizable prop-
erty interests" under the Fifth Amendment. 1126 However, the
court held there was no "taking" under relevant authority be-
"'19 Id. at 3.
1120 Id.
1121 Id. at 6 (citing Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2531,
2535-36 (2008); Save Our Heritage, Inc. v. FAA, 269 F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir. 2001)).
1122 Id. (citing City of Dania Beach v. FAA, 485 F.3d 1181, 1185 (D.C. Cir.
2007)) (quoting Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(en banc)).
1123 Id. at 7.
1124 525 F.3d 1370, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1125 Id. at 1374-75.
1126 Id. at 1377-78.
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cause Huntleigh's contracts were merely rendered impossible,
not appropriated. 127 The court also concluded that no com-
pensation was due under § 101 (g)(2) of the ATSA, which re-
quires payment of due compensation whenever the TSA,
through its responsibilities under the ATSA, assumes a contract
to conduct screening services, because the government had not
assumed any of Huntleigh's contracts but merely took over the
responsibilities under those contracts directly. 128 In reaching
this conclusion, the court rejected Huntleigh's suggested inter-
pretation of § 101 (g) (2), that compensation was due whenever
the government "assumed the functions . . . performed by pri-
vate parties" pursuant to screening contracts, as rendering
§ 101 (g) (2) superfluous, because § 101 (g) (1) already required
the TSA to take over the responsibilities of private entities per-
forming screening services in commercial air travel. 1129
X. CHOICE OF LAW
In In re Air Crash at Lexington, Kentucky, August 27, 2006, the
district court evaluated the applicability of competing state laws
regarding damages and determined that Kentucky law applied
to prescribe the forms of damages that might be recovered by
plaintiffs." 3 Notably, in doing so, the district court applied the
choice of law rules of New York in one case,113' and the choice
of law rules of Kentucky in the other two cases, even though the
plaintiff in one of those cases was a resident of New Mexico." 32
The New York choice of law rules were applied in the case in-
volving a New York resident which had originally been filed in
federal court in New York based on diversity jurisdiction.1 33
The Kentucky choice of law rules were applied in the two cases
filed in Kentucky-one in state court that was removed to fed-
eral court based on supplemental jurisdiction-and the other
filed in Kentucky federal court based on diversity
jurisdiction."134
Under the New York "interest analysis" conducted in the case
originally filed in New York, the court evaluated the competing
1127 Id. at 1378-82.
1128 Id. at 1383-84.
1129 Id. at 1382-83.
1130 No. 5:06-CV-316-KSF, 2008 WL 631238, at *6-8 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 5, 2008).
1131 Id. at *2.
1132 Id. at *2, 6-8.
1133 Id. at *2.
1134 Id. at *1-2.
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interests under rules established in Neumeier v. Kuehner (the
Neumeier rules) and the cases applying those rules.' 135 Plaintiff
argued that even though the Neumeier rules normally prescribed
the application of the law of the state where the accident oc-
curred if one of the parties is domiciled in that state (under the
second Neumeier rule), not all of the defendants were domiciled
in Kentucky; they all had substantial contacts with New York,
and the court should consider the third Neumeier rule which al-
lows the law of the situs of the tort to be displaced if it "will
advance the relevant substantive law purposes without impairing
the smooth working of the multi-state system or producing great
uncertainty for litigants."1136 Nevertheless, the court concluded
that the domicile of the Comair defendants in Kentucky dic-
tated the application of the second Neumeier rule and the appli-
cation of Kentucky law for the Comair defendants. 1 37 The
court also concluded that all of the claims against Delta derived
from its relationship with the Kentucky-domiciled Comair de-
fendants even though Delta was not domiciled in Kentucky;
therefore, there was no basis for disregarding the domicile of
the Comair defendants to apply a different law as to the damage
claims against Delta." 38
The court then applied the Kentucky choice of law analysis to
the cases originally filed in Kentucky.'" 39 The Kentucky choice
of law rule in tort cases is that Kentucky law should be applied if
"Kentucky has enough contacts to justify applying Kentucky
law," even though those interests may not necessarily be the
most significant contacts. 14 ° Under that rule, the court con-
cluded that because the accident occurred in Kentucky and the
forum was Kentucky, the court "'should' apply Kentucky
law."' 14 1 Even as to the New Mexico resident, the court con-
cluded that he owned property and operated a business in Ken-
tucky, made intentional decisions to travel to Kentucky, and to
associate himself with Kentucky in a significant way, such that
the application of Kentucky law was "not merely fortuitous."1 142
1135 Id. at *3-6 (citing Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454 (1972)).
1136 Id. at *4.
1137 Id. at *6.
1138 Id.
1139 Id. at *6-8.
-4 Id. at *6.
1141 Id. at *7 (quoting Adam v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc. 130 F.3d 219, 231 (6th
Cir. 1997)).
1142 Id. at *8.
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In Taylor v. Mooney Aircraft Corporation, the Third Circuit con-
sidered an appeal from a Pennsylvania federal district court re-
lating to dismissal of plaintiffs' claims against two
manufacturers, Mooney and Honeywell, based upon the applica-
tion of Georgia law and its ten-year statute of repose.1 43 The
case arose from an aircraft accident involving two Georgia re-
sidents on a flight from Georgia to New York." 44 Due to
weather, the flight terminated in Pennsylvania, and upon its re-
sumption back to Georgia, the aircraft crashed in Pennsylvania,
due to a mechanical difficulty shortly after takeoff approxi-
mately 10 miles from the airport. 114 5 At the time of the acci-
dent, the aircraft was owned by the Georgia resident and based
in Georgia." 4 6 It had originally been designed and manufac-
tured by Mooney in Texas and sold in 1987 to a purchaser in
Michigan." 4 7 The court also noted that "Honeywell is a Dela-
ware Corporation with its principal place of business in New
Jersey."' x" 48
The district court had granted the motion for summary judg-
ment on the grounds that under Pennsylvania's "flexible
[choice of law] rule which permits analysis of the policies and
interests underlying the particular issue before the court, '1149
only Georgia had an interest in the litigation and that Penn-
sylvania had no interest in applying its substantive products lia-
bility law."" 0 The Third Circuit reached the same result;
however, it was critical of the district court's analysis for failing
to analyze the specific issue to which the choice of law analysis
was to be applied." 5' The appellate court focused on the statute
of repose, and concluded that an "actual" conflict existed, so it
was necessary to examine the governmental policies underlying
the law of Georgia and the law of Pennsylvania as to that issue in
1143 265 F. Appx. 87, 89 (3d Cir. 2008).
1144 Id. at 89.
1145 Id.
1146 Id. at 89 nn. 1-2.
1147 Id. n. 1.
1148 Id. n. 2.
1149 Id. at 90 (quoting Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 203 A.2d 796, 805 (Pa.
1964)).
1150 Id. at 92.
1151 Id. at 91-92. The court noted that the parties were not bound by prior
positions of applicable law as to the case as a whole, or other issues, in the pro-
ceedings before the district court because Pennsylvania choice of laws rule em-
ploy depecage, meaning that the applicable law may differ on an issue-by-issue
analysis. Thus, arguing for one state's law on one issue, did not foreclose a party
from arguing for another state's law on another. Id. at 92-93.
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order to determine whether a "true, false, or unprovided for
conflict" existed. 1 52 If one state had no interest in that issue,
then there was no true conflict, and the state having the interest
in the issue should be applied under the "substantial interest"
analysis.153
The court examined the interest of Georgia in enacting a stat-
ute of repose and concluded that because of concerns over na-
tional products liability litigation, the State of Georgia had
chosen to limit product liability actions to 10 years. 154 The
court concluded that it was in Georgia's interest to limit such
liability "whenever a party to a products liability case is a Georgia
resident."' 55
On the contrary, Pennsylvania had not enacted a statue of re-
pose." 56 The court examined Pennsylvania products liability
law and concluded that it was enacted "only to protect 'the con-
suming public,"' and not the general public." 57 Presumably,
the court viewed the "consuming public" as consumers within
Pennsylvania. The court concluded that "Georgia has a strong
interest in applying its statute of repose, while Pennsylvania has
no interest that would be impaired if its law were not applied,"
thus only a false conflict existed."518 Under these circumstances,
the court concluded that Georgia statute of repose should be
applied to bar plaintiff's claims, and affirmed the summary judg-
ment in favor of Mooney and Honeywell." 59
XI. INSURANCE COVERAGE
A. AVIATION INSURANCE-COVERAGE
In Abdel v. North American Insurance Co., the district court de-
nied cross-motions for summary judgment for hull and liability
coverage on the grounds that there was a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact regarding statements made by the insurer's representa-
tive to the insured student pilot relating to the qualifications of
the flight instructor in the insured aircraft." 6
1152 Id. at 93.
1153 Id. at 95.
1154 Id. at 94.
1155 Id.




1160 No. 3:06-1192, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6013 at *22 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 28,
2008).
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During the application process, the instructor pilot was re-
ferred to in a quote and in the application as a Certified Flight
Instructor (CFI) meeting the "Open Pilot Warranty."' 1 61 The
court agreed that terms defined in the policy that was ultimately
issued would control in the event of any conflict between any
prior representations, quotes or statements in the application;
however, the term "Open Pilot Warranty" was not defined in the
policy or elsewhere." 6 2 Instead, the quote, application, and pol-
icy also referred to requirements for additional pilots to be ap-
proved to operate the aircraft." 63 The court held that it could
not as a matter of law conclude that the term "Open Pilot War-
ranty" was the equivalent of the term "Additional Pilots Require-
ment," particularly since both had been used in the same
documents." 64
The flight instructor operating the aircraft at the time of the
accident did not meet the requirements because he was 21 years
of age (v. 25 years of age), had logged 567.1 hours (v. 1,000
hours) Pilot in Command (PIC) time,"" and he had not flown
the accident aircraft before, but had flown a similar make air-
craft owned by his uncle on occasion and therefore may not
have had the required 25 hours in the same make and model as
the accident aircraft."1 66 The insured student pilot provided
deposition testimony that he had asked the insurance represen-
tative about the required qualifications of the CFI, and that the
insurance representative had told him that most flight instruc-
tors would meet the "Open Pilot Warranty" and it would be best
not to name a specific flight instructor as an approved pilot be-
cause if he changed instructors, more paperwork would be nec-
essary to add a new instructor as an approved pilot.1 16 7 The
court held that summary judgment could not be granted to the
insurer because there were genuine issues of fact as to what the
insured student pilot had been told regarding the requirements
of the CFI and the meaning of the phrase "Open Pilot
Warranty. "1168
1161 Id. at *2.
1162 Id. at *14-17.
1163 Id. at *17-18.
1164 Id. at *18.
1165 Id. at *9-10, *17. The court stated that "at the time of the accident in
question, Wilson did not meet the 'Additional Pilot Requirement.'" Id. at *16.
1166 Id. at *9-10.
1167 Id. at *20.
1168 Id. at *20.
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The court also held that genuine issues of material fact pre-
cluded summary judgment to the insured student pilot because,
while the insured student pilot testified that he had done some
pre-flight planning and preparation, he was in the back seat
asleep on the accident leg of the flight so there was a question of
fact as to whether the flight was a training flight on which the
CFI was acting as his instructor.
169
B. POLICY EXCLUSIONS
In Sugar Financial Group, Inc. v. The Insurance Co. of the State of
Pennsylvania, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington, applying Arizona law, held that the exclusions in
the insurance policy issued by AIG Aviation were not ambiguous
and that the failure of the pilot to meet the requirements of the
pilot endorsement precluded coverage for physical damage to
the aircraft.117 ° The aircraft was a twin-engine Cessna 421 and
the pilot endorsement required that the pilot hold a "current
and valid FAA Private, Commercial, or ATP pilot certificate rat-
ing and endorsements applicable to [the] aircraft, including an
instrument rating" and have "1000 total logged hours as pilot-in-
command of aircraft... [which includes] 50 hours same make
and model as [the] aircraft [and] 500 hours multi-engine pow-
ered fixed wing aircraft."" 71 All parties conceded that the pilot
did not have an instrument rating and approximately 400 hours
total logged time.' 172 The aircraft crashed in "bad weather, ic-
ing, poor visibility, and turbulence."'1 17 3
The policy also included the following exclusion:
This insurance does not apply: 1. under any coverage . . . c)
when the aircraft is in flight: i) with your knowledge and consent
for either an unlawful purpose or for other than the Approved
Use; ii) when a special permit or waiver is required by the FAA;
iii) if piloted by a person other than: (1) a pilot specified in [the
Pilot Endorsement]; (2) a pilot employed by an FAA approved
repair station while the aircraft is in their care, custody or control
for the purpose of maintenance, repair or test flight.
1 74
1169 Id. at *21-22.
1170 No. C07-5398-RBL, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27439, *10-11 (W.D. Wash.
2008).
1171 Id. at *3.
1172 Id. at *5.
1173 Id.
1174 Id. at *4.
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The insured argued that the failure to include the word "or" or
the word "and" in the preceding exclusion rendered it ambigu-
ous and that it should be construed in the manner most
favorable to the insured. 175 In other words, the exclusion re-
quired that the conditions be read in the conjunctive and that
coverage applies unless all of the conditions of the exclusion
were met.
1176
The court rejected this argument on the grounds that in de-
termining whether an ambiguity existed, the court must ex-
amine .... the exclusion in question, the public policy
considerations involved and the transaction as a whole."''' 77
The court concluded that the insured's argument would result
in only one super exclusion which the court regarded as "an
absurdity."'"1 78 The conditions by their nature were separate and
disparate events, which under the insured's interpretation
would result in exclusion of coverage only in the event of "a host
of wholly unrelated, highly unlikely conditions [that] occurred
simultaneously."' 1 79 The court stated that such an interpreta-
tion "would not permit AIG to calculate or limit its risk, and the
ultimate result of such a reading would be to deprive the public
of aircraft insurance entirely."'"18 0
The court concluded that, notwithstanding the absence of the
word "or," the proper interpretation of the exclusion was that it
applied in the event of any one of the conditions and since the
pilot clearly did not meet the requirements of the pilot endorse-
ment, no coverage applied under the policy for the physical
damage to the aircraft. 118 1
XII. PRODUCT LIABILITY
A. SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
In Daymple v. Fairchild Aircraft Inc., the federal district court
granted summary judgment to defendant Fairchild Aircraft In-
corporated (FAI) arising from the crash of a Merlin IVC aircraft
manufactured by a predecessor corporation, Swearingen Air-
1175 Id. at *7.
1176 Id. at *8.
1177 Id. at *9-10 (quoting Ohio Cas. v. Henderson, 939 P.2d 1337, 1339 (Ariz.
1997)).
1178 Id. at *10.
1179 Id.
1180 Id.
1181 Id. at *11.
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craft Corporation (Swearingen).1182 The aircraft, operated by
Flightline, Inc., had crashed off the coast of Spain allegedly as a
result of a lightning strike that resulted in an electrical fail-
ure.1183 Plaintiffs decedent was a passenger aboard the air-
craft.1184 Plaintiff alleged that FAI failed to warn of the
vulnerability of the Merlin IVC to withstand a power loss due to
a lightning strike.1 18 5 An intermediate predecessor, Fairchild
Aircraft Corporation (FAC), issued a service bulletin recom-
mending replacement of a diode which might short out due to a
lightning strike causing the relay in the main battery bus to be-
come de-energized leading to a loss of electrical power."86 FAI
had delivered a complete set of service bulletins, including the
service bulletin at issue, to Flightline in 2001, approximately 9
months before the accident."18 7
The court addressed the issue of FAI's liability under several
theories espoused by plaintiff. First, plaintiff relied upon the
Federal Aviation Regulations which impose a duty on Type Cer-
tificate holders to inform the FAA of dangerous conditions in
aircraft manufactured by them."88 FAI held the Type Certifi-
cate for the Merlin IVC originally issued to its predecessor,
Swearingen, at the time of the accident, but neither manufac-
tured the aircraft nor "had possession, custody, or control of or
performed any maintenance or repair on the Aircraft."" 89 The
district court emphasized that the language of the regulation,
which states that the duty to report applies to aircraft that the
Type Certificate holder "manufactured," interpreting it as limit-
ing that duty only to the holder at the time of manufacture and
not to any subsequent holder, including the successor corpora-
tion in this case.11 90
In addition to a federal regulatory duty, plaintiff also asserted
breach of common law duties. 1191 Because the accident oc-
curred outside the territorial waters of the United States, the
court applied the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA)." 92
1182 575 F. Supp. 2d 790, 794 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
1183 Id. at 793.
1184 Id.
1185 Id. at 797.
1186 Id. at 793.
1187 Id.
1188 Id. at 796-97.
1189 Id. at 793.
1190 Id. at 796-97.
1191 Id. at 796.
1192 Id. at 795.
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Under DOHSA, the court applies federal common law.11 3
Plaintiffs argued that under federal common law, a manufac-
turer has a duty to warn."1 94 The court, however, concluded that
even if there was a duty to warn, there was no evidence of a
failure to warn because the service bulletin delivered to Flight-
line warned of the risk to the diode in the event of a lightning
strike. 19 5 The court rejected plaintiffs argument that there
might be some other unarticulated, let alone demonstrated, vul-
nerability to electrical failure due to lightning strike.1196
Finally, the court rejected plaintiffs argument that FAI might
be liable to plaintiff under a theory that it had undertaken a
voluntary duty, which was relied upon, resulting in an increase
of the risk to plaintiffs decedent. 97 The court concluded that
the only evidence was that FAI's undertaking to provide the ser-
vice bulletin actually made the aircraft safer (based upon the
FAA's adoption of the service bulletin in an Airworthiness Direc-
tive), not that it increased the risk."9 Moreover, there was no
evidence that Flightline ever performed the service bulletin, pre-
cluding any contention that, by following and relying upon
FAI's recommendation, the aircraft had become more danger-
ous.1199 Accordingly, the district court granted summary judg-
ment to FAI on all of plaintiffs claims.1200
B. PRODUCT LIABILITY-LABILITY OF CHART MANUFACTURER
In In re Air Crash At Lexington, Kentucky, August 27, 2006, the
court reconsidered the motion of defendant Jeppesen for sum-
mary judgment on all claims asserted by the Crew Plaintiffs. 120 1
Jeppesen had published the airport charts carried by the flight
crew of Comair flight 5191 which crashed in the darkness on
August 27, 2006, in Lexington, KY, following an attempted take
off from the incorrect, unlighted runway.1 20 2 The taxi to the
correct runway required the aircraft to cross the incorrect run-
1193 Id. at 796.
1194 Id.
1195 Id. at 797.
1196 Id. at 798.
1197 Id. at 799.
1198 Id.
1199 Id. at 798.
1200 Id. at 799.
1201 No. 5:06-cv-316-KSF, 2008 U.S. Dist LEXIS 61159, at *10 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 7,
2008). The "Crew Plaintiffs" were the surviving first officer and the survivors and
representatives of the deceased captain and flight attendant. Id.
1202 Id. at *14.
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way, however, the flight crew taxied on to the incorrect runway,
which was insufficient in length for take off, resulting in the ac-
cident.120 3 Additionally, the incorrect runway was not lighted at
the time of the take off, while the correct runway was lighted. 204
Prior to the Crew Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, the
court had granted summary judgment in favor of Jeppesen on
all of these claims, but had neither expressly stated that there
was "no just reason for delay," nor entered a separate judg-
ment.120 5 The Crew Plaintiffs had filed a notice of appeal, and,
subsequently, also filed the motion for reconsideration based on
a claim of "'newly discovered' evidence.1120 6 The court ruled
that, in the absence of a final judgment, the order was interlocu-
tory; the filing of the notice of appeal did not divest the court of
jurisdiction to reconsider its prior order as a motion for leave to
alter or amend its prior interlocutory order under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 59.1207
The Crew Plaintiffs argued that the testimony of Jeppesen's
expert that it was "probable" that the flight crew referred to the
chart prior to taxi, rebutted the court's basis for summary judg-
ment and created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the flight crew was misled by the chart during the taxi to the
incorrect runway. 12° The court considered the testimony of the
expert, but rejected the Crew Plaintiffs' argument that the pre-
taxi statement and any reference to the chart was evidence that
the chart was used by the captain during the taxi, including a
fifty-second hold short before taxiing on to the incorrect runway
for takeoff, or that the flight crew was "misled" by the chart in
taxiing on to the incorrect runway. 209 The court concluded
that the absence of any subsequent reference to the chart dur-
ing taxi and prior to take off resulted only in speculation as to
whether the flight crew ever referred to the chart during the
taxi, the hold, or the take off on the incorrect runway, particu-
larly since both crew members had substantial prior experience
at the Lexington airport. 1210 The court further noted that all
parties agreed that the chart accurately depicted the pavement
1203 Id. at *14, *17.
1204 Id. at *14.
1205 Id. at *10.
1206 Id. at *10-11.
1207 Id. at *13.
1208 Id. at *10-*11.
1209 Id. at *15-*17.
1210 Id. at *15-*19.
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both at the location of the incorrect runway and leading to the
correct runway, and therefore there was no evidence that the
flight crew was "misled by the chart. ' 1211 The court noted that
Jeppesen's expert had further testified that if the flight crew had
been referring to the chart and had seen their position on the
field and the route to the correct runway as depicted on the
chart, they would have "absolutely crossed" the incorrect runway
to get to the correct runway.12 12 In granting summary judg-
ment, the court noted that "there are many possible causes for
why the pilots did not [taxi to the correct, lighted runway], but
the Crew Plaintiffs have not produced any evidence that the Jep-
pesen chart was a substantial factor in causing the crash,"' 21 3
and:
'Where an accident could have resulted for any number of rea-
sons, the plaintiff has failed to establish the necessary proximate
cause.' When a party attempts to establish causation by circum-
stantial evidence, 'the evidence must be sufficient to tilt the bal-
ance from possibility to probability.' The Crew Plaintiffs'
evidence regarding the Jeppesen chart has never risen to that
level. 121
4
The court denied the motion to reconsider the grant of sum-
mary judgment to Jeppesen on all counts of the Crew plaintiffs
complaints. 1215
C. LIABILITY FOR TRAINING
In Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., the federal district court an-
alyzed plaintiffs claims for alleged deficient training under gen-
eral negligence principles and held that the voluntary
undertaking to provide "transition training" that included use of
the autopilot by non-instrument rated pilots created a duty to
provide such training.121 6 The court held that evidence that this
training component was not given to the pilot precluded sum-
mary judgment, and that the issue of liability would be decided
based upon the "reasonably prudent designer and manufac-
turer" standard.1 217 The court further recognized Minnesota au-
1211 Id. at *16.
1212 Id. at *17.
1213 Id. at *19.
1214 Id. (citations omitted).
1215 Id.
1216 No. 06-2661 (PAM/JSM), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10899 at *9-13 (D. Minn.
Feb. 11, 2008).
1217 Id. at *13.
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thority that any negligence claim should focus on whether the
training was given, and not merely the "'general quality of the
instructors"' or the "nuances of educational processes and theo-
ries."121 The court also denied summary judgment on the man-
ufacturer's defenses that it had contracted out the training to a
third-party, and that the third-party was an independent con-
tractor.1219 The court held that the issue of agency was a ques-
tion of fact that precluded summary judgment. 1220 Finally, the
district court granted the manufacturer summary judgment on
the strict liability and warranty claims, finding that there was no
evidence submitted in opposition to the summaryjudgment mo-
tion that would support a claim that the aircraft was unsafe or
defective. 1221
In In re Cessna 208 Series Aircraft Products Liability Litigation, the
federal district court considered FlightSafety's motion for sum-
mary judgment relating to claims arising from the crash of a
Cessna 208 (Caravan) in icing conditions. 1222 Plaintiffs alleged
that
(1) FlightSafety ... failed to properly instruct the pilots . . . on
how to avoid ice accumulation, the unusual dangers of airframe
icing associated with the Cessna Caravan and how to control the
Cessna Caravan should ice accumulation occur, . . . [and] failed
to exercise reasonable care in performing flight training services;
(2) . . . fraudulently failed to disclose information about icing
conditions with the Cessna Caravan; and (3) ... breached express
and implied warranties . . . concerning . . . training and safety
instructions and the aircraft itself.122
3
The federal district court, applying Texas law, denied the mo-
tion for summary judgment as to the claims of "educational mal-
practice," choosing to follow an earlier ruling by the Texas state
court judge prior to removal, denying a prior motion for sum-
mary judgment as to these claims. 1224 The court observed that
there were no Texas cases rejecting claims of "educational mal-
practice," even though other states had done so in order to
avoid attempting to formulate and apply legal standards "by
1218 Id. at *10-11 (citing Alsides v. Brown Inst., Ltd., 592 N.W.2d 468, 473
(Minn. App. 1999)).
1219 Id. at *14.
1220 Id.
1221 Id. at *15-18.
1222 546 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1155-56 (D. Kan. 2008).
1223 Id. at 1157.
1224 Id. at 1158.
289
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
which to evaluate an educator," the "inherent uncertainties
about causation and the nature of damages in light of such in-
tervening factors as a student's attitude, motivation, tempera-
ment, past experience, and home environment, and in order to
avoid embroiling courts "'into overseeing day-to-day operation
of schools"' and a potential for a flood of litigation. 1225 The
court also examined two subsequent decisions granting sum-
mary judgment to FlightSafety on such claims. 1226 Nevertheless,
the court followed Doe v. Yale University, which recognized claims
for breach of a common law duty not to cause physical injury by
negligent conduct during a course of instruction, 1227 and the
dissent in Page v. Klein Tools, Inc., involving allegations that a
utility pole climbing school had taught an improper technique
for using pole climbing equipment resulting in a subsequent
sixty foot fall. 122a The court also distinguished claims for spe-
cific promises and claims that did not "involve an inquiry into
the nuances of educational processes and theories. ' 1229 Based
upon those authorities, the district court concluded that the
state trial court judge's earlier ruling was a reasonable applica-
tion of Texas law and denied FlightSafety's motion for summary
judgment. 1210
The district also denied FlightSafety's motion for summary
judgment based on federal preemption. 123 1 The court declined
to find preemption in the field of aviation safety, in part because
the FAA had taken no position that its regulations preempted
state law in this field.123 2 The court then considered the possi-
bility of conflict preemption, but concluded that FlightSafety
had not shown that it would have been impossible to provide
the instruction at issue and also comply with FAA regula-
1225 Id.
1226 Id. at 1159 (discussing Dallas Airmotive v. FlightSafety Int'l, Inc., No. 02-
CV-213425-01 (Cir. Ct. Jackson County, Mo. June 19, 2007), and Sheesley v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 2006 WL 1084103 (D.S.D. Apr. 20, 2006)).
1227 Id. at 1159 (discussing Doe v. Yale Univ., 748 A.2d 834, 839 (Conn. 2000)).
1228 Id. (discussing Page v. Klein Tools, Inc., 610 N.W.2d 900 (Mich. 2000)).
1229 Id. (discussing Alsides v. Brown Inst., Ltd., 592 N.W.2d 468, 473 (Minn.
App. 1999), which, despite dismissing claims based on the general quality of edu-
cation and competence of professors, nevertheless "recognized that.., claims for
breach of contract, fraud or misrepresentation are cognizable to the extent that
they allege that the itistitution failed to perform on specific promises and such
claims would not involve an inquiry into the nuances of educational processes
and theories."). Id.
1230 Id.
1231 Id. at 1161.
1232 Id. at 1161 n.3.
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tions, 12 11 or that "plaintiffs state law that claims ... stand as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full objec-
tives of the FAA's regulations.' 12 4 The district court relied on
the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine
for its analysis of conflict preemption. 2 5
The court also considered plaintiffs' implied and express war-
ranty claims.1 236 The district court held that there was no sale of
goods or other relationship to the "repair or modification of ex-
isting tangible goods or property" to support the application of
the implied warranty of good and workmanlike performance. 237
Nevertheless, the district court denied the motion for summary
judgment as to the express warranty claims on the grounds that
the summary judgment motion had been based upon federal
preemption, and the district court held that there was no fed-
eral preemption of an express warranty claim for the same rea-
sons that it had found no federal preemption for the
"educational malpractice" claims. 1238
XIII. FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION LITIGATION
A. AIRPORT FUNDING AND EQUAL ACCESS TO AIRPORTS
In R/T 182, LLC v. FAA, the Sixth Circuit affirmed an FAA
order, holding that a based-user fee did not unjustly discrimi-
nate against aircraft based at the Portage County Airport, Ra-
venna, Ohio.'2 3 9 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the order was
supported by substantial evidence and was not a "rule" requiring
notice and comment.1 240 The plaintiff, R/T 182, brought an ac-
tion under 49 U.S.C. § 47107(a) challenging a fee charged to
1233 Id. at 1160. The court noted that in Sheesley, the court had found pre-
emption because FlightSafety could not teach procedures different from those in
the FAA approved Pilot's Operating Handbook. The court concluded that
FlightSafety had not shown in the present case that the FAA would not authorize
further instruction on flying the aircraft in icing conditions. Similarly, the court
noted that even in Sheesley, the FAA regulations would not have prohibited
FlightSafety from seeking approval and using a flight simulator which accurately
simulated the handling of the aircraft under the conditions in at issue (exhaust
system failure) in that case.
1234 Id. at 1160.
1235 Id. at 1160 (citing Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002)).
1236 Id. at 1161-63.
1237 Id. at 1161-62.
1238 Id. at 1162-63.
1239 519 F.3d 307, 309-10 (6th Cir. 2008).
1240 Id. at 310.
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airport-based users depending upon weight of the aircraft and
frequency of use as "unjust discrimination" on the ground that
the fee was not charged to transient users.1241 The FAA con-
cluded that the fee was not "unjust" because the process of bill-
ing and collecting the fees from transient users could cost more
than the fees generated in revenue and because transient users
have no business relationship with the airport. 124 2 The Sixth
Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs argument that the order was,
in essence, a "rule" that required notice and comment, noting
that the entire process, from the filing of the complaint to the
appeal, was adjudicatory in nature. 1243
In BMI Salvage Corp. v FAA, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and
remanded an order of the Federal Aviation Administrator dis-
missing the complaint of BMI Salvage Corp. (BMI) and its affili-
ate Blueside Services, Inc. (Blueside) against Miami-Dade
County, Florida.1244 The complaint had alleged that the airport
operator had engaged in unjust discrimination in violation of 49
U.S.C. § 47107 and Federal Grant Assurance 22(a) (implement-
ing 49 U.S.C. § 47107).245 Specifically, BMI, a company en-
gaged in the business of deconstructing aircraft, and Blueside,
an affiliate of BMI formed for the purpose of obtaining a long-
term lease in order to become a fixed-base operator, alleged
that the airport operator granted long-term leases and leases to
occupy and/or construct facilities to certain tenants but not
BMI and Blueside.1246 The Federal Aviation Administrator dis-
missed the complaint on the grounds that the tenants who re-
ceived the more favorable leases were not similarly situated to
BMI and Blueside.124 7 Among the reasons cited by the Adminis-
trator for concluding that the tenants were not similarly situ-
ated: one comparator tenant was a repair service, whereas BMI
was a demolition service, and another comparator tenant, a
fixed-base operator, was an established business, whereas Blue-
side was a start-up. 124 The Eleventh Circuit held that these dif-
ferences were per se insufficient to justify the difference in
treatment and remanded the case to permit the airport operator
1241 Id. at 308.
1242 Id.
1243 Id. at 310.
1244 272 F. App'x. 842, 843 (11th Cir. 2008).
1245 Id. at 844.
1246 Id. at 845.
1247 Id.
1248 Id. at 848.
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to present legally and factually sufficient justifications for the
difference in treatment.
1249
B. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
In Nadal v. FAA, the Tenth Circuit affirmed an NTSB order
affirming a sixty-day suspension for a runway incursion. 1250 The
petitioner raised numerous evidentiary objections to admissibil-
ity of documents, presence of expert witnesses in the proceed-
ings, admission of hearsay evidence, and the completeness of
hypothetical questions to expert witnesses. 1251 The Tenth Cir-
cuit reviewed the order only to determine whether the rulings
were "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law."'1252 The court held that each of
these decisions was correct, that the evidence was admissible in
administrative proceedings, and that any error was harmless be-
cause none of the evidence contravened the evidence that the
runway incursion had occurred and petitioner had not testified
that he was confused by any markings or lighting regarding the
"hold short" line and, therefore, evidence of other similar run-
way incursions was irrelevant to show the confusing character of
the runway intersection.1 253 The court also affirmed the NTSB
decision not to accept a late request for reconsideration on the
grounds that such a request is addressed to the discretion of the
agency, and that there was no abuse of discretion in refusing to
accept the late request for reconsideration. 1254 Finally, peti-
tioner raised "ineffective assistance of counsel" as a defense and
the Tenth Circuit affirmed that the only context in which that
defense is available in civil litigation is in immigration cases and
refused to extend the defense to FAA certification
proceedings.1255
In Gabbard v. FAA, the Sixth Circuit affirmed an NTSB order
affirming a revocation of a pilot's certificates on the grounds
that the pilot had knowingly operated an aircraft while having a
prohibited drug (cocaine) in his system. 2 56 The pilot was given
a random drug test by his employer and approximately twenty-
1249 Id. at 852-53.
1250 281 F. App'x. 814, 818 (10th Cir. 2008).
1251 Id. at 816-17.
1252 Id.
1253 Id. at 816-17.
1254 Id. at 817.
1255 Id. 817-18.
1256, 532 F.3d 563, 564 (6th Cir. 2008).
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four hours later, the pilot operated a charterjet aircraft.1257 The
results of the drug test came back positive and the FAA issued
the emergency revocation order. 2 5 s
The pilot argued on appeal that the ingestion of the cocaine
had been inadvertent because someone gave him a cocaine-
laced cigarette the evening before the drug test (approximately
forty-four hours before the charter flight), which he put down
after realizing that it contained cocaine. 1259 The pilot argued
that the FAA presented no expert testimony that the cocaine
had not metabolized and was present in his system at the time of
the flight.1 260 The pilot also argued that the inadvertent use of
the drug was a defense to the positive drug test and the revoca-
tion of his medical certificate. 1261
The Tenth Circuit, while critical of the FAA for emphasizing
the dangers of aircraft operation with drugs in the pilot's system
and then not presenting any expert testimony to prove that the
drugs remained at the time of the flight, found that the NTSB
had not abused its discretion in finding that the drug was pre-
sent because the laboratory report, to which petitioner had not
objected, contained the statement that it may take up to forty-
eight hours for the drugs to fully metabolize. 1262 The court also
was critical of the petitioner's failure to present any expert testi-
mony of his own on this issue. 1263
As to the inadvertent ingestion, the court noted that such sub-
jective explanations are not considered "legitimate medical ex-
planation[s]" such that a drug test result should be changed
from positive to negative. 264 The pilot also sought to appeal to
basic "principles of justice" that would preclude a "professional
death penalty" for inadvertent cocaine use by noting that the
petitioner had given other conflicting versions of the cocaine
use, including the possibility that it was from plastic surgery or
from being around others smoking cocaine, and, more impor-
tantly, the petitioner knew that he had ingested cocaine, but
chose not to report it to his employer and pilot the charter
1257 Id.
1258 Id.
1259 Id. at 565-66.
12- Id. at 565.
1261 Id. at 566.
1262 Id. at 565-66.
1263 Id. at 565.
1264 Id. at 566.
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flight. 1265 Additionally, when asked about the use, the petitioner
had intentionally misrepresented the potential source of the co-
caine metabolites in his system. 126 6 Finally, as in Nadal, the pilot
made an ineffective assistance of counsel argument, which the
Sixth Circuit, like the Tenth Circuit in Nadal, refused to extend
to civil proceedings such as FAA administrative actions.
126 7
XIV. EVIDENCE AND DISCOVERY
In In re Air Crash at Lexington, Kentucky, August 27, 2006, the
federal magistrate rejected the arguments of the air carrier,
FAA, Airline Pilots Association (ALPA), and Regional Airline As-
sociation, that safety reports submitted voluntarily by airline pi-
lots to the air carrier and the FAA under the Aviation Safety
Action Program (ASAP) were privileged and should not be pro-
duced in discovery pursuant to a protective order prohibiting
public disclosure or use of the documents produced for any pur-
pose other than the litigation. 1268 The magistrate concluded
that the FAA regulations under which ASAP was established only
provided protection against "public disclosure," certain uses in
FAA enforcement actions, and action against the pilots by the
employer.1 269 However, the regulations expressly recognized
that the reports may be produced pursuant to an appropriate
court order. 2 0 The magistrate also rejected arguments that the
reports should be privileged pursuant to ICAO guidelines to
member states that urge protection for safety reporting safety
information, 2 7' or under federal or state common law privi-
leges, including the self-critical analysis privilege.1272
The magistrate generally adopted the U.S. Supreme Court's
approach in University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC,127" rejecting a
common law privilege for certain "peer review" reports in cases
1265 Id. at 566-67 (noting that "[petitioner] may have smoked crack cocaine
inadvertently, but he did not fly the jet inadvertently or do so without the knowl-
edge that he had recently smoked crack cocaine."). Id. at 567.
1266 Id. at 566-67 (noting "[n]or did he inadvertently misrepresent to the med-
ical review officer the potential source of the cocaine metabolites found in his
system.").
1267 Id. at 567.
12- No. 5:06-cv-316-KSF, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3864, at *44 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 17,
2008).
1269 Id. at *44-46.
1270 Id. at *44.
1271 Id. at *43.
1272 Id. at *47-52.
1273 Id. at *45 (citing Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 198 (1990)).
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in which it appeared that Congress or federal regulators, such as
the FAA, apparently had already balanced the competing con-
cerns associated with the applicability of a privilege to such re-
ports or could have provided a privilege for such reports. 1274
The magistrate also concluded that the qualified judicial privi-
lege recognized in In re Air Crash Near Cali, Colombia on December
20, 1995, had not been followed by subsequent courts and was
not applicable in this case. 1 2 75
The magistrate also rejected a state law privilege for self-criti-
cal analysis on the grounds that the Kentucky Supreme Court
had previously declined to adopt ajudicial privilege for self-criti-
cal analysis, and that even if the privilege were recognized, the
disclosure of such reports to a third-party, the FAA, would pre-
clude the application of the privilege in this case. 1276
Finally, the magistrate concluded that the plaintiffs had
demonstrated substantial need for the reports to examine air
carrier employees and otherwise provide evidence relating to
plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages. 1277
Subsequently, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Kentucky in In re Air Crash at Lexington, Kentucky, August 27,
2006, also overruled the carrier's objections and adopted the
magistrate's order.1278 The objections were supported by South-
west Airlines and by the Air Transport Association as amici. 1279
The district court considered the carrier's argument that the
magistrate had failed to consider the effect of disclosure on the
ASAP reporting program, but rejected those arguments because
disclosure in litigation was not the equivalent of "public" disclo-
sure with which the drafters of the statute were concerned. 1280
The submission of such information to the FAA (and any limita-
tions on the FAA's disclosure) did not make the underlying re-
ports in the hands of the carrier privileged,1 281 and the statute
1274 Id. at *40-41 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1154 (2000 & Supp. V 2006), which pro-
hibits discovery of cockpit voice recorder transcripts not made available to the
public by the NTSB, and noting that Congress had expressly precluded discovery
of cockpit voice recordings except under certain prescribed conditions, includ-
ing previous public disclosure or necessity for a party to receive a fair trial.).
1275 Id. at 47 (citing In reAir Crash Near Cali, Colombia on Dec. 20, 1995, 959
F. Supp. 1529 (S.D. Fla. 1997)).
1276 Id. at *51-52.
1277 Id. at *52-53.
1278 545 F. Supp. 2d 618, 624 (E.D. Ky. 2008).
1279 Id. at 619.
1280 Id. at 621.
1281 Id.
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itself, the legislative history and the regulations specifically re-
ferred to disclosure pursuant to a court order, including disclo-
sure "in litigation between an air carrier and an individual who
alleges he was harmed by the air carrier's negligence. ' 128 2 Ac-
cording to the district court, this regulatory history demon-
strated that "the FAA expressly contemplated that there could
be disclosure [of ASAP reports] . . . in carrier negligence
cases." 1283 The district court also overruled a request for in cam-
era review of the reports prior to the issuance of a court order to
determine materiality, noting that the statute did not impose
any such restriction on "court orders" and that the discovery re-
quest was specifically limited to "reports that are particularly rel-
evant to [plaintiffs'] claims. 128 4
The district court also affirmed the ruling that the reports
were not protected by a common law privilege, on the grounds
that Congress had specifically permitted disclosure pursuant to
a "court order," and that such a provision indicated "'that Con-
gress ha[d] considered the relevant competing concerns but has
not provided the privilege itself" and therefore the court was
reluctant to recognize a common law privilege. 2 5 Additionally,
the court held that the privilege for critical self-evaluation was
not applicable because the information was not limited to "in
house" review and the federal provision for disclosure pursuant
to a "court order" demonstrated that "the FAA itself does not
hold ASAP information in strict confidence.' 1 286 The court also
agreed with the magistrate that the federal provision allowing
for disclosure pursuant to a "court order" precluded the applica-
tion of a state law privilege for the reports and information. 287
Finally, the court noted that at least one deponent had
remembered several incidents "involving a runway incursion
and wrong runway events," but had been unable to remember
the details. 128 8 The district court concluded that "[w]hen rele-
vant, contemporaneous records are available, . . . '[t]he allow-
ance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably
1282 Id. at 621-22 (quoting 66 Fed. Reg. 33,797 setting forth the FAA's position
relating its proposal to enact 14 C.F.R. § 193.7(f)).
1283 Id. at 622.
1284 Id.
1285 Id. at 623 (quoting magistrate's order).
1286 Id. at 623-24 (quoting In re Air Crash at Belle Harbor, New York, 02 MDL
1448, at 16 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2007) (order requiring "disclosure of specific ASAP
reports").).
1287 Id. at 624.
1288 Id.
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relevant.., would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process
of law and gravely impair the basic function of the courts.'" 28 9
In In re Air Crash at Lexington, Kentucky, August 27, 2006, the
district court held that cockpit voice recorder (CVR) audio tape
recordings were admissible. 1290 The air carrier had moved to
exclude the use of the audio tape recordings at trial under Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence 402 and 403.1291 The district court first
noted that the Sixth Circuit encouraged the admissibility of rele-
vant evidence so as not to "'deprive plaintiffs of their legitimate
right to place before the jury the circumstances and atmosphere
of the entire cause of action which they have brought into the
court, replacing it with a sterile or laboratory atmosphere
.... "'1292 The district court also noted that "'Rule 403 does not
exclude evidence because it is strongly persuasive or compel-
lingly relevant .... The truth may hurt, but Rule 403 does not
make it inadmissible on that account.""1 293
The United States opposed the air carrier's motion to exclude
the audio tapes, and claimed that it was necessary to "allow[ I
the jury to hear the pitch and inflection of the pilots' conversa-
tion and other sounds revealing a crew inattentive to the task of
piloting a commercial airliner.' 29 4 The United States argued
that the audio tapes were prejudicial precisely because they were
material, and that the air carrier had "failed to carry its burden
to show any prejudice [was] unfair and substantially out-
weigh[ed] the probative value of the evidence.' ' 1295 Finally, the
United States had no objections "to reasonable restrictions on
the use of the CVR tape so as to prevent its use 'for purposes
other than for the proceeding. '"1 296 In addition, plaintiffs ar-
gued that the jury should be allowed to hear the audio tape in
open court in order to support "their burden of proof for puni-
tive damages.' ' 297 The district court concluded that "the tone of
voice, pitch, and inflection of the pilots statements.., are com-
pletely absent from [the] printed page" of the transcript, and
1289 Id. (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 712 (1974)).
1290 No. 5:06-cv-316KSF 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52768 at *8 (E.D. Ky. July 8,
2008).
1291 Id. at *5.
1292 Id. at *4 (quoting In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 695 F.2d 207,217 (6th Cir.
1982)).
1-3 Id. at *4-5 (quoting In re Air Crash Disaster, 86 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 1996)).
1294 Id. at *6.
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that "[p]laintiffs need the audio recording to prosecute their
claims and meet their heightened burden to prove gross
negligence." 1298
In In re Air Crash At Lexington, Kentucky, August 27, 2006, the
court held that various safety recommendations issued by the
NTSB were inadmissible based on 49 U.S.C. § 1154(b). 1299 The
court analyzed the interplay between section 1145(b) and the
NTSB's own regulations set forth in 49 C.F.R. § 835.2 (which
divide NTSB reports into two groups: factual reports and analyti-
cal reports containing the Board's determinations and conclu-
sions as to probable cause).13°° Pursuant to its regulations, the
NTSB does not oppose the use of factual reports in evidence,
while it opposes the use of reports containing the Board's con-
clusions and determinations. 130 ' The United States filed a mo-
tion in limine to exclude the safety recommendations, and the
passenger plaintiffs argued that the Board's own regulations did
not specifically mention safety recommendations and include a
probable cause determination, the recommendations do not
usurp the function of the jury and should be admissible. 1312 The
court concluded that the issue was essentially a matter of statu-
tory construction and that the agency's interpretation of its own
regulations, while not controlling in this case because Congress
had not explicitly granted the NTSB rule-making authority
in this area, were "entitled to some deference and is
persuasive."' 3 03
The issue was whether safety recommendations were admissi-
ble factual reports or conclusions and determinations of the
Board precluded under the statute. In one prior decision, it
had been held that safety recommendations were conclusions
and determinations of the Board.130 4 Moreover, in this case, the
United States submitted an opinion letter from the general
counsel of the NTSB stating that the Board "opposes any use of
NTSB safety recommendations in civil actions for damages. It
has been the NTSB's long-standing position that safety recom-
1298 Id. at *8.
1299 No. 5:06-cv-316-KSF, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56169, at *30 (E.D. Ky. 2008).
1300 Id. at *18-19.
1301 Id. at *19.
1302 Id. at *20-21.
1303 Id. at *21, *28.
1304 Id. at *26-27 (citing In re Jacoby Airplane Crash Litigation, No. 99-6073
(HAA) (D.N.J. Sept. 19, 2007)).
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mendations are covered by the statutory prohibition against the
use or admission of NTSB reports. 13 °5
The court concluded that, while the NTSB's regulation did
not refer to safety recommendations, the Board's policy was en-
titled to deference and was persuasive. 306 Additionally, the
court concluded that the language of the statute "reflects an in-
tent to encompass within the statute more than just the proba-
ble cause determination. The statute precludes admission of
any 'part of a report of the Board, related to an accident or the
investigation of an accident.'- 1307 The safety recommendations
"arose out of and are related to the investigation of one or more
accidents."1 3 0 8 Additionally, the statutory restrictions on testi-
mony of NTSB investigators reflected "Congress' 'strong * * *
desire to keep the Board free of the entanglement of such
suits.' "1309 The court concluded that admitting such recommen-
dations "would surely 'exert an undue influence on litigation,"'
and that the court, as had prior courts, saw "little difference be-
tween introduction of safety recommendations or probable
cause reports.' 131 0 Based on this analysis, the court concluded
that "safety recommendations of the NTSB are encompassed
within the meaning of "a report of the Board, related to an acci-
dent or an investigation of an accident"' and are therefore inad-
missible under 49 U.S.C. § 1154(b).3
In In re Air Crash At Lexington, Kentucky, August 27, 2006, the
court considered a motion to strike all or portions of the testi-
mony and exhibits from a deposition taken by plaintiffs of a
Comair captain who was also a member of the Air Line Pilots
Association's Central Air Safety Committee. 1312 The witness tes-
tified during deposition to certain communications he had
made to Comair, prior to the crash, regarding "sterile cockpit
violations and runway incursions. ' 113 The witness had not been
designated as an expert witness and his deposition testimony was
taken after the deadline for identifying expert witnesses. 3
14
1305 Id. at *19.
1306 Id. at *28-29.
1307 Id. at *29.
1308 Id.
1309 Id.
1310 Id. at *30.
1311 Id.
1312 No. 5:06-cv-KSF, 2008 U.S. Dist LEXIS 58482, at *1-2 (E.D. Ky. July 31,
2008).
1313 Id. at *2-3.
1314 Id. at *7.
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Comair objected to the use of the testimony at trial on the
grounds that the witness (1) was not designated as an expert
witness; (2) lacked personal knowledge on a number of matters;
(3) testified regarding subsequent remedial measures; (4) testi-
fied regarding Comair's submission to the NTSB; (5) testified
regarding "'hearsay and hearsay within hearsay;"' and (6) gave
testimony that may be given "'preemptive weight and thereby
cause ... extreme prejudice at trial."' 1315
The court initially ordered that in view of the credibility of the
witness on "such a critical issue," "his testimony at trial must be
live and in person," and his deposition used only in keeping
with the "rules relating to any live witness; for example, for pur-
poses of impeachment.' 1 316 The court then excluded any opin-
ions requiring "technical or other specialized knowledge," as
permitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 because the wit-
ness had not been designated as an expert witness before the
deadline.1 31 7 The court ruled that, as a lay witness who may pro-
vide opinions under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, those opin-
ions could not "apply knowledge and familiarity ... beyond that
of the average lay person," and cautioned Plaintiffs that his testi-
mony must satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence
701.1318 The court reserved ruling on all other objections until
trial, but noted plaintiffs' arguments that the testimony as to rec-
ommendations to Comair might be admissible for various rea-
sons, including notice, impeachment, feasibility, and rebuttal of
Comair's expected testimony regarding a "high commitment to
flight safety and to correct factual inaccuracies in Comair's sub-
mission to the NTSB."' 1 9 The court also noted Comair's argu-
ment that testimony regarding proposed safety measures which
Comair considered after the crash would violate the prohibition
against evidence of subsequent remedial measures under Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 407.1320
XV. CRIMINAL LAW
In United States v. Murphy, the court held that expert testimony
regarding the defendant's post-traumatic stress disorder or
1315 Id. at *3-*4.
1316 Id. at *7.
1317 Id.
1318 Id. at *7-8 (quoting United States v. White, 492 F.3d 380, 403 (6th Cir.
2007)).
1319 Id. at *5-6, *8.
1320 Id. at *3-4, *8.
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other mental disease was inadmissible for the purpose of negat-
ing the defendant's mens rea or the voluntariness of the defen-
dant's actions because the crime with which he was charged was
a general intent, as opposed to a specific intent, crime." 2 "On
March 15, 2007, [the defendant] boarded a plane in New York
bound for Los Angeles. 1322 [D]uring the flight, [the d]efendant
allegedly acted in an irrational, agitated, and aggressive man-
ner."1323 The defendant was indicted on "one count of intimi-
dating two flight attendants and thereby interfering with and
lessening their ability to perform their duties, in violation of 49
U.S.C. § 46504."1324 The defendant sought to introduce expert
testimony that he had severe post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) and that when he was in a PTSD-induced dissociative
state, he lost "rational and voluntary control of his behavior.' 13 25
The proffered testimony would have further established that he
was in such a state during the March 15, 2007, flight and, there-
fore, the defendant would have lacked the mental capacity to
commit the crime in question, namely the "intimidation of a
flight attendant. 1 326 Further, the defendant asserted that the
testimony would have established that "his actions were involun-
tary or automatic. "1327
The court explained that evidence of diminished mental ca-
pacity is admissible under only two conditions: (1) "such evi-
dence may negate the mens rea of a 'specific intent' crime;" and
(2) the "expert testimony is limited to a diagnosis, the facts
upon which the diagnosis is based, and the characteristics of any
mental disease or defect from which a defendant suffered dur-
ing the relevant time period.' 1 328 The court did not address the
second condition, finding that the crime charged was a general
intent crime because it did "not require knowledge or apprecia-
tion of the wrongfulness of the act" but merely required that the
act was done "voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of
mistake or accident. ' 1329 The court noted particularly that the
statutory language defining the offense of interference made no
1321 556 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1237 (D. Colo. 2008).
1322 Id. at 1234.
1323 Id.
1324 Id.
1325 Id. at 1235.
1326 Id.
1327 Id.
1328 Id. (citing United States v. Jackson, 8 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1241 (D. Colo.
1998)).
1329 Id. (citing United States v. Blair, 54 F.3d 639, 642 (10th Cir. 1995)).
302
2009] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION LAW
mention of a specific intent,1 330 stating, "[i]f Congress had in-
tended the statute to require specific intent to interfere with the
performance of the duties of a flight crew, 'the statute would
have said "with the intent" to interfere.' 1331 "In the absence of
an explicit statement that a crime requires specific intent," the
court noted that it was bound to assume the statute required
only general intent.1332
The court similarly found that the offense of intimidation did
not require a specific intent to intimidate.1333 The court ex-
plained that "[i]t is common knowledge that a person may in-
timidate another without intentionally making a direct or even
veiled threat.133 4 Thus, even though the defendant may not
have intended to injure or frighten anyone on board, the of-
fense of intimidation could be proven by showing that the de-
fendant's conduct and words "would place an ordinary,
reasonable person in fear."'33 5 If the defendant's actions cre-
ated a reasonable apprehension of bodily harm among the
flight attendants, it was irrelevant whether the defendant specifi-
cally intended to intimidate them. 1336
Finally, the court held that where expert testimony was ex-
pressly excluded as to general intent crimes, the same expert
testimony could not be admitted on the issue of "voluntari-
ness."' 133 7 The court stated that the likelihood that such testi-
mony would confuse the jury as to the issues of general intent
outweighed the probative value of such testimony on the issue of
"voluntariness," and that, while due process
'prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that
serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the
1330 Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 46504 (2000 & Supp. V 2006), which states, in
pertinent part:
An individual . .. who, by assaulting or intimidating a flight crew
member or flight attendant of the aircraft, interferes with the per-
formance of the duties of the member or attendant or lessens the
ability of the member or attendant to perform those duties, or at-
tempts or conspires to do such an act, shall be fined under title 18,
imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or both.).
Id.
1331 Id. (quoting United States v. Grossman, 131 F.3d 1449, 1451 (11th Cir.
1997)).
1332 Id. (United States v. Lewis, 780 F.2d 1140, 1142-43 (4th Cir. 1984)).
1333 Id. at 1237.
1334 Id. at 1236.
1335 Id. at 1236-37.
1336 Id.
1337 Id. at 1237.
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ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of
evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative
value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the
jury."1338
XVI. LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
A. AGE DISCRIMINATION
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Exxon Mobile
Corp., the District Court for the Northern District of Texas de-
nied the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
(EEOC) motion for a temporary restraining order and prelimi-
nary injunction against defendant Exxon Mobile Corporation in
an action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) brought by the EEOC on behalf of several pilots who
were retired on their sixtieth1339 birthday under Exxon's corpo-
rate mandatory retirement policy.1340 The district court held
that Exxon demonstrated a likelihood of success on its defense
that age was a "bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ),
which is a statutory affirmative defense to the ADEA.1341' The
district court concluded that the FAA's mandatory retirement
age, upon which the Exxon corporate policy was modeled, was
highly probative of Exxon's BFOQ defense because of the "con-
gruence" between the work performed by commercial airline pi-
lots and the work performed by Exxon pilots.1342
In Miller v. American Airlines, Inc., the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the district court's summary judgment on the plaintiffs' com-
plaint alleging that American Airlines' mandatory retirement
policy under the ADEA was both discriminatory in application
and on its face. 343 The plaintiffs were flight engineers and the
terms and conditions of plaintiffs' employment were governed
by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and its supplement
(Supplement U), which provided that a flight engineer's salary
1338 Id. (citing Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, (2006)).
1339 The FTEPA was passed subsequent to the filing of the lawsuit. However,
the district court concluded that its analysis was unaffected by the raising of the
mandatory retirement age to sixty-five. Subsequent to the passage of the FTEPA,
Exxon also raised its mandatory retirement age to sixty-five.
1340 No. 3:06-cv-1732-Ky, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39071, at *27 (N.D. Tex. Apr.
28, 2008).
1341 Id. at *25.
1342 Id.
1343 525 F.3d 520, 521-22 (7th Cir. 2008).
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would be guaranteed "until his normal flight engineer retire-
ment date," which was the pilots' 65th birthday.1344 The district
court ordered a stay of the action pending arbitration under the
Railway Labor Act (RLA), after concluding "that the plaintiffs'
claims involved a minor dispute over the terms in a [CBA]."1345
After arbitration, the district court deferred to the arbitrator's
decision that the CBA did not guarantee flight engineers com-
parable pay beyond the normal retirement age of sixty-five. 13 46
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding, noting
that only arbitral boards under the RLA have the authority to
interpret CBAs. 1347 As for the allegation that Supplement U was
discriminatory on its face, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
this argument was not properly before the court because it was
not included in plaintiffs' EEOC charge.1348 It merely alleged
that plaintiffs suffered discrimination when they were not of-
fered positions with a comparable salary after retirement age,
which the Seventh Circuit considered to be a much narrower
charge than the allegation that the policy was discriminatory on
its face. 1 34
9
In Vaughn v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, International, the district
court dismissed the claims of current and former pilots of US
Airways who had either reached or were close to their
mandatory retirement age against ALPA and RSA, an equity
sponsor of US Airways during one of two bankruptcies. 3 5 0 The
claims were related to the termination of the pilots' original
pension plan and the creation of two successor retirement
plans, which were increasingly less favorable than the original
pension plan to pilots who were close to retirement age. 13 5 1 The
original plan was a defined benefits plan (DB Plan).1352 The DB
Plan was replaced by a defined contribution plan (DC Plan I),
which required the airline to make contributions to the plan
1344 Id. at 522.
1345 Id. at 522-23.
1346 Id. at 523.
1347 Id. at 524. The Seventh Circuit noted that its holding did not mean that
employees are always precluded from bringing an ADEA claim in federal court if
the dispute involves a collective bargaining agreement; however, if the success of
the claim is dependent upon the interpretation of a collective bargaining agree-
ment, the court could not consider it. Id.
13- Id. at 525-26.
1349 Id. at 527.
1350 395 B.R. 520, 528 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
1351 Id. at 533.
1352 Id. at 529.
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based upon each pilot's contribution rate, up to 100% of the
pilot's salary, with each pilot's contribution determined by a
formula designed to help the pilot achieve a certain target upon
retirement. 35 3 Under this plan, the airline was required to
make higher contributions for pilots who were close to retire-
ment age. 3 154 DC Plan I was later replaced by DC Plan II, which
required the airline to make contributions to each pilot's indi-
vidual account at 10% of the pilot's salary. 1355
The pilots sued ALPA for breach of the duty of fair represen-
tation, for age discrimination under sections 623(c) and (i) of
ADEA, and for racketeering under RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962.1356
The pilots also sued RSA under RICO. 13 57 The district court dis-
missed all of plaintiffs' claims and denied leave to amend. 35
The district court dismissed plaintiffs' duty-of-fair-representation
claims on the grounds that ALPA's conduct was not without ra-
tional basis or explanation; ALPA was under no obligation to
accede to its members' preferences even if a vote had taken
place; DC Plan I actually discriminated in favor of older pilots;
and ALPA was not required to achieve "absolute equality among
its members" so long as there is a "'legitimate, rational reason
for the union's conduct.' "359
The district court dismissed the ADEA claims under § 623(c)
on the grounds that the pilots' sole allegation of discrimination,
that the younger pilots would have more time to accumulate re-
tirement benefits was a function of compound interest and the
time value of money rather than discrimination and was thus
insufficient to make out a prima facie case of discrimination' 360
and on the grounds that the ADEA's safe harbor provision,
found in § 623(f)-the "'equal cost or equal benefits"' rule-
precluded plaintiffs' claims, because the payments made were
1353 Id. at 533.
1354 Id.
1355 Id. at *19.
1356 Id. at 528-29.
1357 Id. at 529.
1358 Id. at 553.
1359 Id. at 539 (quoting Ramey v. Dist. 141, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aero-
space Workers, No. 99-cv-434, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26670, at *9-10 (E.D.N.Y.
Nov. 4, 2002).
136 Id. at 541. In support of this conclusion, the district court relied upon a
series of cases, notably, Cooper v. IBM Pers. Pension Plan, 457 F.3d 636 (7th Cir.
2006), holding that the implementation of a cash-balance plan in lieu of a de-
fined benefits plan did not constitute age discrimination when older employees
receive fewer benefits than younger employees upon retirement. Id. at 541-42.
306
2009] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION LAW
not disparate. 13 61 The district court also dismissed plaintiffs'
claims under § 623(i) of the ADEA, "which makes it unlawful to
cease or reduce the rate at which benefits accrue or are contrib-
uted to" under a pension plan, on the grounds that neither DC
Plan ceased or reduced the amount of contributions based on
age. 1362
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' RICO claims
against ALPA on the grounds that the predicate acts alleged
failed to give rise to an inference of fraudulent intent and allege
a pattern of racketeering activity. 13 63 The district court dis-
missed the RICO claims against RSA, which was an equity spon-
sor of the airline during one of the two bankruptcies, because
plaintiffs alleged only a single fraudulent act, fraud in connec-
tion with a bankruptcy case under Chapter 11, which is insuffi-
cient to establish a claim under RICO, which requires two or
more predicate acts in order to establish a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity. 1364
In Carswell v. Air line Pilots Ass'n, International, the District
Court for the District of Columbia dismissed plaintiffs claims
for breach of contract against ALPA and the AFL-CIO for age
discrimination under the ADEA against his airline employer, US
Airways, arising from the pilot's forced retirement upon reach-
ing the age of sixty.1 365 The district court dismissed the age dis-
crimination claims on the grounds that the FAA regulations
creating a mandatory retirement age were a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification (BFOQ) and held that the airline was under
no duty to offer the plaintiff another position on its own initia-
tive. 136 6 The district court also rejected the pilot's claim that the
airline owed him a fiduciary duty to seek an exemption to the
FAA regulations requiring mandatory retirement. 1367 The dis-
trict court dismissed the breach of contract claim against the
AFL-CIO on the grounds that there was no evidence that ALPA
was acting as an agent on behalf of the AFL-CIO, even though
there was a link to the AFL-CIO website on ALPA's website; the
AFL-CIO and ALPA shared some mutual officers and directors
1361 Id. at 543.
1362 Id. at 545.
1363 Id. at 549.
1364 Id. at 553.
1365 540 F. Supp. 2d 107, 110-11 (D.D.C. 2008).
1366 Id. at *116-20. The court noted that plaintiff failed to apply for another
job with the airline for which he was qualified. Id. at 117-18.
1367 Id. at 116.
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and the two unions had occasionally filed joint documents with
public agencies, because none of these activities involved the ex-
ercise of control over ALPA by the AFL-CIO. 136 The district
court dismissed the plaintiffs breach of contract claim against
ALPA on the grounds that mandatory arbitration was required
under the RLA, because this was a "minor dispute" involving the
interpretation of a CBA. 360
In Adams v. FAA, the petitioners were commercial airline pi-
lots who reached the age of sixty before December 13, 2007, and
had filed requests for an exemption with the FAA, from the reg-
ulation barring them from flying commercial aircraft after they
turned sixty.1 70 The FAA denied their requests for exemption
and the petitioners filed petitions for review in the D.C. Circuit
under 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a), which permits direct challenges to
an order issued by the FAA.137' The D.C. Circuit held that the
Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act (FTEPA), 49 U.S.C.
§ 44729, which raised the maximum age limit for pilots flying
large commercial aircraft to sixty-five, expressly repealed the
regulation that was the Age 60 Rule, making the petitions
moot.1372 The pilots asserted that their petitions could not be
dismissed as moot, because the statute itself is a constitutionally-
prohibited bill of attainder and a violation of their rights to due
process and equal protection, because it denies such pilots any
seniority or benefits from their prior (pre-age sixty) years of ser-
vice if they are rehired by an airline prior to reaching age sixty-
five. 13 7' The U.S. court of appeals held that it had no 'jurisdic-
tion to consider constitutional questions unrelated to the FAA's
[Rule 65] order," promulgated under FTEPA. 13 74 If the pilots
could "satisfy Article III standing requirements, their facial chal-
lenges" to the FTEPA must be brought first to the district court,
"which has original jurisdiction over federal question claims. ' 1375
B. WRONGFUL TERMINATION
In Borodkin v. Omni Air International, Inc., the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor
1368 Id. at 124.
1369 Id. at 124-25.
1370 550 F.3d 1174, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
1371 Id.
1372 Id.
1373 Id. at 1175-1176.
1374 Id. at 1176.
1375 Id.
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of defendants on plaintiffs claims for "tortious discharge"
(wrongful termination) and defamation under Nevada law aris-
ing from plaintiffs failed alcohol test.1 376 The Ninth Circuit
held that Nevada law does not protect "an employee who was
been terminated for failing an alcohol test" because such a
cause of action does not express public policy or protect public
safety.1"77 The Ninth Circuit further held that the Pilot Records
Improvement Act (PRIA), 49 U.S.C. § 44703(i) (1) "prohibits ac-
tions against air carriers that have provided pilot records to a
prospective employer if the pilot has signed a release of liabil-
ity," which the plaintiff did, thus barring plaintiffs defamation
claim. 1378 The Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiff's argument
for application of the exception under PRIA created for cases in
which the air carrier knew the information was false and main-
tained it in violation of a federal criminal statute, because the
information was not maintained in violation of a criminal
statute. 1379
C. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
In Rachford v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, International, the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs claims for
tortious interference and negligent disruption of two agree-
ments, a CBA and a letter of agreement, entered into between
the Emery pilots' union and the defendants, which contracts al-
legedly required defendant Emery Air Freight Corp to fund Em-
ery World Airlines' maintenance.1 38 1 Since the plaintiffs' claims
involved the interpretation of a CBA, they were preempted
under the RIA, which requires mandatory arbitration.1 31 And,
since the arbitrator concluded that the letter of agreement and
CBA did not contain the obligation that plaintiff claimed was
disrupted, plaintiffs claims for negligent and tortious interfer-
ence must fail.138 2
1376 279 F. App'x. 517, 518 (9th Cir. 2008).
1377 Id. at 518.
1378 Id.
1379 Id. at 518-19. The only criminal statute identified by plaintiff was 18
U.S.C. § 1001, which prohibits the making of false statements "'in any matter
within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Gov-
ernment of the United States."' However, the court concluded that this statute
was inapplicable because the alleged false information was provided to another
airline rather than the government. Id.
1380 284 F. App'x. 473, 474 (9th Cir. 2008).
1381 Id. at 475.
1382 Id.
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D. FEDERAL AND STATE WHISTLEBLOWER STATUTES
In Gervasio v. Continental Airlines, Inc., plaintiff Gervasio was
terminated from his job with Continental Airlines, Inc. after he
"escorted a relative through an unauthorized security check
point" on the fifth anniversary of the September 1 1th attacks.138
The plaintiff then won reinstatement through Continental's in-
ternal appeals process, but failed to receive a Port Authority ID
within six months of reinstatement, which was a condition pre-
cedent to reinstatement.1384 Plaintiff filed suit on September 11,
2007, alleging that Continental violated the New Jersey Consci-
entious Employee Protection Act (CEPA) when it terminated
him for reporting violations of federal security regulations.138 5
The action was removed to federal court under the theory that
plaintiff's state law claims were preempted by the ADA. 3 6 The
district court, noting a split among the circuits, concluded that
the ADA did not preempt claims under state whistleblower pro-
tection laws where the claims were not directly related to prices,
routes, or services of an air carrier and because the employee's
actions did not have the possibility of grounding any particular
flight, any connection to Continental's services would be too re-
mote and attenuated for these claims to be preempted.1 87 The
district court remanded the action to state court. 1388
In In re UAL Corp., the bankruptcy court disallowed a former
employee's claim for damages under the Whistleblower Protec-
tion Program of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and
Reform Act for the 21st Century (49 U.S.C. § 42121 (2000))
(WPP).1389 The WPP protects employees of air carriers from re-
taliation for providing air safety information to their employers
or to the FAA.'390 The former employee, Mark Sassman, was
terminated for repeatedly coming in late to work without filling
out an "exception form," documenting his late arrival time, and
thereby receiving pay for hours not actually worked. 3 1 The air-
1383 No. 07-5530 (DMC) (MF), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58767, (D.NJ. 2008).
1384 Id. at *2-3.
1385 Id. at *4.
1386 Id.
1387 Id. at *9-11.
1388 Id. at *12.
1389 No. 02-48191, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 441, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 2008).
13- Id. at *2.
1391 Id. at *6-7. The airline did not use timecards, relying instead on an honor
system whereby the employees would notify the airline of a late arrival using an
"exception form." If no exception form is filled out, then the employee is pre-
sumed to have worked his full shift. Id.
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line opposed the claim on the grounds that the officials who
ultimately terminated the former employee did not know about
the complaints and that, even if the officials involved in the ter-
mination did know about the safety complaints, the airline
proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have ter-
minated Sassman in the absence of the protected activity.1
9 2
The bankruptcy court agreed, holding that the airline was not
liable for Sassman's discharge under the WPP. 393
In Hafer v. U.S. Department of Labor Administrative Review Board,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a whistleblower claim
against United Airlines after that claim was discharged in bank-
ruptcy. 139 4 Timothy Hafer, an employee of United Airlines, ini-
tially filed a complaint under the WPP with OSHA, which was
determined to be "meritless" by the OSHA investigator.
1 395
Hafer appealed to an administrative law judge, who upheld the
investigator's determination.1 396 Hafer then filed an appeal with
the Administrative Review Board of the Department of La-
bor.13 97 The Review Board issued a stay of the appeal pending
United Airlines' bankruptcy proceedings and then dismissed the
appeal once the confirmation order was entered. 139 On appeal,
the Ninth Circuit upheld the Review Board's dismissal on the
grounds that the confirmation order enjoined the continuation
of all claims against United Airlines discharged by the confirma-
tion order, and concluded that the WPP does not fall within any
of the exceptions to discharge and does not create a separate
and unique exception to discharge. 1
399
In Garland v. US Airways, Inc., the Third Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of an airline pilot's claims for employment discrimina-
tion in part because the pilot failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies in pursuing his claims. 400 The court explained that
the pilot failed to demonstrate that he exhausted his claims with
the EEOC, a necessary prerequisite to bringing an action for
race and age discrimination under Title VII in federal court.
140 1
1392 Id. at *59.
1393 Id.
1394 277 F. App'x. 739, 740 (9th Cir. 2008).




13- Id. at 741.
1400 270 Fed. Appx. 99, 103 (3d Cir. 2008).
1401 Id. at 103.
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In Carter v. Aero Mechanical Industries, Inc., plaintiff filed a com-
plaint in state court alleging a violation of New Mexico common
law arising from his termination following his refusal to sign-off
on inadequate work and his subsequent complaint to the
FAA. 4 2 The defendant removed the case, claiming preemption
of the claims under the WPP. 14 ° 3 The district court remanded
the action to state court on the grounds that the allegedly pro-
tected activity did not directly affect prices, routes, or service
and, therefore, did not implicate the WPP. 4 °4 In reaching this
conclusion, the district court noted a split among the circuits,
with the Eighth Circuit holding that any whistleblower claim
that implicates FAA regulations is preempted by the WPP and
the Third and Eleventh Circuits holding that preemption occurs
only if the protected actions have an impact on prices, routes, or
service. 1405
In Rollins v. Administrative Review Board, the Tenth Circuit af-
firmed the decisions of the Administrative Review Board dis-
missing a complaint filed by an airline employee who alleged
that he had been fired in violation of the WPP. 14 °6 The Admin-
istrative Review Board held that the complaint had not been
filed within the ninety-day period following the alleged violation
as required under Section 42121(b) (1) of WPP and refused to
consider an argument raised for the first time on appeal that an
oral complaint was made within the ninety-day limitations pe-
riod.14 °7 The Tenth Circuit, reviewed the decision under an "ar-
bitrary, capricious, or abuse of discretion" standard, and
affirmed the decision, noting the Board's determination that
the limitations period ran from the communication of the deci-
sion rather than the consequences of that decision was in line
with relevant authority.14 " The Tenth Circuit also held that the
Board's decision not to consider a belatedly raised argument on
appeal was nothing other than an application of uniformly ap-
plied procedural rules.14 9
1402 No. CIV 08-608 BB/RLP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108824, at *1-2 (D.N.M.
Dec. 3, 2008).
1403 Id. at 17,265.
1404 Id.
1405 Id.
1406 No. 07-9521, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 7260, at *1-2 (10th Cir. 2008).
1407 Id. at *7-8.
1408 Id. at *5-6.
140- Id. at *8.
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E. RAILWAY LABOR ACT
In United Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, International,"'0
United Airlines filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief under § 2, First of the RLA against ALPA and
various individual members of an ALPA committee known as
the Industrial Relations Committee (IRC), alleging that ALPA
had been engaged for more than a year-and-a-half in a cam-
paign to pressure United Airlines to reopen the parties' CBA.
141 1
United Airlines claimed ALPA promoted activities that were un-
lawful under the RLA, including encouraging the pilots to
"work-to-rule," to refuse to waive provisions of their contract that
were otherwise waivable, to refuse voluntary flight assignments
known as 'junior/senior manning," to increase fuel consump-
tion, to refuse to operate aircraft with deferrable maintenance
items, and to take excessive time in pre-flight cockpit checks. 412
The court entered a preliminary injunction in favor of United
Airlines.1"' More specifically, the court concluded that ALPA
violated its duty under § 2, First of the RLA to exert every rea-
sonable effort to avoid any interruption to commerce. 1414 In-
stead, ALPA published communications and directives to
continue the slowdown campaign and, accordingly, injunctive
relief was warranted under the RLA.1 5 The district court re-
jected ALPA's argument that the dispute was a "minor dispute"
over the interpretation of the CBA over which the district courts
lack jurisdiction. 14 6 Rather, the court concluded that this was a
"major dispute," in light of ALPA's campaign to reopen the
CBA, and, even if it were a "minor dispute," ALPA was forbidden
under the RLA from exercising self-help in the form of con-
certed action, which is a violation of the RLA."14 7 The court fur-
ther held that United Airlines' claims were not barred by the
RLA's six month statute of limitations, because this was a contin-
uing violation, which extended into the limitations period.
14 8
1410 No. 08-CV-4317, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94750, at *2-6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17,
2008).
1411 The collective bargaining agreement at issue was negotiated during
United's bankruptcy and resulted in wage reductions and other concessions from
the pilots. Id. at *25-26.
1412 Id. at *3-6.
1413 Id. at 136.
1414 Id. at *101-08.
1415 Id.
1416 Id. at *115-16.
1417 Id. at *109-16.
1418 Id. at *116-21.
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The court also held that United Airlines' claims were not barred
by the doctrine of laches, because the evidence did not support
a claim that United Airlines slept on its rights and because there
is no evidence that other, earlier actions, such as filing a griev-
ance, "would have resolved the disputes between the parties."'
419
The court rejected ALPA's defense that the Norris-LaGuardia
Act's basic policy against the injunction of activities of labor un-
ions would bar an injunction in this instance, because the gen-
eral provisions of the act do not apply in the face of the more
specific provisions of the RLA, which permits injunctive re-
lief.1420 Moreover, § 7(a) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not
deprive a court of jurisdiction to issue an injunction if unlawful
acts have been threatened and will be committed or continued
unless restrained, and ALPA's unlawful concerted action would
likely continue in the absence of an injunction.' 42' Finally, the
district court evaluated the four factors traditionally considered
in evaluating the propriety of injunctive relief: likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits, irreparable harm, the balance of hardships,
and the public interest; it concluded that these factors, consid-




In International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v.
Varig, S.A., Varig, S.A. appealed the decision of the district court
entering judgment in favor of sixteen former employees of
Varig, represented by the LAM, for severance pay, vacation and
sick day accruals due under a CBA. 1423 Varig, in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings in Brazil, decided to pay out the amounts due over a
ten year period, as part of its plan of reorganization. 1424 The
Second Circuit affirmed the judgment in favor of the former
employees, rejecting Varig's argument that this was a "minor dis-
pute" regarding the interpretation of the CBA over which the
National Railroad Adjustment Board has exclusive jurisdic-
tion. 1 4 25 Rather, according to the Second Circuit, this was a ma-
jor dispute because the provisions of the CBA were
"unambiguous and require[d] no contractual interpreta-
1419 Id. at *121-22.
1420 Id. at *122-25.
1421 Id. at *125-28.
1422 Id. at *127-29.
1423 302 F. App'x. 10, 11 (2d Cir. 2008).
1424 Id. at 11-12.
1425 Id. at 12.
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tion.' 14 26  Therefore, mandatory arbitration was not
required.14 27
In Silva v. Continental Airlines, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that he
had been terminated in retaliation for engaging in a union or-
ganizing drive. 14 28 Shortly before his termination, and shortly
after the plaintiff met with union representatives, he was investi-
gated for "harassment" of a co-worker overjoining the union.
The plaintiff, who was suspended without pay and ultimately ter-
minated, filed suit alleging unlawful retaliation under the RLA.
The district court denied summary judgment to the defendant
on the grounds that (1) the individuals responsible for disciplin-
ing the plaintiff knew of his union activity, (2) these same indi-
viduals made various statements that were open to an inference
of anti-union animus, and (3) the union "failed to show that it
would have taken the same action even if the [p] laintiff had not
been involved in union activity."' 4 ° Therefore, under the bur-
den-shifting methodology, originally developed under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, summary judgment was
inappropriate."4 3
In Addington v. US Airline Pilots Ass'n., the plaintiffs were a
group of pilots formerly employed by America West Airlines,
Inc. prior to a merger between America West and US Air-
ways. 1 4 3 2 The pilots brought suit against US Airways and U.S.
Airline Pilots Association (USAPA) for injunctive relief and
damages arising from the defendants' failure to implement a se-
niority list (the Nicolau Award) created as a result of binding
arbitration held in accordance with a Transition Agreement be-
tween, among other parties, the former pilots of America West
(the West Pilots) and US Airways (the East Pilots). 4 33 The se-
niority "list gave West Pilots seniority over East Pilots who were
1426 Id.
1427 Id. The Second Circuit in its decision also declined to extend comity to
the bankruptcy proceedings in Brazil, noting that there was nothing in the plan
that would prevent non-adhering post-petition creditors from pursuing claims
against Varig in foreign courts and that a permanent injunction issued in ancil-
lary bankruptcy proceedings in New York provided that post-petition creditors,
such as the employees, who chose not to adhere to the plan could assert their
rights in U.S. courts. Id.
1428 No. H-07-1248, 2008 WL 4552779, at *1 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
1429 Id.
1430 Id. at *8.
1431 Id.
1432 588 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1055-56, (D. Ariz. 2008).
1433 Id.
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on furlough at the time of the merger, gave 517 East Pilots se-
niority over all West Pilots, and [then] blended the seniority of
the West Pilots and the remaining East Pilots.' 43 4 The East Pi-
lots, dissatisfied with the Nicolau award, formed a new union,
USAPA, comprised of only East Pilots, for the primary purpose
of implementing a date-of-hire seniority list.1 35 The West Pilots
then brought "this action against USAPA and US Airways seek-
ing damages for lost wages and benefits[,] a permanent injunc-
tion requiring the parties to negotiate a single [CBA, and] a
preliminary injunction against furloughing . . West Pi-
lot s.]"' 143 6 The district court dismissed the claims against the
airline on the grounds that the dispute between the West Pilots
and the airline was a "minor dispute" under the RLA, over
which it had no jurisdiction and even if it had subject matter
jurisdiction, no preliminary injunction would be issued because
the employees had an adequate remedy and the balance of
hardships favored the airline." 37 The district court held that
the union breached its duty of fair representation, because the
union was formed for the purpose of imposing a date-of-hire
scheme on the minority membership in disregard of an arbi-
trated compromise (the Nicolau Award), causing injury to the
West Pilots.14 " There was no duty to exhaust administrative
remedies under the RLA, because the RLA provides no extraju-
dicial remedy for grievances between unions and employees
where the allegation is that the union breached its duty of fair
representation.13 9 Exhaustion of remedies was not required
under the Norris-LaGuardia Act (NLGA), because the Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that the NLGA's requirement of ex-
haustion of remedies does not apply to compel a union to per-
form its statutory duty of fair representation."" ° Nor, according
to the district court, was exhaustion of remedies required con-
tractually, as USAPA's Constitution and other internal docu-
ments did not create an internal union grievance procedure
that would have applied to this dispute."" Accordingly, the dis-
trict court ordered a bifurcation of this dispute into separate
1434 Id. at 1056-57.
1435 Id. at 1057.
1436 Id. at 1058.
1437 Id. at 1062-64.
1438 Id. at 1057.
1439 Id. at 1065-66.
1440 Id. at 1065.
1441 Id. at 1066.
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arbitration proceedings against the airline and judicial proceed-
ings against the union.1 442
In Office and Professional Employees International Union v. Air
Methods Corp., the District Court of Colorado ruled in favor of
the plaintiff unions who were seeking to enforce the decision of
a System Board of Adjustment (System Board) created under
the terms of a CBA negotiated by Air Methods, an air medical
transportation services company that employs pilots, and the
plaintiff unions. 1443 The plaintiff unions filed a grievance with
the System Board alleging that Air Methods refused to pay pilots
"who perform a workover and ultimately worked in excess of
twelve (12) hours during a workover shift in a manner consis-
tent" with the CBA.1444 "The System Board found in favor of the
unions. "1445 Air Methods refused to comply with the System
Board's award and argued that it exceeded its authority in issu-
ing its decision.'446
The district court, pursuant to the RLA, has the authority to
review a System Board decision on narrow grounds.1447 The
court upheld the award of the System Board and granted the
plaintiff unions' motion for summary judgment because (1) the
record did not demonstrate that there was any procedural irreg-
ularity which resulted in fundamental unfairness to either of the
parties 448 and (2) "the System Board's interpretation of the
CBA was not 'wholly baseless and completely without reason'
and instead could be "reconciled with a reasonable interpreta-
tion of the CBA."'1
449
In Brietigam v. United Parcel Service Co., the Western District of
Kentucky granted the plaintiff-pilot's motion to remand the case
back to state court because it determined that the question on
whether the plaintiff's state law claim is preempted by the RLA
"is a matter that the state court [could] decide." '45
The pilot originally filed a complaint in state court alleging a
wage dispute between the pilot and his former employer,
1442 Id. at 1067.
1443 No. 06-cv-02086-REB-CBS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5711, at "12-13 (D. Colo.
Jan. 24, 2008).
14 Id. at *4-5.
1445 Id. at *5.
1446 Id. at *10.
1-7 Id. at *2.
1448 Id. at *10.
1449 Id. at *11.
1450 No. 07CV-654-M, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6045, at *8 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 25,
2008).
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UPS. 14 51 UPS removed the case to federal court alleging that
the pilot's claims arise under the RLA "because they are based
on an alleged breach of the [CBA] between UPS" and the pilot's
union. 1 452 The pilot claims that his " [c] omplaint alleges only a
state law claim for wages and he" asked for the case to be re-
manded back to state court.14 53
The district court remanded the case because it found that
the state court was equipped to determine whether the claim
could proceed or be dismissed in favor of the RLA's administra-
tive procedures. 14 54
In Marcoux v. American Airlines, Inc., the Eastern District of
New York granted defendants' motion for summary judgment,
denied plaintiffs union members' motion for summary judg-
ment on plaintiffs' duty of fair representation claims and denied
plaintiffs class certification as moot.1 4 55
Plaintiff flight attendants filed claims against American Air-
lines, Inc., its affiliates, the union, and certain union officers al-
leging violations of the RLA and for breach of the duty of fair
representation.1456 Plaintiffs also asked for certification as repre-
sentatives of a class of plaintiffs. 1457 After the events of Septem-
ber 11, 2001, American Airlines requested wage concessions
from its unions. 1458 The union in this case, the Association of
Professional Flight Attendants (Union), ultimately agreed to
make certain concessions and executed new agreements with
American. 1459 The plaintiffs claimed violations of the RLA and
violation of the duty of fair representation. 14 60
The plaintiffs claimed that the amendments to the CBA vio-
lated the RLA.1461 However, the court dismissed this claim and
found that the plaintiffs, as individual employees, did not have a
private right of action under the RLA § 142 Seventh and § 152
First. 1462 Plaintiffs' claim under RLA § 152 Fourth was also dis-
1451 Id. at *2.
1452 Id.
1453 Id.
1454 Id. at *8.
1455 No. 04CV1376 (NG) (KAM), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55751, *81-82
(E.D.N.Y. Jul. 22, 2008).
1456 Id. at *1-2.
1457 Id. at *2.
1458 Id. at *5-6.
1459 Id. at *45-46.
146 Id. at *50.
1461 Id.
1462 Id. at *53, *56-58.
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missed because they "failed to show that the integrity of the
Union and its ability to bargain on the employees' behalf were
compromised by Company conduct. 1 46 3 Instead, only the
Union could claim a private right of action under the RLA.464
With respect to the duty of fair representation, the court dis-
missed those claims and found that there was no "triable issue of
fact" regarding whether the Union's conduct was "arbitrary, dis-
criminat[ing], or in bad faith.""46
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. North American Air-
lines, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Northern District of Califor-
nia's denial of the Teamster's motion for a preliminary
injunction against North American Airlines.1466 The Teamsters
initially sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief
from North American's unilateral alteration of the pilots' work-
ing conditions.1467 The Ninth Circuit found that the RLA did
not create a status quo requirement that would prohibit a car-
rier from unilaterally altering the terms and conditions of em-
ployment once negotiations toward an initial CBA had begun,
but before the agreement had been completed. 1468
North American "is a certified air carrier engaged in sched-
uled and charter passenger service, as well as service for the De-
partment of Defense." 1469 The airline employs 120 pilots. 1470
"In January 2004, the National Mediation Board certified the
[Teamsters] as the collective bargaining representative for the"
pilots and the parties began "negotiations for an initial [CBA] in
April 2004.'1 4 7 In November 2004, North American notified its
employees that it would be cutting costs due to turbulent times
facing the airline industry.4 72 In order to reduce costs, the air-
line made scheduling changes, instituted cost sharing for health
premiums and reduced senior management salaries.1 473 With
respect to the pilots, North American sought to achieve a "12-
18% reduction in its flight deck costs per block hour.'1 474 After
1463 Id. at *67.
1464 Id.
1465 Id. at *80.
1466 518 F.3d 1052, 1053 (9th Cir. 2008).
1467 Id. at 1055.
1468 Id. at 1061.
1469 Id. at 1053-54.
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discussing its plan with the Teamsters, North American decided
that the pilots were "unwilling to provide the necessary coopera-
tion for a successful overhaul of the schedule. 14 75 North Ameri-
can then made the unilateral decision to reduce pilot costs
through wage deductions. 1476 The Teamsters applied for media-
tion services with the National Mediation Board and proceed-
ings began on December 13, 2004.1477
The Teamsters filed this complaint in January 2005, after
North American's changes took effect. 4 78 The Teamsters al-
leged that North American violated its obligations under § 2,
First and Fourth of the RLA by "unilaterally altering the pilots'
rates of pay, rules, and working conditions after the parties had
commenced negotiations regarding an initial [CBA] .'1479 The
union "sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief
from any unilateral alteration to the pilots' working conditions"
and asked for a "return to the working conditions that existed
prior to the beginning of the negotiations.' 1480
The Ninth Circuit found that, because no CBA had been com-
pleted, the RLA did not impose a status quo requirement on the
employer during this pre-agreement time frame, regardless of
whether negotiations had been instituted.1481
In Earle v. NetJets Aviation, Inc., the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals refused to overturn an arbitrator's decision upholding
NetJets Aviation, Inc.'s decision to terminate Richard Earle, one
of NetJets' pilots. 482 NetJets terminated Earle after it took him
almost six hours to reach a drug-testing facility near his gateway
airport.1 483 NetJets suspended, then terminated Earle, because
it viewed the delay as a constructive refusal to submit to a drug
and alcohol test pursuant to the requirements of NetJets' Fed-
eral Aviation Administration-required Alcohol Misuse Preven-
tion Program contained within the CBA between the pilot union
and NetJets. 148 4 Under the CBA, NetJets could not terminate




1478 Id. at 1055.
1479 Id.
1480 Id.
1481 Id. at 1060.
1482 262 F. App'x. 698, 699 (6th Cir. 2008).
1483 Id. at 700.
1484 Id.
1485 Id.
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The arbitrator, after reviewing the CBA and the Alcohol Mis-
use Prevention Program, found that a violation of the drug pro-
gram could be considered 'just cause" under the CBA and
NetJets acted within its authority by terminating Earle. 14 86 The
arbitrator considered Earle's reasons for his delay, including his
claim that he had lied to NetJets on the day of the drug test and
told them that he was closer to the facility than he actually was
which resulted in increased driving time and traffic. 4 87 The ar-
bitrator also considered Earle's claim that under the CBA pilots
were only subject to drug tests after arriving at work. 1488
The sole issue in this case was whether, in resolving any legal
or factual disputes, the arbitrator was, "arguably construing or
applying the contract."'48 9 The Sixth Circuit found that there
was no evidence that the arbitrator "'was doing anything other
than trying to reach a good-faith interpretation of the contract"'
and therefore, the arbitration award must be enforced. 1490
In Naugler v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, the Eastern District of New
York dismissed an eight-count first amended complaint filed by
the plaintiff-pilots against their union, ALPA. 49 ' ALPA served
as the plaintiffs' exclusive collective bargaining representa-
tive.14 92 The plaintiffs are US Airways "pilots who agreed to work
for MidAtlantic Airways[ ] during their furlough from US Air-
ways."' 49 . They alleged that ALPA "misrepresented and con-
cealed the fact that MidAtlantic was a division of US Airways and
not a wholly-owned subsidiary, in order to 'secretly recall' them"
to US Airways without giving them the rights owed to them
under the CBA. 494 The plaintiffs claimed that ALPA breached
its duty of fair representation under the RLA and also violated
the RICO. 1
49 5
The court dismissed four of the pilots' duty of fair representa-
tion claims as time-barred under the six-month statute of limita-
1486 Id. at 701.
1487 Id.
1488 Id.
1489 Id. at 700.
1490 Id. at 702 (quoting Mich. Family Res. V. SEIU Local 517M, 475 F.3d 746,
754 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc)).
1491 No. 05-cv-4751-NG-VVP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25173, at *52 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 27, 2008).
1492 Id. at *4.
1493 Id.
1494 Id. at *5.
1495 Id.
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tions. 1 6 The court found that the plaintiffs, outside of the six-
month time frame, were provided actual notice, that the terms
of the MidAtlantic employment was negotiated without regard
to MidAtlantic's actual corporate form.1497 The court also dis-
missed as time-barred, two of the pilots' claims which alleged
that ALPA failed to submit a 2004 modification of pay rates to
the members for ratification.1498 The pilots' final duty of fair
representation claim was dismissed because the court found that
the plaintiffs knew or should have known the truth regarding
MidAtlantic and any efforts by ALPA to conceal that informa-
tion could not have caused any harm.1499
The RICO action was also dismissed because it failed to state a
claim under the RICO statute. 5 °° The court found that the
plaintiffs were obligated to provide more than "'labels and con-
clusions"' in its cause of action.' 50 '
Nonetheless, the court permitted the plaintiffs to file a sup-
plemental complaint to their first amended complaint alleging a
new violation of ALPA's fair duty of representation which alleg-
edly occurred after the filing of the amended complaint. 5 2
The plaintiffs alleged that ALPA knowingly stipulated to the in-
troduction of an erroneous seniority list during an arbitration
regarding the integration of seniority lists after the merger of
US Airways and America West Airlines, Inc. 150 1
In Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. National Labor Relations Board, the
Ninth Circuit rejected the National Labor Board's (NLRB) find-
ing that it had jurisdiction over a dispute which was properly
governed by the RLA. 5 °4
In 1990, pursuant to the RLA, ALPA was certified by the Na-
tional Mediation Board as the representative of DHL Airways pi-
lots. 1 50 5 "ALPA is the oldest and largest labor organization in
the United States" and represents airline pilots covered by the
RLA. 1 5 0 6 Its "membership includes over 62,000 pilots. '"1507 At
1496 Id. at *23.
1497 Id. at *30.
1498 Id. at *31.
14- Id. at *33.
1500 Id. at *43.
1501 Id. at *41 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556
(2007)).
1502 Id. at *51.
1503 Id. at *47.
1504 525 F.3d 862, 870 (9th Cir. 2008).
1505 Id. at 864.
1506 Id.
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the time of [this] dispute, ALPA [also] "represented approxi-
mately seventeen pilots of Ross Aviation, Inc."'15 8 Ross's "pilots
are covered by the National Labor Relations Act" (NLRA) and
"ALPA is considered a labor organization within the meaning of
the" NLRA. 150
9
DHL Airways is a subsidiary of DHL Holdings, a company in
the business of picking up, sorting and carrying documents,
small parcels, and other freight on a time-sensitive basis.
1 510
ALPA and DHL Airways entered into a CBA in 1998.1511 The
scope clause within the CBA provides that DHL Airways shall use
DHL pilots for all present and future flying for the airline. 1512 It
also provides that it will use DHL pilots to the maximum extent
possible.151 3 DHL Holdings also agreed that any of its successors
would be bound by this clause. 1514
"The DHL [companies] restructured its U.S. operations in
both March 2001 andJuly 2003. ''1515 DHL Holdings transferred
the ground operation of DHL Airways to a new subsidiary called
DHL Worldwide Express, Inc. 1516 The air operations remained
with DHL Airways.1
517
This dispute began after DHL Holdings sold its remaining
shares of DHL Airways in July 2003.1518 Following the sale, DHL
Airways was wholly owned by a group of independent investors
and its new name became ASTAR Air Cargo.15 1 1 "ASTAR and
DHL Worldwide entered into a new Aircraft, Maintenance and
Insurance Agreement with respect to the provision of freight
services. "1520 "[I]n March 2003, the parent company of DHL
Holdings announced an agreement to merge with Airborne,
Inc." who was also engaged in the business of delivering time-









1515 Id. at 864.
1516 Id.
1517 Id.
1518 Id. at 865.
1519 Id. at 864.
1520 Id.
1521 Id. at 865.
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ABX. 5 22 ABX pilots are "represented by the Teamsters and gov-
erned by the [RLA]."1523 Once the merger was complete, "ABX
became an independent company and Airborne, consisting only
of air operations, became a wholly-owned subsidiary of DHL
Holdings. ABX entered in an aircraft, maintenance and insur-
ance agreement with Airborne."'15 24
In June 2003, "ALPA sent DHL Holdings a letter [stating] that
the flying generated by the former Airborne operations would
be subject to the scope provisions of DHL Airways (now ASTAR)
CBA.' 5 25 After meeting with DHL Holdings, ALPA submitted a
grievance against DHL Holdings and DHL Worldwide alleging
violations of the CBA and requesting arbitration. 1526
DHL Holdings then filed an action against ALPA in the South-
ern District of New York [seeking] a declaratory judgment that
the [CBA] did not require that ASTAR perform future flying on
behalf of Airborne. In the alternative, DHL Holdings sought an
order that ALPA's claim over the Airborne work was a represen-
tation dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National
Mediation Board under the [RLA] .1527
ALPA responded and asked the court to submit the "dispute to
arbitration, declare that the [CBA] was in full force and effect,
and [prevent] DHL Holdings from implementing any agree-
ment with ABX [where any] flying on behalf of DHL Airways...
would be performed by non-ASTAR pilots. 1 ' 528
In September 2003, "ABX filed a Charge with the NLRB
against ALPA alleging that, by filing the grievance and attempt-
ing to force DHL Holdings not to do business with ABX, ALPA
had violated the [NLRA] .1529 The District Court action was
stayed pending resolution of ABX's Charge. '15 ° An administra-
tive law judge held a hearing on the NLRB's complaint against
ALPA and found that ALPA committed the violations al-
leged.1 53' The judge specifically found that the NLRB had juris-
diction over the matter based on ALPA's representation of the







1528 Id. at 865-66.
1529 Id. at 866.
1530 Id.
1531 Id.
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in the present dispute, were covered by the NLRA. 153 2 On re-
view, one member of the NLRB disputed the findings on the
grounds that the dispute should have been adjudicated under
the RLA, not the NLRA. 1533
The Ninth Circuit, after reviewing these facts, concluded that,
"in determining that it had jurisdiction over this dispute, the
Board misapplied" Supreme Court precedent. 153' 4 The Court
found that none of ALPA's NLRA employee members are in-
volved in this case. 1535 As a result, these facts concern ALPA's
efforts to enforce the scope clause regarding only air transporta-
tion work on behalf of only RIA covered pilots.1 536 The court
found that, "It]his is fundamentally a [RLA] dispute and, as
such, [it] is 'pro tanto, exempt from the [NLRA].' "1537
In Global Aero Logistics Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, International,
the Eastern District of New York enjoined ALPA from prosecut-
ing its grievances against plaintiffs Global Aero Logistics Inc.
and ATA Airlines, Inc. before the ATA-Pilots Association System
Board because it found that the National Mediation Board had
the exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate ALPA's grievances. 538
ATA is an airline with scheduled passenger service in the
United States and to Mexico with a fleet of 29 aircraft. 1539 ATA
is a subsidiary of Global" Aero.1540 ALPA represents ATA's pilots
and negotiated a CBA with ATA.1541 "In February 2008, ALPA
filed two grievances after" Global Aero acquired World Hold-
ings, the parent company of World Airlines and North Ameri-
can Airlines. 1542 First, ALPA claimed that under the CBA,
Global Aero's acquisition of World Airlines and North American
Airlines entitles ATA crewmembers to seniority integration and
an integrated CBA.1543 Second, ALPA alleged that World Air-
1532 Id. at 867.
1533 Id.
1534 Id. at 868.
1535 Id. at 864 (citing Brotherhood of R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal
Co., 394 U.S. 369, 376-77 (1969)).
1536 Id.
1537 Id. at 870 (quoting Jacksonville Terminal, 394 U.S. at 377)..
1538 08-CV-1845 (JG) FRER), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46621, at *1-2 (E.D.N.Y.
June 17, 2008).
1539 Id. at *2.
1540 Id. at *3.
1541 Id.
1542 Id. at *4-5.
1543 Id. at *5-6.
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lines and North American Airlines are alter egos of ATA and
Global Aero "has diverted work from ATA crewmembers."'
' 544
In April 2008, ATA filed for bankruptcy and "shut down its
flight operations [without any] advance notice to ALPA or its
pilots. ' 154 5 As a result, ALPA tried to accelerate the scheduling
of the arbitration.1546 When ATA and Global Aero would not
agree to the acceleration, "ALPA filed an adversary proceeding
... in the bankruptcy court to compel arbitration.' 1 547 The par-
ties executed a "settlement agreement" where ALPA "agreed to
dismiss the adversary proceeding in exchange for Global [Aero]
and ATA's commitment to proceed with the arbitration on dates
earlier than August. '154 The settlement agreement listed dates
for the arbitration to take place.1549 The settlement agreement
also noted that each party reserved its position on whether "the
[g]rievances should be heard together or sequentially."'' 55 0 Ad-
ditionally, the parties discussed the location of the hearing.1551
Despite the existence of the settlement agreement, ATA and
Global Aero sought an injunction which would prohibit ALPA
from prosecuting its grievances before the System Board pro-
vided for in the CBA. The court found that the grievances raise
representation issues where the National Mediation Board
(NMB), pursuant to the RLA, has exclusive jurisdiction. 1552 The
court found that the plaintiffs, by entering into the settlement
agreement, did not waive their right to judicial review of sub-
stantive arbitrability.-55 3 As a result, because the NMB had ex-
clusive jurisdiction and the plaintiffs satisfied injunctive relief
requirement, ALPA was prohibited from pursuing its grievances
through the System Board. 554
In Russell v. American Eagle Airlines, Inc., the Eastern District of
New York dismissed the amended petition of Plaintiff Oswald
Russell, a former quality control inspector for defendant Ameri-
can Eagle Airlines, Inc., a common carrier subject to the
1544 Id. at *6.
1545 Id. at *6-7.




1550 Id. at *8.
1551 Id.
1552 Id. at *13.
1553 Id. at *22.
1554 Id.
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RLA. 1555 As a quality control inspector, Russell inspected the
work of aircraft mechanics and also performed non-destructive
testing on metal at different locations. 5 56 Because of employee
shortages, Russell was often asked to work on unscheduled dates
or while he was on vacation. 1557 Although he usually worked at
JFK Airport, he was also sometimes asked to work at other air-
ports. 151 When working at JFK, Russell manually recorded his
attendance in an "exceptions log" because he could not use
American Eagle's fingerprint scanning system.1 559
In February 2006, Russell's supervisors opened an investiga-
tion into the length of his road trips to other locations.1560 After
the investigation revealed that no grounds existed for claims of
impropriety, his supervisors shifted the investigation to Russell's
time records. 156' Russell's supervisor claimed that he made false
entries into his non-destructive testing logs by recording results
for dates that he was not at work.1562 Russell was suspended and
eventually terminated.156 Russell's union filed a grievance on
his behalf which led to arbitration. 564 The arbitration board
upheld American Eagle's decision to terminate.5 6 5 Russell com-
plained that the arbitrator refused to accept into evidence "ex-
ceptions logs" that would show that he was at work on the dates
that American Eagle claimed that he was off or on vacation. 566
The court dismissed Russell's amended petition because his
allegation that the arbitrator failed to admit the "exceptions
logs" into evidence was not grounds on which the court can re-
view the arbitration award. 567 The court further noted that,
"the scope ofjudicial review of arbitration awards rendered pur-
suant to the RLA is 'among the narrowest known to the
law.' "1568 According to the court, the transcript of the arbitra-
tion hearing demonstrates that the "exception logs" were ex-
1555 07 CV 4119 (NG) (RER), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50241, at *1, *3(E.D.N.Y.
July 1, 2008).
1556 Id. at *3.
1557 Id.
1558 Id.
1559 Id. at *3-4.





1565 Id. at *5.
1566 Id. at *5-*6.
1567 Id. at *8.
1568 Id.
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cluded pursuant to the CBA and an agreement between the
parties.1569 The Board considered the plaintiffs arguments but
chose to rely on other types of evidence. 157" The court found
that as a matter of law, Russell could not claim a due process
violation because his allegations "offer no more than an attack
on the arbitrator's conclusions.' '
571
In CareFlite v. Office and Professional Employees International
Union, the Northern District of Texas found that the Office and
Professional Employees International Union's (Union) griev-
ances were minor disputes subject to mandatory and binding
arbitration as mandated by the RLA. 1572 Any attempt by the par-
ties' CBA to remove the grievances from arbitration is
unenforceable.1573
Plaintiff CareFlite is a Texas helicopter emergency medical-
transport service subject to the RLA.157' The Union represents
the helicopter pilots that work for CareFlite. 1575 CareFlite termi-
nated a helicopter pilot after he did not timely obtain an Airline
Transport Pilot Certification (Certification) which was required
under the parties' CBA. 15 76 The certification "is the highest-
level certification that a pilot can obtain but it is not required by
the FAA.115 77 The CBA stated that a termination because of a
pilot's failure to obtain a timely certification is non-grievable
and non-arbitrable. 5 78 The Union filed a grievance alleging
that the pilot should have been given additional time to obtain
certification. 1579 The arbitrator reinstated the pilot and ordered
him to take and pass any required examinations. 158  Almost a
year after his termination, the pilot was reinstated. 1581 Under
the CBA, the pilot would have to obtain certification within
three weeks after his reinstatement. 5 2 The Union asked for ad-
ditional time to obtain certification due to the time lost because
1569 Id. at *9.
1570 Id. at *12.
1571 Id. at *12.
1572 No. 4:07-CV-334-Y, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57684, at *21-22 (N.D. Tex. July
30, 2008).
1573 Id. at *22.
1574 Id. at *2-3.
1575 Id. at *2.
1576 Id. at *6.
1577 Id. at *5 n. 3.
1578 Id. at *4-*5.
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of the pilot's previous unjust discharge. 583 CareFlite refused
the request and the Union filed a grievance alleging that CareF-
lite would not give the pilot adequate time to obtain certifica-
tion. 15 84 After the three weeks passed, CareFlite terminated the
pilot and the Union filed another grievance. 1585 The Union de-
nied both grievances and stated that the CBA provisions made
the pilot's termination non-grievable and non-arbitrable. 1586
The Union appealed to a System Board of Adjustment and
CareFlite filed a declaratory action in federal court seeking a
ruling that the System Board lacked jurisdiction. 158 7
The court found that the RLA mandatory procedures for han-
dling minor disputes, such as this one, cannot be altered by a
CBA.158 8 The court further noted that the "Union's grievances
involve minor disputes because they involve the interpretation
of an existing CBA between the parties. 1 589 Because Congress
intended that the arbitration procedures under the RLA to be
the ultimate means for settling small disputes, any provision in
the CBA attempting to exclude the Union's grievances from ar-
bitration is unenforceable. 1590
In Hastings v. Wilson, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a lower
court's decision dismissing an Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act (ERISA) class action lawsuit brought by employees of
Northwest Airlines, Inc. 591 The plaintiffs brought breach of fi-
duciary duty claims against the alleged fiduciaries of two sepa-
rate pension plans. 51 2
The district court found, and the appellate court agreed, that
the ERISA action regarding the first pension plan was subject to
the RLA mandatory arbitration provision which divested the fed-
eral court of subject matter jurisdiction.1 593 The court rejected
the plaintiffs' claim that Congress did not intend the RLA's
mandatory arbitration provision to apply to ERISA claims. 1594
The court stated that the RLA's mandatory arbitration provision
1583 Id. at *7.
1584 Id.
1585 Id.
1586 Id. at *7-8.
1587 Id. at *8.
1588 Id. at *16.
1589 Id. at *20.
1590 Id. at *21-22.
1591 516 F.3d 1055, 1058 (8th Cir. 2008).
1592 Id. at 1058.
1593 Id. at 1059.
1594 Id.
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applies to ERISA claims if the pension plan is a CBA or is main-
tained pursuant to a CBA1 595 The plaintiffs did not dispute that
the pension plan was maintained pursuant to CBAs. 1596 The
court also found that this dispute was a minor dispute subject to
arbitration under the RLA.1597 With respect to the second pen-
sion plan, the court found that the plan representatives did not
have standing to bring suit because they were not participants,
beneficiaries, or fiduciaries of the plan.1598
In Hedman v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., the District Court of Min-
nesota dismissed the ERISA claims ofJan Hedman, a former em-
ployee of defendant Northwest Airlines, Inc. 1599 The court
dismissed Hedman's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion and found that the RILA mandated that the claim be subject
to arbitration.1 60 0
Hedman stopped working for Northwest Airlines due to a dis-
ability. 60 1 After Hedman was no longer able to work, he filed
for disability benefits under Northwest's pension plan. 160 2 In
December 2005, Northwest denied the claim.160 3 In April 2007,
Hedman filed his complaint alleging that Northwest's decision
violated ERISA.1 60 4 The court found that the pension plan was
subject to the RILA's mandatory arbitration provision because it
was maintained pursuant to the CBA between Northwest and
Hedman's union. 60 5 Therefore, this dispute was a minor dis-
pute subject to the RLA's arbitration requirement. 160 6 The
court also stated that it lacked the subject matter jurisdiction
necessary to force Northwest to arbitrate the claim and toll the
expired arbitration deadline. 6
0 7
In Carmona v. Southwest Airlines Co., the Fifth Circuit reversed
the district court's dismissal of a male flight attendant's (Car-




1598 Id. at 1060.
1599 Civ. No. 07-1847-ADM/RLE, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32717, at *1 (D. Minn.
Apr. 21, 2008).
1600 Id. at *7.
1601 Id. at *1.
1602 Id. at *2.
1603 Id.
1-4 Id. at *2-3.
1 65 Id. at *7.
1606 Id.
1607 Id. at *9.
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employer, Southwest Airlines Co. 608 The district court claimed
that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the em-
ployee's claims because his employment was governed by a CBA
and thus, his claims were subject to adjudication under the
RLA. 16 °9 The appeals court disagreed and remanded the claims,
because the suit did not require an interpretation of the CBA
and was not precluded from judicial review. 161 0
The CBA contained attendance provisions which assigned a
point system to absences. 161 Employees who were assessed over
twelve points were subject to termination. 6 12 Under the point
system, Carmona had was terminated for excessive absences. 61 3
Carmona took absences for illness which were not considered
excused absences. 1614 Carmona alleged that he was assessed at-
tendance points and denied medical leave where similarly situ-
ated female flight attendants were not assessed points or were
granted medical leave and were not terminated for exceeding
twelve points. 161 5 Carmona also claimed that Southwest discrim-
inated against him because of his "disability. 1 61 6 Carmona al-
leged that the CBA procedures were applied in a discriminatory
fashion, not that the procedures were fundamentally discrimina-
tory. 16 17 As a result, the appellate court found that Carmona's
claims did not require the interpretation of the CBA and the
district court did have jurisdiction to hear the claims.1618
In Bate v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local Union
1108, the Southern District of Ohio dismissed the claims of the
plaintiff-employee's claims against NetJets Aviation, Inc., the In-
ternational Brotherhood of Teamsters Local Union 1108 (the
Union), and the president of the Union. 619 The plaintiff
claimed that the Union breached its duty of fair representation;
NetJets and the Union breached the CBA, that the Union
breached an implied contract with the plaintiff, and that the
Union president is personally liable for the alleged breaches by
1608 536 F.3d 344, 345 (5th Cir. 2008).
16o- Id. at 347.
1610 Id.
161, Id. at 345.
1612 Id.




1617 See id. at 348.
1618 Id. at 351.
1619 No. 2:08-cv-100, 2008 WL 3008976, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 1, 2008).
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the Union.1620 The dispute began after the plaintiff was re-
moved from the Union maintained electronic message board lo-
cated on the Union's website. 162  The plaintiff claimed that
Union members posted sexually harassing messages about plain-
tiff on the message board. 16 22 Plaintiff complained to the Union
and to NetJets and they did not address the matter. 1623 The
Union also claimed that plaintiff violated the terms of the mes-
sage board by posting strong dissatisfaction with the proposed
terms of the amendments to the CBA. 1624 Eventually, Plaintiff
was permanently expelled from the message board. 16 25
The court dismissed plaintiff's fair representation claim
against the Union because it concerned his relationship with the
Union and not his relationship with NetJets.'6 2 6 As a result,
there was no duty of fair representation.1 627 The court dis-
missed plaintiff's claim that NetJets breached the CBA because
the court lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to hear the
claims because it was a minor dispute preempted by the RLA
and under its exclusive jurisdiction.1621
Similarly, the court dismissed plaintiff's claim that the Union
breached an implied contract to address the inappropriate com-
ments on its website because it could only have a basis in a state
law action. 16 29 The court found that a claim for breach of the
CBA against the Union could only have a basis in a pendent
state law claim and because all of the federal claims were being
dismissed, the court declined to hear those claims. 1630 With re-
spect to the president of the Union, the court dismissed the
claims because breach of the duty of fair representation was
made against bargaining representatives, not against individual
union members or officers.' 63 '
1620 Id. at *3.





1626 Id. at *5.
1627 Id.
1628 Id. at *7.
1629 Id. at *8.
1630 Id.
1631 Id. at *9.
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F. WAGE AND HOUR
In Blackwell v. SkyWest Airlines, Inc., the plaintiff, was employed
by SkyWest Airlines, Inc. as a Cross-Utilized Agent, responsible
for ticketing and boarding assistance, baggage handling and lo-
cation, marshaling aircraft into and out of gates, and coordinat-
ing operations between other agents, air traffic control, and the
airplanes.1 632 She filed suit against her former employer for
multiple violations of California's wage and hour laws.1 633
SkyWest sought summary judgment or, in the alternative, sum-
mary adjudication on eighteen separate issues of law and
fact. 63 4 The district court denied the motion for summary judg-
ment and denied in part and granted in part the motion for
summary adjudication. 163 15  More specifically, on plaintiffs
claims that she was not paid for every hour she worked, the dis-
trict court denied summary adjudication, as issues of fact re-
mained. 6 6 As for plaintiffs claim that SkyWest failed to pay
her overtime in violation of California's state wage and hour law,
the district court held SkyWest was exempt from state overtime
claims under state law, which creates an exemption for employ-
ers who have entered into a CBA in accordance with the
RLA 1 6 3 7 The district court further held that plaintiffs claims
for violations of California law relating to overtime, meal time,
and rest time were preempted by the RLA because they involved
the interpretation of a CBA, even if they also implicated state
laws, and were thus "minor disputes" under the RLA. 163 8 The
district court also concluded that plaintiffs claims under Cali-
fornia law relating to the provision of rest and meal times were
also preempted by the ADA, because they would have the force
and effect of regulating SkyWest's services, prices, and
routes. 6 9 The district court denied the airline's motion for
1632 No. 06cv0307 DMS (AJB), 2008 U.S. Dist LEXIS 97955, at *2 (S.D. Cal.
Dec. 3, 2008).
1633 Id. at *1.
1634 Id.
1635 Id. at *2.
1636 Id. at *14-15.
1637 Id. at *27. In reaching this determination, the district court concluded
that the agents' representative, SAFA, was a "representative" under the RLA. Id.
at *17-25. The district court further concluded that written policies called "Stan-
dard Practices," which governed the terms and conditions of plaintiffs employ-
ment, constituted a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at *25-27.
1638 Id. at *42.
1639 Id. at *53-*54. The district court concluded that plaintiff provided a "ser-
vice" to passengers because part of her duties involved marshaling flights into
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summary adjudication on its claimed right to offset some
$15,000 in travel benefits against plaintiffs claims because
SkyWest did not possess an enforceable claim for repayment of
those benefits. 640 The district court also denied SkyWest's re-
quest for summary adjudication on plaintiffs claim for "waiting
time penalties" under California law, which imposes penalties
for willful failure to pay wages due at termination, because dis-
putes of fact remained whether the failures were "willful. u 641 Fi-
nally, the district court held that plaintiffs claims under
California's Unfair Business Practices Act were preempted by
the ADA.
1 64 2
boarding gates, inspecting and documenting damage to aircraft and coordinat-
ing activity between air traffic control, the aircraft and the agents, and her claims
relating to mandatory rest and meal times under California law would impact the
provision of those services. Id. at *48-49. State law mandatory rest and meal
times would also affect prices and routes because the additional labor costs would
increase prices and reduce or eliminate routes. Id. at *53-54.
1640 Id. at *55-*57.
1641 Id. at *57-59.
1642 Id. at *59.
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